

Manufacturing writing in English

I: Formal academic writing

SCRIPTA DE COMMUNICATIONE POSNANIENSI

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Manufacturing writing in English

I: Formal academic writing

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"The maker of a sentence launches out into the infinite and builds a road into Chaos and old Night, and is followed by those who hear him with something of wild, creative delight".

(RALPH WALDO EMERSON)

"Either write something worth reading, or do something worth writing".

(BENJAMIN FRANKLIN)

"Communicating our written work to an outside audience is both a challenge and a delight".

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Introduction

It is commonplace to say that the most advanced communication system encountered on Earth, the human communication system, involves the use of two major channels, the auditory-vocal channel, used in spoken communication, and the visual-tactile channel used in written (or graphic) communication. In the course of human civilization, in particular of Western civilization, written communication has evolved to great social significance and has finally comprised a diversified number of guises, ranging from personal letters, brief notes and squibs to literary and poetic writing, to various formal texts such as a rich variety of legal texts, various media texts and academic writing. It is a well known fact that the most advanced nations in the Western hemisphere have willingly and most amply exercised the power of expression by a rich assortment of written (and graphic) means thus preserving and further developing their languages. English is an instance of such a language that has enjoyed the presence and continuous development of its written manifestations at least since the first known written English sentence (whose present-day version runs as follows: "The she-wolf is a reward to my kinsmen", an Anglo-Saxon runic inscription placed on a gold medalion, found in Suffolk and dating back to about A.D. 450-480). Since that time, the English language community has produced an extremely varied and rich bulk of writing, as documented both in hand-written incunables and countless many printed resources that have been accumulated in library stocks all over the world.

The present collection of written materials is limited in scope, for it has been designed to serve as a practical illustration of present-day written English in the area of one type of writing, formal academic writing. This type of writing belongs to a very specific and highly technical area

of written communication which is clearly an important manifestation of the power of English as a language of international communication in general, and of written (or graphic) academic discourse in particular, owing to its recent spread on a global scale. The various forms of academic writing presented in this collection, authored by experts working in various areas of scientific endeavour, have been gathered here with the aim of providing assistance to the students of advanced courses of written English communication in their efforts to build communicative written competence by helping them to become successful and comfortable scientific writers.

The ability to communicate with others, both in spoken and written modes of expression, permeates through and affects every area of our private and professional lives. Therefore, the need to become skillful communicators in formal academic written English is not only important but has also become an urgent task for university graduates, since many of them go on to a great variety of professional careers, where communication skills, especially in the area of written communication, are of the essence. Subsequently, the present compiler expresses his deep conviction that the university graduates who seek careers in such areas as teaching, research, publishing, the media, counseling, administration, business, management, advertising, librarianship and public relations, should be particularly interested in acquainting themselves with advanced written communication skills in English, since it is rather hard to imagine that an educated transnational, translinguistic and transcultural communicator would not be able to demonstrate and maintain sufficient prowess in the domain of written academic English as today's major globalizing language.

All the samples of formal academic writing in English contained in the present collection have been grouped into five sections representing appropriate categories. Subsequently, the following categories have been proposed: theoretical papers, experimental papers, general audience scientific papers, reviews and review articles, and academic miscellanea of which two forms, book notices and editorials, have been presented. In each category, samples have been selected to illustrate it. In addition, each sample of academic writing has been organized into appropriate sections which conform to the general organizational schema whose specifics are presented at the beginning of each category. In this way, students of advanced courses of written English communication have not only been provided with an opportunity of getting involved in a practical inspection of the various samples of authentic scientific papers and

other forms of academic writing but have also been invited to get acquainted with the anatomy, or functional architecture, of this kind of written communication in English, and in this way really enjoy the flavour of academic writing in English.

Summing up, if one wishes to communicate successfully and comfortably in a context which requires the use of formal academic writing in English, one should try to apply the following very basic rules in manufacturing this type of communication:

- be aware of the overwhelmingly informative nature and power of formal academic writing,
- be aware of the functions of the structural elements of the particular type of academic writing one wants to use,
- write clearly and unambiguously,
- be aware of the need to carefully structure what one writes,
- take full responsibility for the overall content and for all the lexical, grammatical and stylistic choices made in the text.

In preparing the present collection of texts I have relied in editorial matters on the assistance of Elwira Wilczyńska to whom I address my sincere words of gratitude.

Stanisław Puppel
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Theoretical papers

1. The structure of a theoretical paper

A theoretical paper usually has a rigid structure and contains a number of parts, such as the following:

- title of the paper
- name(s) of the author(s)
- their affiliation (optional)
- their addresses (optional)
- abstract (optional)
- keywords (optional)
- internal division into sections (usually numbered) which include:
 - o introduction
 - o sections (their number is not fixed and varies from paper to paper) where the gist of the paper is discussed
 - o conclusion
 - o paragraphs
 - o diagrams and figures (optional but numbered obligatorily)
 - o quotations (optional)
 - o bibliography (or references, where the particular entries may be optionally numbered, including the Internet sources)
 - o annexes (optional)
 - o acknowledgements (optional; presented before or after the bibliography /reference part).

2. Samples of theoretical papers

Sample nr 1

The structure of the paper

Title of the paper

Building social capital in virtual learning communities

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ABSTRACT. Social capital is a significant value-added to learning in virtual learning environments. It is created when learners interact with each other in the community, by exchanging rich and thoughtful experiences among themselves through storytelling. Little research has focused on how this stock of capital is valued in virtual environments. The goal of this paper is to describe how social capital is created, singling out trust as basis for building social capital in virtual learning environments. The paper argues that storytelling can be a protocol for the exchange of experiences, which in turn can be avenue for the cultivation of trust. Trust is then an enabler of social capital. The paper is organized as follows. First the concept of virtual learning community is examined. This leads into the description of the essential elements of virtual learning community. Second, the paper describes how social capital is grounded on trust and this is presented through a process model. The rest of the paper will then discuss this model and the significance of social capital in virtual communities.

Internal division into numbered sections

1. Introduction

The impact of new technologies on society and the sweeping corresponding influences on education and training systems, has led into the emergence of ubiquitous learning environments, distributed learning environments and virtual learning communities. More specifically, the technologies of the Internet and the World Wide Web have come to support an infrastructure that promotes interaction in distributed learning environments and formation of virtual communities. Key to the existence of these communities is communication and social interaction in cyberspace. The interaction through communication that computer technologies enable in virtual and distributed learning communities can stimulate knowledge sharing, leading to collaboration and creation of social capital, which is a vital stock of capital in knowledge communities. However, little is known about whether or not virtual communities add value to the learning process. Schwier (2001) suggests that one of the future research directions in virtual learning communities should investigate what value administrators, educators, and learners place on virtual learning communities.

Furthermore, virtual community literature shows little on whether social capital, a stock of capital that resides within relationships of individuals in physical communities, also exists in virtual learning communities. The goal of this paper is to examine the value of social capital, which is basically accrued from social interaction and knowledge exchange in virtual communities. Through a process model, the paper shows how storytelling facilitates the creation of social capital in these environments. But first, the concept of virtual learning community is examined. This leads into a description of the essential elements of virtual learning community. Second, the paper describes how social capital is grounded on trust through periodic social interaction within particular social contexts. This is presented in form of a model and then the rest of the paper will discuss this model and the significance of social capital in virtual communities.

2. Virtual learning communities

Etzioni (1993) defines community as a web of affect-laden relationships among a group of individuals. Relationships criss-cross and reinforce one another (as compared to one-on-one or chainlike individual

relationships). This definition suggests that any community is committed to a set of shared values, norms, and meanings, through a shared history, and identity within a particular culture. In traditional society, communities are evoked by geographical closeness for instance; villages, neighbourhoods, and towns are natural occurrence of terrestrial communities. The foundation of community might even be organisational as in the case of churches, schools, and clubs (Rheingold, 1993, Smith and Kollock; 1997; Croon, Erik and Agren, 2000). By contrast a virtual community is a social network, a group of people who are trying to achieve something through the use of technology. These communities are emergent and are mainly determined by their interconnectivity by computer technologies and associated media. A virtual community can be any aggregation of individuals who are interested in making connections among themselves through new technologies to achieve certain goals.

Virtual communities are global in nature and their presence never requires shared physical and temporal space, but rather they are global in terms of time and space. These communities have been the features of the Internet since its inception. People of similar interests team up and they form groups virtually regardless of geographical locations and time constraint. These people often form communities to share ideas and goals (Schwier, 2001). In addition another aspect, which characterizes communities, is the nature of social interaction among members of the community (Nichani, 2000). It is the nature of social interactions that sustain these communities and in the case of virtual learning communities; it is the sharing of knowledge, which sustains their very existence. Communities contain individuals who form relationships, and who have sense of a group membership within the group.

While the generic definition of virtual communities as collections of individuals who are bound together by common interests, what actually constitutes a virtual learning community has been a subject of debate. Many researchers stress that in practice any virtual community has one or more elements of learning (McCalla, 2000; Schwier, 2001). Wenger (1998; 2001) made a distinction between communities of interests and communities of practice by pointing out that any group that shares interests online can be referred to as a community. However, this is different from community of interests as he argued: a community of practice is a particular kind with members focusing on a domain of knowledge, and over time members accumulate expertise in this domain through exchange of knowledge and experiences. They develop shared practice by interacting around problems, solutions, and insights, and building

a common store of knowledge. Such a community draws members to engage in similar practices in similar language and interests, and to share experiences methods and techniques. Membership in these forms of communities is very cohesive and involves engagement in a collective process that creates a bond among the members. Wenger illustrate this by referring to work teams, who can share tacit knowledge.

Virtual learning communities emerge over time as members interact and negotiate (Schwier, 2001; Dugage, 2002) so they are products of social interaction. In some cases, rules of practice and engagement emerge, which binds people together into a social body. These rules might also change over time as members interact with each other. This suggests that communities have life cycles, they emerge and cannot be created, however, they can be can be destroyed.

3. Essential elements of virtual learning communities

A virtual community is a social entity formed out of social interaction in cyberspace. When people relate to each other through the use of technology, whether based on interests or certain goals, they tend to form a community. However, the literature on virtual community demonstrates no agreement on what constitutes a virtual learning community. The concept ranges from virtual community networks (Rheingold, 1993, Smith and Kollock; 1997; Croon, Erik and Agren, 2000) based on interests, virtual learning communities of relationships, place, ideas, reflection and ceremony (Schwier, 2001); to communities of practice in the corporate (Wenger, 1998, 2001).

Though there are various definitions of virtual community, they share common elements. For instance, every community has a unique language and culture (McCalla, 2000). Language is the communication infrastructure of a community. It is an avenue in which members negotiate meaning, understand each other and build common vocabulary around their interests and goals. In fact, a culture in virtual community does not equate with natural human culture, (but rather a repetitive way of doing things unique to a community). This can be the way in which a community recruits its new members, socialise with each other and solve problems of individuals or those that relate to the community in general.

Besides language and culture, every community maintains a hospitable environment for its members. Hospitality is an essential element of any virtual learning community. It encourages togetherness and pro-

notes participation. Active participation of members in virtual communities accounts for community sustainability and continuity (Schwier, 2001). In addition, closely associated with membership is the sense of shared identity among individuals in virtual community. To some degree virtual community members identify themselves with the community's mission, values and norms. Identity can also emerge from sharing common history. As Schwier (2001) noted, effective communities share common history, culture and identity. Connected with the above elements of virtual communities, the existence and continuity of a virtual community depends heavily on social interaction, and social interaction is created around commitment, trust and values embedded within social relationships of the individuals.

In a virtual learning community, members share a common repertoire of resources: experiences, stories, methods and tools for solving problems. Members in these communities discuss new ideas; assist each other in keeping up with current information related to their practices for example. This also promotes shared identity among them because discussion is organized around subjects of interest that matter to members.

4. Knowledge construction in virtual learning communities

There are various forms of knowledge-generating activities in virtual learning communities. These range from interaction to solving problems together to exchanging experiences and sharing of gossips through storytelling and socialization. Such interactions are made possible by a wide range of technological tools, such as email, chat rooms, discussion boards, collaborative review of documents, application sharing, code sharing, and web tours tools.

The process of knowledge sharing and exchange in virtual learning communities requires collaboration. In virtual learning environments, learning activities are structured to promote knowledge negotiation among learners towards the creation of new body of knowledge.

Congruent with constructivist theory, learners in virtual learning communities are responsible for their own learning. This suggests that learners need to be stimulated to remain highly engaged in the learning process. In addition, in collaborative virtual learning environments learners actively search for information, engage in critical discussion, ask questions, discuss answers, make proposals and reply to other proposals (Veerman, 2000).

The knowledge negotiation process in these communities entails an exchange of experiences exchanged through storytelling. Storytelling can be effective techniques for conveying information in a compelling and memorable way. Neal (2002) noted that storytelling remains an important mode through which individuals and cultures communicate. When learners share experiences, their engagement can be high after all they share common problems and seek for common solutions to the problems. In virtual learning environments when people of similar experiences exchange stories they are likely to build a rapport and special bond that connects them together regardless of their adverse differences. In these learning environments, learners carry their expectations prior experiences and knowledge with them, and learn by relating stories they hear to their own experiences.

Indeed, stories are important cognitive events of a particular pedagogical value because they encapsulate in one rhetorical package, four of the crucial elements of human communication: information, knowledge, context, and emotion (Norman, 1993; Neal 2002).

Stories usually emerged from experiences. Narrating experiences through storytelling encourages the process of building trust. Trust begins when learners are able to identify with those with whom they share similar experiences, create their own learning and contribute their experiences to the group. Learning by relating experiences also allows learners to build a knowledge base by relating theory to practice. This argument is promoted in the case based learning, where learners read a case or listen to a story and apply problem-solving techniques to it. Case based learning applied in corporate work setting promotes case based reasoning, but it is beyond the scope of this paper to go into further details on these approaches.

However it is worthwhile to note that in virtual learning environments, learners bring to the discussion prior knowledge, experiences and personal beliefs and values. This implies that related experiences have an impact on how learners contribute to the process of knowledge negotiation and construction. As Stahl (1999) noted, people become aware of the world through entering into a mysterious social interaction, and they bring their own experiences and observation into the activity i.e. learning starts on the basis of tacit pre-understanding. Learners will benefit greatly if they can learn from each other and draw on their rich distinct experiences. This means they need to value relationships and differences as value-added into the discussion.

5. Social capital in virtual communities

Social capital refers to the stock of social trust, norms and networks that people can draw upon to solve common problems. While physical capital refers to physical objects, and human capital refers to properties of individuals such as knowledge, social capital implies connections among individuals and the value accrued from this connection. It consists of social networks and norms of reciprocity and the trust that arises from social interaction.

There are two levels for defining social capital. For instance, the definition of social capital provided by the World Bank emphasizes institutional connections on macro level. According to the World Bank, *social capital refers to the institutions, relationships, and norms that shape the quality and quantity of social interactions. In this view, social capital is not only the sum of the institutions, which underpins the society; it is the glue that holds them together* (The World Bank, 1999). *On the micro-level, social capital is a stock of active connections among people: the trust, mutual understanding, and shared values and behaviours that bind people, the members of human networks and communities and make co-operative action possible* (Cohen and Prusak 2001).

There are many social networks in which social capital resides. Few of these are networks of civic engagement, associations, clubs and co-operatives, neighbourhoods, and virtual communities. In fact, the notion of social capital suggests an abstract hidden resource, which can be accumulated, tapped, attained when people value relationships among each other, interact, collaborate, learn and share ideas. This is a value-laden stock of capital. Productive resources can reside not just in things but also in social relations among people (Coleman, 1988; Putnam, 1993). Resnick (2002) argues that social capital is a residual side effect of social interaction and the enabler of future interactions. In some traditional African societies, social capital is seen as a principle resourceful stock for community development. For instance, in those societies where farming is the main activity, farmers can exchange tools and labour. Labour exchange and the willingness to do so are based on reciprocal relationships of giving and taking. These practices foster sturdy norms of generalized reciprocity, by creating the expectations that a favour given now will be returned tomorrow. The implication is that past collaboration is the basis for future collaboration, and refusal to take or give increases one's chances of being sanctioned or even removed from the society. Hence social capital is essential for both personal and community development in those societies.

Today in most virtual communities, for example, virtual help-centres, people are motivated to help each other not because of financial returns associated with such practices but a social desire to help, and by possible reciprocal expectations of social appreciation. Kim (2001) suggested that most people provide help in virtual communities in order to get personal satisfaction from contributing to the community and an 'ego boost' from enhancing their reputations. They also view their participation as an effective way to raise their visibility within the community. There are a number of virtual learning communities that are dedicated to helping; for instance novice computer programmers get advice and help from veteran programmers who spend hours each day helping people whom they value as newcomers to programming. They do these not because they expect some financial gain, nor because they know their helpees. Rather they do it mainly for social reasons. Perhaps they deem novice programmers as potential programmers and newcomers who can greatly benefit from accumulated knowledge of veteran programmers. Such line of reasoning is directly related to situated cognition, in which newcomers are often socialized or initiated to the community's norms and values and learning is approached as an apprenticeship. In this kind of learning the continuity and willingness to learn and to be guided or taught, is dependent on the relationship between the mentor and the mentee, the learner and the teacher or the new timer and the veteran.

These relationships encourage informal knowledge exchange, the creation of social networks, participation in on-line discussion, peer tutoring and computer-supported teamwork, collaborative learning processes, self-assessment and reflection, and peer assessment are all within these processes.

6. Building social capital on trust

If social capital inculcates value to communities and has high returns to individuals and communities, what builds social capital? Trust is an enabler of social capital. It is a subjective degree of belief that nurtures understanding among members of a community. It promotes a sense of reliability and social security among its members (Abdul-Rahman, and Hailes, 2000). Earlier proponents of social capital, such as Fukuyama (1995) noted that there is a direct relationship between trust and social capital. Fukuyama distinguishes between high trust and lower trust societies. His main argument is that high trust societies tend to develop

high social capital and subsequently they enjoy high economic development than low trust societies. This argument also suggests that high trust groups and cultures also accumulate greater social capital (Sirianni and Friedland, 1995).

The concept of trust is relevant to virtual communities. It acts as a binding factor that glues people together in virtual learning communities. It is based on relationships, and is often the core principle of virtual learning community. Trust is one of the essential lubricants to social activities, allowing people to work and live together without generating a constant flurry of conflict and negotiations (Cohen and Prusak 2001). People come to cultivate trust after realising that they share common stories or experiences.




Figure 1. Virtual learning community/community of Practice

Individuals in most virtual learning environments are characterized by high variation in training, language and culture. The diversity of these individuals is likely to affect they way they interact especially when they do not use the same language or use common vocabulary. However, through sharing of experiences or telling stories of common interests, individual identify with each other and build trust. In the long run, this trust can facilitate the development of social capital, which can be of value to the group and the individuals. Cohen and Prusak (2001) state that through relationships, communities, cooperation, and mutual commitment become the essential elements of social capital and these elements are built upon trust. Trust between individuals includes trust be-

tween strangers and trust of social institutions; ultimately trust becomes a shared set of values, virtues and expectations. It seems trust enables people to build communities, to commit themselves to each other and form a social fabric, which in turn is useful to both the community and the individual members of that community.

However, trust may take long time to cultivate. As Nichani (2001) puts it, there is no thing as instant trust. Trust takes time and space to develop. Trust grows as a result of exposure to one another, and sharing experiences, whether success or failures, shared experiences provide a critical avenue for building trust. Relationships built on trust cannot be hurried. They are not developed over night but rather grow exponentially through time, space and social interaction. The proceeding figure presents a gradual process in which social capital through social interaction builds trust based on two factors: time and space.

7. Discussion

There are varied connotations and overtones on the concept of virtual community. Much of the research has mainly dealt with the basic perspective, mainly trying to understand the purpose and nature of virtual communities. This has led into many definitions ranging from virtual communities, virtual learning communities and communities of practice. Even if there are many definitions of this concept, different definitions of virtual communities share many elements in common. For instance, any virtual community involves learning of some sort (Wilson and Ryder, 1998; McCalla, 2000; Schwier, 2001). The fact that virtual communities are formed out of individuals, who are interested in reaching common goals, implies that they can constantly learn from each other's experiences. Learning in any context at any time is also consistent with situated learning theory and sociocultural theory of learning (Clancey, 1997). Learning in a situated activity builds on the process of legitimate peripheral participation as described by (Wenger, 1998, Driscoll, 2000). In legitimate peripheral participation, learners inevitably participate in communities of practitioners and that the mastery of knowledge and skill requires newcomers to move toward full participation in the socio-cultural practices of a community. Legitimate peripheral participation provides a way to speak about the relations between newcomers and veterans, and about activities, identities, artifacts, and communities of knowledge and practice (Lave and Wenger, 1991).

Learning takes place in a social and physical context (Vygotsky, 1978).

'A situated learning environment provides an authentic context that reflects the way the knowledge will be used in real-life(physical context) that preserves the full context of the situation without fragmentation and decomposition, that invites exploration and allows for the natural complexity of the real world' (Brown, et al., 1989). Key components of the situated learning include stories, reflection, and articulation of learning skills, cognitive apprenticeship, collaboration, coaching, multiple practice and technology (McLellan, 1996).

This paper argues that all these theories apply to learning in virtual communities, because virtual communities do not only consist of merely individuals who gather in one place in a particular time. Virtual communities are social entities built around social interaction. It is the people not the space in which they interact that form the community. If virtual communities are more less the same as physical communities, then definitely they have implicit value. One of these values is social capital. Little is known about how social capital develops in virtual learning communities, and whether or not there is such thing as social capital in learning communities. This paper argues that social capital exist in virtual learning communities. It argues that social capital in these communities develops periodically and permeates the community through trust. Trust is the driving element to the development of social capital.

Central to the process of developing trust in virtual learning communities is relating experiences through storytelling. Learning through storytelling makes learners relate individual experiences to the shared task and participants build common ties, interests and history and common identity along their experiences and coexist together. They will also possibly come to understand individual differences. Collaboration develops, especially when diverse members discover that they share common experiences and can confide on one another. Cohen and Prusak (2001) state that what ties community of practice is the aspect of social capital. People are willing to co-operate, share, help, and support with their views, opinions, feedback, and experience because they can trust each other and believe and a share common cause within a community of practice.

8. Conclusion

Community networks, virtual learning communities, communities of practice, all are conglomerations of individuals, who aggregate mainly to share common ideas, pursue common interests and goals in cyberspace.

These individuals make use of information technologies to connect and relate to each other, because they need one another to reach their goals. These can be goals for building knowledge, goals for socialization, goals for learning, and goals for solving pressing problems that require more than one person to solve. Central to the functioning of these communities is mutual support built on mutual understanding, the need to reciprocate in order to sustain membership and friendships and avoidance of social sanctions.

There are also requirements based on various needs, for instance, the need to:

- Work together and build a unique identity of individuals and organizations.
- Form a strong political body that for some political or legal reasons cannot operate in physical locations, that is the need to protest against the status quo, the need to maintain the status quo.
- Collaborate with one another today in order to obtain aid from others tomorrow.
- Be heard and be visible from invisible physical scene.
- Work together to produce better products and services in order to compete in the turbulent business markets.
- Advertise and sell products and services and expand market shares.
- Improve collaboration and knowledge distribution among employees and learners.
- Strengthen relationships with customers and trade partners.
- Solve problems in just-in-time fashion when individuals are geographically distributed and reduce the cost of transportation.
- Seek for affection and love that is denied in physical environments.
- Collaborate and exchange research findings between academic, corporate and government researchers working in the same research areas and the need to avoid duplication of research projects geared towards solving the same problem.
- Learn from each other's experiences to enable group and personal growth.
- Even the simple need to exchange gossips and popular 'cheap talks' for mere psychic satisfaction.
- The various needs of neediness to be not to be, are essentially the reasons to form connections in cyberspace.

The above needs are prominent factors that trigger individuals to form networks and communities, both physical and virtual. This indicates that there is some value accrued from being a member of a virtual community. This value is derived from social interaction and can be measured in terms

of social capital. But social capital is a residue of social interaction in virtual learning communities. The process involve in its creation requires trust as a main element. This element can be built through time and space and it cannot be cultivated quickly. But it is a process of social relations best attained through exposure to experiences that can be narrated by individuals who can share and learn from these experiences.

Future research will look into the development of measurable parameters that constitute social capital in virtual learning environments.

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Sample nr 2

The structure of the paper

Title of the paper

Writing about cool: teaching hypertext as juxtaposition

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ABSTRACT. This article takes as its departure point the near simultaneous work on notions of cool, technology, and composition in 1963, to begin discussion on how the juxtaposition of these moments can lead to an electronic rhetoric. Based on classroom work done at the University of Florida in two courses entitled “Writing About Cool,” the article presents juxtaposition as a method for writing electronically. Because this particular juxtaposition revolves around the word cool, the rhetoric proposed here is called a rhetoric of cool. The article frames a rhetoric of cool by describing how temporal events in the respective fields of writing, technology, and cultural studies seen in juxtaposition provide a model for electronic research. The article considers the influential 1963 Conference on College Composition and Communication (4Cs), writings by Albert Kitzhaber, Marshall McLuhan, Douglas Engelbart, and Amiri Baraka, and demonstrates how these works inform writing instruction in a contemporary networked writing classroom. Finally, the article examines how students working with hypertext, drawing from these works and juxtapositions, are able to not only write about cool, but are able to write cool as well.

KEYWORDS: Composition, Cool, Cultural studies, 4Cs’ Hypertext, Pedagogy, Technology

Internal division into numbered sections

1. Introduction

In the Fall and Spring of 1999 and 2000, I taught two courses at the University of Florida’s Networked Writing Environment (NWE) entitled “Writing About Cool.” These courses took as their departure points both the popular understandings of cool as represented in print and electronic media and the coincidental usage of the term cool in the period leading up to and including 1963, by three writers working in three distinct fields: Marshall McLuhan’s (1964) designation of cool as a description of

the high-participatory nature of certain media forms (TV, the telephone, comic books) as opposed to the low-participatory characteristic of other forms he called "hot" (film, radio, print); Amiri Baraka's (1963) usage of cool to describe the African-American reaction to a white, oppressive authority's appropriation of black culture as calm, non-involved, detached; and Robert Farris Thompson's (1983) work in West Africa, which discovered that African-American terms like cool have their origins in indigenous, African societies such as the Yoruba, who use it to express in art and aesthetics a lifestyle characteristic of appeasement, conciliation, and calmness. The classes began by questioning the implication of finding one term prominent in three distinct fields of study (technology, cultural studies, and writing—in the form of aesthetics). Why cool? How do these writers change our current understandings of cool? What does such a juxtaposition do as a heuristic? How might such a juxtaposition lead to a more comprehensive practice, like a rhetoric of cool?

Cool is not a new concept to popular or academic discourse. Contemporary understandings of cool as a technological phenomenon surface on the World Wide Web in the guise of "cool sites," "cool tips," and "cool gadgets" or in e-mail bulletins such as the popular "Cool Site of the Day Newsletter" (Cool Site of the Day, 2000). These usages of cool tend to concentrate on worthwhile places to visit on the Web. Alan Liu's (2000) Voice of the Shuttle Web portal, for instance, presented a "Laws of Cool" listing of sites that he feels combine literature and information into an aesthetic category he defines as "cool." Liu foregrounded the purpose of his project in an introductory paragraph:

Through such improvised categorizations as "techno-cool," "anti-verbal cool," and "ordinary cool" (e.g., pages recording someone's grocery list or daily journal), I hope to gain some initial purchase on the deeper issues. My goal is to make it possible eventually for critical consciousness to be brought to bear upon what otherwise seems one of the most single-minded and totalitarian aesthetics ever created. Why are there "cool sites of the day" but no beautiful, sublime, or tragic sites? Why is it that "cool," which came out of the border worlds of the jazz clubs in the '20s and '30s and the Beats in the '50s is now so mainstream-hip that even the major corporations want "cool" home pages? Who does cool serve?

Liu's question dominated Internet applications of the word cool. Web portals like Netscape and Yahoo, or Web services like The Cool Zones (2000), Project Cool (2000), and Yahoo Cool Links (2000), camouflage their promotional activities by creating "cool site" listings that often lead to retailers of electronic gadgets. When Netscape, for instance, asked

"How Cool Are You" it answered its own question with a link to a computer supply warehouse. In addition, these sites proposed cool as long listings of out-of-the-ordinary Web sites because of either design or content. Usually, the more bizarre or eclectic, the cooler the site. As Netscape (2000) used to clarify its criteria for coolness on the Web:

Someday we'll all agree on what's cool on the Net. In the meantime, the Netscape cool team will continue to bring you a list of select sites that catch our eyes, make us laugh, help us work, quench our thirst ... you get the idea.

Portals like Netscape's or Liu's present cool as a combination of technological savvy and countercultural attitude. They propose that to be cool in the twentieth century, one must be connected to electronic culture. As Douglas Rushkoff and Barak Goodman (2001) emphasized in their PBS documentary *Merchants of Cool*, electronic culture anchors its commercial prospects in the desires of youth. Exemplified by Cool.com (2000), "a docking station for teens," this version of cool has become the Web's direct link to youth culture. Cool.com declared, "You know what's cool. We'll show you what's hot," and does so through its Coolwishbox section (once again, lists of sites with commercial ties), Cooltoons comics, and free email that allows registered users to become <yourname@cool.com>. These sites fall into the trap the editors of Suck.com (1995) satirized as a growing obsession with being hip and trendy. Suck.com's editors saw the over-indulgent Web site listings as pretentious and false entryways into youth culture. Site listings point to the Web as a new media tool capable of only supporting the latest trends in fashion or style: "Analysis and commentary are decidedly extraneous, 'Old Media' impediments, which only serve to obscure the fundamental catechism: 'Is it cool? Does it rule?'"

Overall, such notions are brought to the classroom by students raised in a media culture that teaches cool as meaning "good," "popular," or "in," all within the context of teenage angst and electronic familiarity. What students don't ask about, however, are the more complicated roles of cool, how this version of cool has become a corporate appropriation of a one-time counter-culture strategy, what Thomas Frank (1997) called "a staple of advertising that promises to deliver the consumer from the dreary nightmare of square consumerism" (p. 32). The ways corporate players like Web hosting company .tv reintroduce cool into television ads display the intersection of media theory (McLuhan's high participatory cool) and cultural phenomena (the ways appropriation affects discourse, as described by Baraka in his definition of cool) at the point of

writing (the ad itself). .tv's ad announces, "James Dean was cool. There was no cooler name than James Dean. This moment of cool was brought to you by .tv." The image of Dean hides the economic conditions from which the ad is created. Yet the ad uses cool as a rhetorical strategy, albeit one to sell products. Appropriating a cool person and juxtaposing him in a new medium, tv demonstrates a powerful rhetorical application for pedagogy when the commercial dimension is removed. The lesson of corporate usage of cool, then, is a rhetorical one. The pedagogical challenge is to resituate the popular application of cool as an electronic and cultural phenomenon (TV and Web usage) into a curriculum that teaches electronic rhetorical strategies. We can do so by juxtaposing popular understandings of cool with the 1963 internal juxtaposition of cool in order to bring both understandings together as heuristic.

Juxtaposition functions as a heuristic, an invention strategy that has been used within the context of media and writing by Walter Benjamin (2002) in the Arcades project, William S. Burroughs and Bryon Gysin (1978) with the cut-up method, and Marshall McLuhan (1964) in *Understanding Media*. These writers used juxtaposition as a rhetorical device for creating associations and emotional responses out of the combination of unlike words and images, but they did so within the context of media. In particular, McLuhan's 1963 understanding of cool functioned by way of juxtapositions—cut and pasted selections he presented not only as a narration of media development but also as a demonstration of how media operates. McLuhan's work in *The Gutenberg Galaxy* (1962) and *Understanding Media* repeated technology's propensity for juxtaposition as an argumentative strategy. For McLuhan, cool was the highly participatory, media environment brought on by the electronic age that created this mosaic of cultural and textual juxtapositions. McLuhan's (1964) cool media culture dependent on high participation belonged to a dichotomy of how he believed media functioned:

There is a basic principle that distinguishes a hot medium like radio from a cool one like the telephone, or a hot medium like the movie from a cool one like TV. A hot medium is one that extends one single sense in "high definition." High definition is the state of being well filled with data. A photograph is, visually, "high definition." A cartoon is "low definition," simply because very little visual information is provided. Telephone is a cool medium, or one of low definition, because the ear is given a meager amount of information. And speech is a cool medium of low definition, because so little is given and so much has to be filled in by the listener. On the other hand, hot media do not leave so much to be filled in or completed by the audience. Hot media are, therefore, low in participation, and cool media are high in participation. (p. 36)

For McLuhan, cool's extension of discursive interaction (extending the senses visually, aurally, and cognitively) created the mosaic of patterns that shape his texts. His work, therefore, is cool because the reader must form associations among the various patterns he generated. What is useful about McLuhan's distinction between hot and cool media, then, is not if the division continues to hold up perfectly across current media formations, but rather that cool creates a mosaic culture demanding new methodologies for how writing functions. As demonstrated in the eclectic mix of cool on the Web and within contemporary popular culture that I surveyed in the beginning of this article (the juxtaposition of youth culture, capitalism, fashion, and the Internet), McLuhan's cool mosaic becomes a form of electronic writing. The various areas where cool appears in discourse are not distinct, but rather juxtaposed through electronic media so that they can be read in conjunction with one another. A rhetoric of cool updates McLuhan's observations by addressing the possibilities of juxtaposition within a specific, electronic writing practice, hypertext.

Hypertext studies has treated at great length the potential the medium poses for annotation, extended bibliography, and non-linear writing. John Slatin (1990), Jane Yellowlees Douglas (1992), and Nancy Kaplan (1995) offered detailed analyses of how hypertextual reading and writing practices function within these parameters. Often concentrating on how the link supports these capabilities, hypertext theory proposes its application in useful ways, but leaves open other possibilities for hypertext to be taught as writing. Kaplan (2000) warned that "isolating the link from other constituent elements of hypertexts, however, distorts the view of reading and literacy a more inclusive understanding might yield" (p. 220). These "other constituent elements" might be found in the practice of juxtaposition McLuhan engages with. As Gregory Ulmer (1994b) demonstrated, McLuhan's contribution to hypertext is the allowance for juxtaposition to function as an invention principle because it creates patterns out of unlike material which then prompt new observations. Through the patterns, McLuhan claimed, readers and writers fill in the gaps. "The key to electronic methodology is the recognition and formation of patterns," Ulmer stated (1994b, p. 370), a key point emphasized in McLuhan's work and the basis of his definition of cool. The internal juxtapositions of cool in 1963 provide a theoretical place (by way of pattern formation) from which an alternative hypertextual pedagogy can begin to think of cool as a juxtapositional practice.

2. Juxtaposing cultural studies with hypertext

Working from 1963, we can initially approach cool from the position of cultural studies. Baraka's concerns with African-American representation in popular media forms preempts a major tenet of cultural studies, which frequently is concerned with issues of racial, gendered, and class representations. Baraka's work offers an opportunity to integrate cultural studies into the teaching of cool writing. The attempt by composition studies to include cultural studies in its curriculum often concentrated on the questions of representation, ideology, and power. James Berlin's (1991) position that all rhetorical study must address the presence of ideology inspired a great deal of current cultural studies-influenced pedagogy. Berlin's work demonstrated the classroom role of cultural studies by proposing that compositionists should study the semiotic cultural codes that make up popular discourse and should teach students how these codes construct subjectivity. Berlin's pedagogy sought

to make students aware of the cultural codes—the various competing discourses—that attempt to influence who they are. Our larger purpose is to encourage our students to resist and to negotiate these codes—these hegemonic discourses—in order to bring about more personally humane and socially equitable economic and political arrangements. (1991, p. 50)

Berlin (1988) situated the argument more explicitly in terms of writing by asking that the study of rhetoric examine the implicit ideologies already existing in rhetorical strategies. He said, "a rhetoric can never be innocent, can never be a disinterested arbiter of the ideological claims of others because it is always already serving certain ideological claims" (p. 477). The way to circumvent the dominant ideological claims found in rhetorical practices, Berlin contended, is to demonstrate the inherent contradictions within them. Advertising, music, film, comic books, all become acceptable media for study because they reveal how racial, gendered, and class groups are represented by the dominant discourse as well as how they are not represented. The study of these media can reveal oppressive institutional practices, a point made by Baraka's exposure of a twentieth-century ideology of representation and social restriction through a reading of African-American music. Doing so allows students to recognize that cultural codes previously considered natural suddenly appear problematic and in need of reconsideration. Doing so also allows students to resituate themselves politically. But as Susan Miller (1997) pointed out, Berlin's pedagogy emphasized reading more

than writing. Miller argued that Berlin's pedagogy produced readers, not writers.

By teaching texts rather than their making, by teaching awareness rather than rhetoric, and by teaching the power of meanings rather than the making of statements, we inadvertently reproduce a politics that is aware but passive. Rhetoric is not, that is, semiotics. And while it often suits us to equate the two (for reasons related more to professional politics than to democracy), writing is not reading. (p. 499)

Following Berlin, Lester Faigley (1992), saw in networked writing environments a space where students can draw upon the lessons of cultural studies in order to disrupt "discourse conventions" and "lead to a sharing of classroom authority" (p. 182). Based on his classroom experience, Faigley claimed that when viewed anew, the fragmented exchanges that take place in networked electronic discussion spaces (like INTERCHANGE) can be read in juxtaposition with one another and thus reveal "identifiable lines of coherence" running through overlapping dialogues (p. 178). For Faigley, the differences that arise in these fragmented electronic exchanges can be liberating in any number of ways for students—they can reveal the discrepancies in discursive practices that students engage with daily but take for granted. As he demonstrated, the juxtapositions that govern a considerable amount of electronic writing allow for critique. When the conversations that took place in Faigley's electronic classroom are viewed in combination with one another, Faigley read critiques of class and gender issues. Faigley's cultural-studies inspired computer classroom echoed the observations made by George Landow (1997) who saw in his students' hypertextual work in STORYSPACE "the form of appropriation and juxtaposition" (p. 257). Landow's students brought together excerpts of writings from various authors to critique the role of the author in electronic discourse. For Landow, hypertextual writing, defined by its usage of links to connect ideas and images, was motivated by juxtapositions. The reason was because by permitting users

to make connections between texts and between text and images, the electronic link encourages one to think in terms of connections. To state the obvious: one cannot make connections without having things to connect. Those linkable items must not only have some qualities that make the writer want to connect them, they must also exist in separation, divided. (p. 171)

Hypertext's ability to allow for connection between unlike image and text also appears in Gregory Ulmer's (1994a) question, "What will re-

search be like in an electronic apparatus?" (p. 32). Ulmer's answer was "an electronic rhetoric, one meant to exploit (but not limited to) the digital convergence of media in hypermedia," which he called chorography (p. 34). Ulmer went beyond just "linking" unlike items by instructing those who wish to apply chorography to "not choose between the different meanings of key terms, but compose by using all the meanings" (p. 48). By working from a term's multiple meanings, by juxtaposing those meanings, chorographers "fill in the gaps" that are "evoked by the juxtaposed semantic fields" (p. 346). Juxtaposition becomes a cool writing practice.

What this brief survey of the field tells me, then, is that while cultural studies and hypertext have been thought of as interconnected, and while hypertext and juxtaposition have been considered interrelated, there still exists a need to bring all of these items together. Cool provides a place to do so; it allows us to work with "all the meanings of the term" (as Ulmer required) in order to expand composition pedagogy in the computer classroom. By working with cool's multiple meanings, each juxtaposed with the other, we can discover new methods for hypertext instruction. What follows is a breakdown of how one such method can be constructed.

3. 1963

The background and rationale for this project stems from the year 1963. Because the initial observation of cool discovered in the Writing About Cool classes came from this distinct temporal moment, and because Writing About Cool is a composition class, further consideration of cool as a rhetoric encourages the inclusion of other events occurring concurrently with composition. Therefore, I begin with a juxtaposition of attitudes regarding writing in 1963. In 1963, the Conference on College Composition and Communication (4Cs) met in Los Angeles, California. A major result of the conference, as indicated in its published report in the October issue of *College Composition and Communication* (CCC) of the same year, was the desire to develop a strategy for redefining composition¹. The Executive Committee (1963) of the conference decided to take up "debate on the long research paper, its purpose, its place in the

¹ See North (1987), Faigley (1992), and Sirc (1994) for further work highlighting the importance of this conference.

program" as well as to consider a motion that "freshman English courses should either be wiped out or changed in character" (p. 182). The same issue of CCC offered alternatives to the teaching of composition and possible approaches to this problem, Albert Kitzhaber's (1963a) "4C, Freshman, English, and the Future," Wayne Booth's (1963) "The Rhetorical Stance," and Edward P.J. Corbett's (1963) "The Usefulness of Classical Rhetoric," but left no overall conclusion over which method worked best.

Although each essay suggested potential paths towards finding a new way of teaching writing, Kitzhaber's (1963a) essay proved interesting because of the near-simultaneous publication of his *Themes, Theories, and Therapy* (1963b). Partly in response to the 4Cs meeting, *Themes, Theories, and Therapy* [along with its temporal counterpart Richard Braddock, Richard Lloyd-Jones, and Lowell Schoer's (1963) *Research in Written Composition*] marked another moment of institutional interest in reshaping composition. Kitzhaber's critique of composition practice questioned the emphasis on certain grading principles (the marking of wrong words in student writing), the lack of clarity surrounding assignments (the general theme paper), and the divorce between writing instruction and other areas of academic interest (notably literature). Kitzhaber (1963b), though, also pointed to the use of technology in the classroom.

A teaching machine or a programmed text is a device that presents one item or frame at a time; that is, it allows students to see one sentence with a critical word left out or one statement followed by a question. The student writes the required answer on the program itself or on an answer tape or booklet. If he has been using a typical teaching machine, it then activates a mechanism that moves his answer under a clear plastic window (where he cannot change it) at the same time that it reveals the correct answer. (p. 85)

Foreseeing the usage of machines in classrooms, Kitzhaber directed attention to potential problems in using applications comprised of merely preprogrammed responses and answers. For Kitzhaber, such activities were not conducive to learning. In fact, he discussed programs we can recognize today as question-and-answer drills. These exercises, whether online or on purchased computer disks or CD-ROMS, remain popular methods of teaching grammar and punctuation. As a student of the computer classroom, though, my interest wasn't in reproducing the question-and-answer drill that, as Kitzhaber (1963b) indicated, is limiting in its ability to teach new skills. The mechanical aspects of writing are essentially superficial; teaching their correct use, difficult though it may often be, is not synonymous with teaching composition. (p. 85)

Instead of using the computer to teach the proper usage of commas, the students and myself in the Writing as Cool classes were more interested in the technology's other potentials. We needed another reason to think of how computers affected writing, particularly the relationship between computer-based writing and a method of juxtaposition. Douglas Engelbart's (1963) "A Conceptual Framework for Augmenting Man's Intellect" provided such an explanation. Engelbart's essay outlined computer usage that today has become ubiquitous in computer writing: the way the windows system allowed for certain types of visual juxtapositions to be easily maneuvered at the user's discretion. In his pioneering essay, Engelbart designed an early conception of hypertext and the windows system for displaying text on a computer screen. He proposed "that by using a computer and a video display screen to compose documents, it would be possible to enhance the entire process of written composition" (Rheingold, 1991, p. 83).

Engelbart's vision of personal computers as "hypothetical writing machines" capable of storing writing and representing several versions of text at once for further manipulation introduced the possibilities of merging technology with education (1963, p. 7).

What changes in language and methodology might not result? If it were so easy to look things up, how would our vocabulary develop, how would our habits of exploring the intellectual domains of others shift, how might the sophistication of practical organization mature (if each person could so quickly and easily look up applicable rules), how would our education system change to take advantage of this new external symbol-manipulation capability of students and teachers and administrators? (Engelbart, 1963, p. 15)

Engelbart's writing machine resembled McLuhan's cool mosaic, a technologically shaped writing system where disciplines juxtapose with one another. Where McLuhan felt that technology (including computers) allowed for a more participatory experience, Ted Nelson (1987) proposed—at the same time Engelbart was formulating his ideas on the windows system—a way of enacting this mosaic through a high participatory writing system he called "hypertext."² Nelson's idea considered how the computer could be used to set up several simultaneously displayed pages of information which could then be joined together in a variety of ways by the user. Nelson hypothesized a system where

² On Nelson's Web site, <<http://www.sfc.keio.ac.jp/~ted/TN/WhoIAm.html>>, he claimed that although he didn't publish the term hypertext until 1965, he came up with the idea in 1963.

pages would be juxtaposed in front of the user creating a display more analogous to associative thought. His work attempted to shift pedagogy in the electronic age away from the “paperdigm,” “the notion [that] paper—a two dimensional, sequential relation of facts and ideas—is one of the things most holding back software design and human progress” (p. 27). Nelson suggested that hypertext, a method of juxtaposing like and unlike ideas in a computer environment, would allow new understandings of old material to evolve. In *Dream Machines/Computer Lib*, two books pasted together that could be opened at either end, Nelson (1987) continued McLuhan’s idea of expressing in print the possibilities of computer-based writing by creating several lines of thought (some fragmented, some running pages in length) capable of being read in any order. *Dream Machines/Computer Lib* functioned as a print version of a pre-Web hypertext and as a pedagogical experiment for how to write, as I now call it, cool.

4. From cool to cool

The compositional computer contribution of 1963 provides an intersection with cultural studies in Amiri Baraka’s (1963) *Blues People*. By working with Baraka, the Writing as Cool classes discovered a way to think of how cultural studies and computers and writing came together. Although McLuhan discussed cool as a form of media, Baraka used the term to describe the oppressed African-American experience of the late ‘50s and early ‘60s as detached, unemotional, and uninvolved. Baraka’s position came out a year before the founding of the Center for Contemporary Cultural Studies at Birmingham, which legitimized the academic study of popular culture as a means to uncovering dominant ideologies and power structures within institutional systems (the beginning of contemporary cultural studies). Baraka asked how the representation of African-American culture in popular music forms became appropriated by white production on a consistent basis. Culturally, African-American music and artifacts were often taken over by white culture as commodities in ways that seemed natural to the white majority but also in ways that left African-Americans feeling shut out from mainstream society. Politically, African-Americans were denied access to the institutional order because of segregation. In response to that cultural and political segregation, African-American culture created its own aesthetic called cool. Baraka (1963) said,

To be cool was, in its most accessible meaning, to be calm, even unimpressed by what horror the world might daily propose. As a term used by Negroes, the horror, etc., might be simply the deadeningly predictable mind of white America.... It is perhaps the flexibility of the Negro that has let him survive; his ability to "be cool" – to be calm, unimpressed, detached, perhaps to make failure as secret a phenomenon as possible. (p. 213)

Reading Baraka offers a cultural studies dimension to our project. Baraka's *Blues People* forms parallels between the history of African-American culture and popular music, a history he viewed largely as one of appropriation. For Baraka, twentieth-century African-American music found itself appropriated not only by white performers, but by commercial interests who isolated African-American cultural artifacts from their original musical context and recontextualize them in non-historical manners. Baraka stated that appropriation began with minstrel adaptations of black face and watered down jazz stylistics of popular white performers such as Paul Whiteman, all of which transformed the look of musicians, in particular Dizzy Gillespie, into a commodity representative of a growing 1950s white "hip" movement. Baraka (1963) further stated that

the goatee, beret, and window-pane glasses were no accidents; they were, in the oblique significance that social history demands, as usefully symbolic as had been the Hebrew nomenclature in the spirituals. That is, they pointed toward a way of thinking, an emotional and psychological resolution of some not so obscure social need or attitude. (p. 201)

Representation and commodification overlapped within Baraka's analysis allowing us in the *Writing as Cool* class to rethink 1963 in terms of social and political detachment. This sense of detachment shifted to popular expression as cultural artifacts became icons; that is, they were removed from their historical context so that only the cultural marker remained. The iconic look (Dizzy Gillespie's beret and goatee) became a visual form of expression in which the icon dictated meaning.

When put into other media forms, the icon functions as a method of discourse. Notably, a film like *American Graffiti* (Coppola and Lucas, 1973), which takes place at the end of 1962 and the beginning of 1963, displayed a cultural moment not in terms of historical accuracy but in terms of iconic representation. The narrative of *American Graffiti* presented us with a pastiche of idyllic '50s iconic signifiers: the drive in; buying booze underage; cool cars like the 56 T-Bird, 55 Chevy, and a souped-up Deuce Coup; playing chicken; high school dances; and hip DJs spinning records and sending dedications late into the night. Direc-

tor George Lucas did not discuss those elements of the '50s that were not conducive to innocence: the Greensboro, North Carolina, lunch counter sit ins, George Wallace, segregated water fountains, or any other racially charged event that would disturb an idyllic viewpoint of '50s culture. For such a turbulent racial period, representation of African-Americans is considerably lacking. The only depiction of African-American culture comes by way of the racially ambiguous DJ Wolfman Jack—thirteen-year-old Carole tells John Milner, “I just love listening to Wolfman Jack. My mom won’t let me because he’s a Negro.” The film, as visual writing, stresses iconic placement over historical contextualization. With this in mind, the Writing as Cool class began to think of American Graffiti as iconic writing (albeit film writing) relative to the culture concerns raised by Baraka. The analogy we considered was how film media of the '70s used the icon to depict or ignore racial issues in ways the media, specifically hypertext, of the late twentieth- and early twenty-first century is doing. If detachment is a cool form of cultural reaction, how does it fare in a cool medium like hypertext—cool because of its extensive demands of interaction on the part of the reader and writer? What does the iconic writing of the Web do to our understandings of social issues? We had to consider if hypertext merely reinforced traditional cultural studies investigations into these matters (i.e., a lack or abundance of representation of a racial group, which is one way to read American Graffiti) or asked us to approach them from a different perspective.

The icon and cool are often understood in terms of a cool figure. The question of “who is cool” (i.e. James Dean, Marlon Brando, or Elvis) had to be addressed in the Writing as Cool classes if we were to understand cultural experience and iconicity, particularly in the ways we could write about these areas. Technology’s reproduction of the figures of entertainment, icons like the cool figure captured in John Milner of American Graffiti, eventually become detached names and images that reappear in cultural and media expression in various ways. Those detached names then become part of our cultural vocabulary. As Greil Marcus (1991) made clear, in the electronic age, Elvis as ultimate celebrity consistently reappears in our culture as commodity, late night joke, comic book cover, pop cultural allusion, White House reference, Web site, and so on until the end result is a collage and subsequently new representation that society begins to use as discourse. Discourse, then, is created through juxtapositions, the cultural joining of Elvis in an Energizer commercial with Elvis the alarm clock with Elvis the singer. Elvis’ shifting meanings allow for the sign we name as Elvis to be juxtaposed in various manners, to be

put to various ideological purposes, from critiques of consumer fetishism to Marcus' understandings of Elvis as metaphor for American idealism. Marcus (1991) said,

with each of [the examples of Dead Elvis] there is a presentation, an acting out, a fantasy, a performance, not of what it means to be an American – to be a creature of history, the inheritor of certain crimes, wars, ideas, landscapes – but rather a presentation, an acting out, a fantasy of what the deepest and most extreme possibilities and dangers of our national identity are. (p. 31)

The icon motivates a form of discourse determined by juxtaposition. Celebrity images become appropriated and reentered into cultural expression by way of unlikely arrangements. Updated, Baraka's alignment of cool with appropriation becomes a lesson for cultural studies in the computer classroom – instead of reinforcing an oppressive practice, appropriation becomes a way to rethink cultural positions. While the lesson of American Graffiti is that iconic display may be a discursive construction void of critique³, Marcus taught that unlikely combinations of iconic representations can be critical gestures as well. The final challenge is to put such a theory into practice in the computer classroom. As the Writing as Cool class began to bring together the '50s content of cool, music, and racial issues in hypertextual form, we found ourselves juxtaposing two opposing understandings of cool: that of social experience and that of technology.

5. Writing about cool

In order to juxtapose these two areas of cool in a way that would fully conceptualize the specific content of our course, the class set out to write handbooks of cool. The handbooks would not teach "how to be cool" but rather "how to write cool." Since we were less interested in writing only expository analyses of cool or prescriptive argumentations in the form of "one should/should not write cool," the handbook appeared to be an appropriate method of engagement, one that blended both exposition and argumentation. The handbook, a medieval technology designed to teach rhetoric, juxtaposes various viewpoints and writings under the

³ Fredric Jameson's (1991) position was that American Graffiti as an example of the postmodern-nostalgia film does not offer cultural critique because of its usage of iconic placement, what Jameson termed pastiche. I contend that iconic juxtapositions can be used in critique, for this is a great deal of what my 1963 juxtapositions are doing.

rubric of one work. The medieval handbook, or *Ars*, often brought together writings from several authors without citing their origins. Part of a textual culture of appropriation, medieval handbooks' sources often were absent because of the way authorship was understood in the Middle Ages. As Martin Irvine (1994) stated, "Frequently it is difficult to determine if a compiler [of an *Ars*] was drawing directly from a common late classical source or from an earlier compilation based on these sources" (p. 109). Matthew of Vendôme's (1981) *Ars Versificatoria*, a well-known medieval handbook, used Ovid, Horace, Cato, and others without indication. Matthew's strategy was as follows:

The material which anyone proposes to treat will be either untouched or treated previously by some poet. If it has been treated, you will have to proceed according to the trend of the poetic narration, with such regard that certain diffusions be not introduced which are affinitive but not pertinent to the principal theme, such as comparisons, poetic abuses, figurative constructions, arrangement of quantities and syllables. (p. 93)

The writer of the handbook, then, acted as a compiler. Any "original" writing produced found itself lost amid quoted texts.

Our handbooks began with a similar approach. Just as McLuhan viewed his 1962–64 writings as compilations—mosaics of past and current work to teach a principle about writing in the electronic age—the Writing as Cool class wanted to find a balance between the old and the new by switching our roles from authors to compilers. In turn, our compilations would teach the rhetoric of cool. The challenge of this project, though, differs from that of the medieval compiler. We had to reflect on how the technology of the course contrasted/complimented its content. Unlike medieval writers, our technology extends beyond the open margins the gloss created for additional commentary or the simple pre-textual layout of space for more than one writer. Some of the medieval may still hold true for the computer writing environment, but much more has been added. Our rationale for choosing the handbook seems a logical one since handbooks still remain popular media for instruction. The difference between our handbooks and others with which the students might be familiar (such as writing handbooks that are almost always assigned in writing courses in our university) would be that ours would be published on the Web. Therefore, we were immediately faced with the challenge of form (what does writing for the Web entail?) as well as content (how should we collect materials for a set of instructions?).

Although it is impossible to detail every student-created handbook of cool, I would like to outline a few approaches to this project the students devised. To teach others how to write cool, we began with an inventory of items central to cultural production and technology. Appropriation, iconicity, social conflict, rebellion, style, consumer culture, celebrity, and others made our lists for culture. Students compiled their material from a variety of sources: class readings, outside readings, films, and television. Attention then shifted to that of hypertext: questions of frames, image maps, hyperlinks, javascripts, etc. As compilers, students gathered the necessary technological knowledge from class instruction, the Web, and local online documentation⁴. When the two collections came together, even if their meanings were initially drastically different, we had the basis for our handbooks. Juxtaposed, the material yielded an innovative method of figuring out what cool writing means. The different terms, when viewed together, created a new position. For example, at the level of appropriation, students realized that cool-as-appropriation involved the concerns of Amiri Baraka who critiqued white appropriation of black cultural artifacts, as I outlined earlier in this article. And appropriation involved the technologies of the classroom: the cut-and-paste options available through hypertext where images are easily acquired by the right click of a mouse and code can be borrowed via the browser's View Page Source option. Juxtaposed together, student work demonstrated the rhetoric of cool through their use of appropriated code and images to discuss cultural moments of appropriation. Within the handbook, students might instruct readers that to write cool, writers must engage with the practice of appropriation.

At the level of iconicity, student projects used image maps to discuss how films like *American Graffiti* recontextualized commodities and cultural moments as iconic writing. One student example demonstrated this idea by creating an image map of the character John Milner and his hot-rod. Clicking on various portions of Milner and the souped-up car he stands next to led to specific explanations of how each item in the image works as icon. Milner's posture indicates style and attitude. The car denotes the role of technology as well as fashion. In addition, each hyperlink of the image map is positioned as icon, an emblematic representation divorced from historical contextualization.

⁴ The University of Florida's Networked Writing Environment provides students with detailed online documentation for Web page construction. See <<http://web.nwe.ufl.edu/>>.

Students also discovered that cool presented new strategies for dealing with language. Working from a variety of sources, students recognized a repetition of Baraka's (1963) belief in the importance of language to the feeling of cool, in particular, the role African-American culture played in shaping language: "A great many young white Americans [adopted] many elements of a kind of Negro speech. 'Bop talk' and in my own generation, 'Hip talk' are certainly manifestations of this kind of social egalitarianism" (p. 187). On the one hand, black dialect informed cool by way of slang. From the '50s to '90s, from "daddy-o" to "phat," cool creates intricate reworkings of words from one context to another. (Fat leads to phat, for instance.) Our work with HTML also demonstrated the way code becomes recontextualized from site to site depending on the subject matter displayed. A hyperlink can function as a device for setting up a table of contents, for enforcing linearity, for breaking linearity, or for creating a multimedia experience. Each usage depends upon its context. In addition, language as graffiti—a visual form of writing associated with hip-hop culture—gave us another place to rethink the relationships between street talk, text, and image. Juxtaposed, HTML and slang produced new possibilities in the cool medium. The tag⁵ spray-painted across the wall of an inner-city neighborhood or subway car made new sense against the tag placed in an open HTML file to center text, create frames, or build tables. The tag became a cool form of written expression. And although the Writing as Cool composition classes didn't study Jean Baudrillard (1993), after reading the work created by these students, I could see Baudrillard's notion of cool writing unfold. Borrowing from McLuhan's 1963 musings on cool, Baudrillard deemed current discourse cool because of its emphasis on commutation rather than signification. In cool discourse, Baudrillard (1993) claimed, "signs are exchanged against each other rather than against the real" (p. 7). It is this pure play of the signifiers, this place where reproduction of signs overshadows production of signs, that Baudrillard terms cool. The juxtapositions of these commutations creates cool discourse. Parallel to Baudrillard's understanding of cool as the place between the social and the digital (graffiti and binary codes), the students positioned their ideas on social writing (graffiti, fashion, digital sampling) against the HTML code they were learning and found themselves not only writing about cool, but writing cool. In our classes, we found ourselves exchanging signs against one another, the graffiti tag juxtaposed with the HTML tag, cultural appropriation against technological appropriation.

⁵ Tags are the distinct names spray painted in graffiti.

6. Writing cool

The students' handbooks of cool teach that in digital writing subject matter cannot be divorced from the medium in which it is displayed. More importantly, though, they teach the logic of juxtaposition. Juxtaposing content and form allows composition studies to rethink its relationship to technology. The handbooks of cool do not reflect the only method for including juxtaposition in composition, but rather answer 4Cs' still relevant demand for new kinds of research papers that instigate innovative relationships between course content and writing. In 1963, the 4Cs Evaluation Committee (1963) identified a need to refocus composition studies: "We still speak with many voices. We need to know what relationship these voices have to our central purpose, composing—the relationship of literature, or linguistics, or rhetoric to the process of composition" (CCC, p. 202). The inclusion of temporal works like those of McLuhan, Engelbart, and Nelson indicated the need to also evaluate the role of computers in composition. Currently, many writing instructors either embrace technology in their classroom because of its propensity for collaboration, use technology to question the politics of computer access and interfaces, or ask their students to consider the ways audience is redefined in networked writing environments or on the World Wide Web. I don't discount any of these legitimate approaches. Instead, I ask: How much of classroom work places the content of the course in juxtaposition to the institution's available computer writing systems like hypertext? Should we continue to think of content and form as separate? Do other disciplines, like cultural studies, inform our work in computers and writing?

Juxtaposition as pedagogy gives us another place to consider the teaching of hypertext. It doesn't negate interest in hypertext's propensity to create non-linear writing or annotated literary works. Instead, juxtaposition enhances our ability to conceptualize the interaction of technology and culture. By working with juxtaposition, the Writing as Cool classes inadvertently followed techniques put forth by McLuhan, Kathleen Hutchon, and Eric McLuhan (1977) almost thirty years ago:

Suppose that all the items on any give page of the paper—stories, letters, editorials, ads, comics—were connected in theme. What would happen? What kind of narrative sequence or logic would result? Would the recurrence and repetition of one topic give the effect of a conspiracy, or of paranoia, or of humor? (p. 41)

In other words, the repetition of an item, term, word, or idea (like cool) leads to additional insights. A project like "The Handbook of Cool"

allows students opportunities to discover that the cultural and technological aspects of a specific subject matter can overlap and provide astonishing revelations. From such observations, students scrutinize their relationships to writing in the digital age. No longer does writing demand study separated from the actual process of composing. We not only examine the tools of technology, we use them as well. With cool writing, the notion that the computer-networked classroom is a place for looking outward to cyberspace and its threatening, challenging, different ways of expression for purposes of evaluation and analysis becomes instead the idea that we are already in such a place and that we bring to those situations cultural events, transformations, and strategies. With cool writing, we become intertwined with the content of our writing. Traditionally, cultural studies has granted our students alternative understandings of their once accepted positions to race, gender, and class. With the added dimension of cool, our students take another step towards redefining their conception of how writing affects and is effected by cultural patterns and formations. Our students, in turn, become cool writers.⁶

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⁶ The work and classes I've described can be viewed at the following URLs: <<http://liberalarts.udmercy.edu/~riceje/fall99/1749.html>>, <<http://liberalarts.udmercy.edu/~riceje/spring00/1731.html>>. Space limitations prevent me from presenting a more detailed description of each handbook's appearance. I encourage readers to visit the preceding Web sites in order to view archived assignments.

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Experimental papers

3. The structure of an experimental paper

An experimental paper has a rigid structure and usually contains a number of parts, such as the following:

- title of the paper
- name(s) of the author(s)
- their affiliation (optional)
- their addresses (optional)
- abstract (optional)
- keywords (optional)
- internal division into sections (optionally numbered) where the gist of the paper is discussed and which may include the following:
 - o introduction
 - o description of the experiment which usually includes the following
 - o stimuli
 - o procedure
 - o subjects
 - o results and discussion
 - o conclusion
 - o diagrams and figures (both obligatorily numbered)
 - o quotations (optional)
 - o bibliography (or references, where the particular entries may be optionally numbered)
 - o endnotes (optional)
 - o acknowledgements (optional).

4. Samples of experimental papers

Sample nr 1

The structure of the paper

Title of the paper

Evidence for phonetic adaptation of loanwords: an experimental study

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ABSTRACT. Japanese loanword adaptations show an asymmetry in the treatment of word-final [n] in words from French and English, respectively: while word-final [n] is adapted as a moraic nasal consonant in loanwords from English, it is adapted as a geminate nasal followed by an epenthetic vowel in loanwords from French. We provide evidence that this asymmetry originates in the way Japanese speakers perceive word-final [n] in French and English. Indeed, in a forced choice task with non-words, Japanese listeners perceived an epenthetic vowel significantly more often in stimuli produced by French speakers than in stimuli produced by American English speakers. In the former, the final nasal consonant was longer and had a more important vocalic release than in the latter; the perception of an epenthetic vowel correlated with the length and intensity of the nasal consonant and its release, showing that listeners are sensitive to fine phonetic detail. We conclude, then, that the adaptation of word-final [n] in loanwords reflects phonetically minimal transformations that apply during speech perception.

Internal division into numbered sections:

1. Introduction

When borrowed by a language, words of foreign origin mostly do not preserve their original shape but get adapted to the sound system of the borrowing language. In phonological approaches to loanword adaptations, whether rule-based or constraint-based, the driving force behind the adaptations is the aim to make non-native words conform to the surface phonological structure of the native language. Indeed, loanword adaptations are mainly transformations that apply to foreign forms that would be ill-formed if they were borrowed without modification (see, among many others, Hyman 1970; Yip 1993; Paradis and Lacharité 1997). There are, however, several cases of loanword adaptations that appear to be ‘unnecessary’, in the sense that they do not repair some ill-formed structure. For instance, in Korean, loanwords from English that end in a voiceless stop are often adapted with an aspirated stop followed by an epenthetic vowel (especially if the preceding vowel is tense) (Kang 2004).

- (1) a. [pætʰɪ] < ‘bat’
b. [tʰkʰɪ] < ‘deck’
c. [hɪpʰɪ] < ‘hip’

These transformations are unexpected, since native words can end in a voiceless stop, as shown in (2).

- (2) a. [pat] ‘field’
b. [kæk] ‘guest’
c. [tʰɪp] ‘house’

Kang (2004) provides evidence that the presence versus absence of epenthesis depends upon phonetic factors. In particular, given that final stops are strictly unreleased in Korean, epenthesis is more likely if the stop is released in the English source form, which depends upon – among other things – the tenseness of the preceding vowel. In her OT-account, the adaptations are driven by constraints that require perceptual similarity between the phonetic form in the source language and that in the borrowing language.

In this paper, we study a similar case of an unexpected adaptation pattern. That is, in on-line adaptations of French words ending in [n], Japanese speakers transform [n] into a geminated nasal followed by an epenthetic vowel (Shinohara 1997).

- (3) a. [duan...]} < Fr. *douane* [dwan] ‘customs’
 b. [pisin...]} < Fr. *piscine* [pisin] ‘swimming pool’
 c. [p}roÇen...]} < Fr. *prochaine* [proʃ’n] ‘next-FEM’

These transformations are unexpected, since native words can end in a moraic nasal consonant, as shown in (4).

- (4) a. [teN] ‘point’
 b. [hoN] ‘book’
 c. [nip...oN] ‘Japan’

Moreover, both on-line adaptations of English words (5a) and integrated loanwords from English (5b) conform to this native pattern and fail to show epenthesis.

- (5) a. [s}k}riiN] < ‘screen’
 [nap}kiN] < ‘napkin’
 b. [ÇaiN] < ‘shine’
 [kotoN] < ‘cotton’

We explore the hypothesis that small phonetic differences in the realization of [n] in English and French are responsible for the observed asymmetry. Specifically, word-final [n] is longer and has a stronger release in French than in English, which might be interpreted perceptually by Japanese speakers as the presence of a vowel.

The present hypothesis is couched within the framework of Peperkamp and Dupoux (2003), which states that all loanword adaptations are phonetically minimal transformations that apply in perception. Their proposal is based on psycholinguistic evidence that all aspects of non-native phonological structure, including segments, suprasegments, and syllable phonotactics, are systematically distorted during speech perception. That is, non-native sound structures are assimilated to ones that are well-formed in the native language (Kiriloff 1969; Goto 1971; Massaro and Cohen 1983; Dupoux et al. 1997, 1999; Hallé et al. 1998; Pitt 1998), both by monolinguals and by bilinguals (Pallier et al. 1997, 2001; Sebastián-Gallés and Soto-Faraco 1999; Dupoux, Peperkamp and Sebastián-Gallés in preparation). Moreover, these perceptual assimilations are reflected in loanword adaptations. For instance, French speakers have difficulties perceiving stress contrasts (Dupoux et al. 1997, Dupoux, Peperkamp and Sebastián-Gallés 2001), and in loanwords, stress is systematically adapted to the native pattern of word-final stress (e.g. [wikénd] ‘weekend’). Peperkamp and Dupoux (2003) thus argue that loanword adaptations originate in perceptual assimilations. Psycholin-

guistic models of speech perception contain a phonetic decoding module, in which non-native segments are assimilated to the closest available phonetic category (Kuhl 2000; Best 1994). In order to account for the perceptual assimilation effects in case of non-native phonotactics and suprasegmental structure, Peperkamp and Dupoux (2003) propose that the phonetic decoding module takes complete word forms rather than individual segments as its input. All loanword adaptations, then, whether they concern changes in segmental, suprasegmental, or phonotactic structure, reflect the process of perceptual assimilation during phonetic decoding.

In order to test the hypothesis that the Japanese adaptations in (3) and (5) are the result of perceptual assimilation, we carried out an experiment in which monolingual speakers of Japanese performed a forced choice task on orally presented stimuli spoken by native speakers of French and American English.

3 Experiment

3.1 Stimuli

Twenty-two items of the form CVN, were created. The vowels used were [i], [ɛ], [ø] and [a]. All items respected the phonotactic structure of Japanese, French, and American English, and most were non-words in both French and English. All items were read in isolation by two male and two female native speakers of French and American English. None of our French speakers had Southern French accent, where final consonants are systematically followed by schwa. All items were recorded on a DAT-recorder, digitized at 16000 Hz, and stored on a computer disk.

The mean durations of the French and the American English stimuli were 515 ms and 631 ms, respectively, representing a significant difference ($F(158,1)=69.6$, $p<.0001$). There were also highly significant differences in the relative mean durations of the vowel (French: 27.9 %, English: 49.6 %, $F(158,1)=472.8$, $p<.0001$) and those of the final nasal (either released or not) (French: 49.5 %, English: 31.2 %, $F(158,1)=266.4$, $p<.0001$).

French stimuli got a vocalic release in 100 % of the cases and English stimuli in 73.6 % of cases, again representing a significant difference ($F(158,1)=31.2$, $p<.0001$). The relative mean duration of the release - if present - was 19 % in French and 13.7 % in English stimuli ($F(142,1)=51.9$, $p<.0001$). French releases all had vocalic formants and can

be classified as a schwa. English releases had vocalic formants (although to a lesser extent than in the French ones) when produced by female speakers, whereas in case of male speakers the release was better characterized as an aspiration. Finally, the mean intensities of French and English releases were significantly different: 63.7 dB and 56 dB, respectively ($F(142,1)=144.5$, $p<.0001$).

3.2 Procedure

For the main part of the experiment, we created 22 blocks, one per item, consisting of eight tokens each. Tokens were randomly shuffled within the blocks and separated by 5-second silences. The main part was preceded by a short training phase, where subjects were presented with three different CVN stimuli, pronounced by a native speaker of Russian and separated by 10 second silences. During the experiment, subjects had to use answer sheets, which contained six answer options for each token. In Japanese the duration of vowels and consonants is used phonemically. Thus, the answer sheet contained all six logically possible options for each test item: [CVN], [CV...N], [CVn], [CVn...], [CV...n], and [CV...n...]. These options were transcribed in Romanji alphabet. Subjects completed a forced choice task: after listening to a token, they had to choose on their answer sheet one candidate word which in their opinion was the closest to the word they had heard. At the end of each block, subjects had to press a button to start listening to the next block.

1 The English speakers produced the vowel [a] as a back vowel, i.e. [ɑ].

2 There were actually 12 tokens per item, but in this paper we only report on the results for eight tokens.

The remaining four were either produced by the French speakers and contained a nasal vowel instead of the sequence VN, or they were produced by the American English speakers and contained the vowel [ʌ] instead of [i].

3.3 Subjects

Nine native speakers of Japanese with no prior knowledge of French were tested in Tokyo, Japan. All subjects but one, who had lived in the US from the age of 3 to 10 years, had no linguistic experience in an English speaking country. The whole experiment lasted about 25 minutes. Subjects were from 23 to 35 years old (mean: 29).

3.4 Results and discussion

For the purposes of the present article, we are only interested in the presence versus absence of epenthesis (and not in the gemination of the nasal consonant and/or the preceding vowel). Results obtained on the answer sheets were therefore coded as belonging to two groups: one containing answers without epenthesis, i.e. [CVN], [CV...N], and the other containing answers with epenthesis, i.e. [CVn], [CVn...], [CV...n], and [CV...n...]. The mean percentages of answers with epenthesis for the four French speakers and the four American English speakers, respectively, are shown in Table 1.

Table 1. Mean percentages of answers with epenthesis by speaker

% epenthesis	S.E.	
French speaker A	90.9	2.62
speaker B	95.9	1.47
speaker C	98.4	1.07
speaker D	99.0	0.67
<i>Mean</i>	96.1	1.15
English speaker E	37.3	4.01
speaker F	43.8	7.14
speaker G	66.1	4.85
speaker H	88.2	3.85
<i>Mean</i>	58.8	3.97

The mean percentages of answers with epenthesis were submitted to a repeated measures ANOVA with the intra-subject factor Language (French vs. English). The analysis showed a highly significant effect of Language ($F(7,1)=106.4$, $p<.0001$), due to the fact that French stimuli yielded more epenthetic responses than English ones. Restricted analyses showed that there was a significant effect of Speaker for both the French stimuli ($F(7,1)=7.7$, $p<.001$) and the English stimuli ($F(7,1)=38.3$, $p<.0001$). A regression analysis showed that epenthesis is best predicted by two factors: the duration of the nasal and its release (if present) ($R\text{-Squared}=0.41$, $F(1,158)=109.9$, $p<.00001$), and the intensity of the nasal and its release multiplied by its duration ($R\text{-Squared}=0.46$, $F(1,158)=133.8$, $p<.0001$).

These results show that Japanese subjects perceive an epenthetic vowel at the end of CVN-items significantly more often when produced by French speakers than when produced by American English speakers. In particular, the presence versus absence of the epenthetic vowel depends upon fine phonetic details such as the length and the intensity of the nasal consonant and its release. These results are in accordance with the hypothesis that the different treatments of French and English loanwords, with an epenthetic vowel appearing in the former but not in the latter, originate in phonetic decoding during speech perception. Whereas all four French speakers produced stimuli that yielded invariably very high percentages of epenthetic responses, there was important variability among the four American English speakers, and two of them yielded more than 50% epenthetic responses. This variability might be due to the fact that the stimuli were recorded in isolation. A better way to obtain the stimuli might be to record them using a frame phrase. This would also make the experimental results more comparable to the loanword adaptation data, in that loanwords are likely to be embedded within phrasal contexts when entering the borrowing language. We are currently running the same experiment with stimuli recorded in frame phrases.

4 Conclusion

In phonological approaches to loanword adaptations, the surface form of the source language represents the input to the adaptation process, which makes the foreign form conform to the phonotactic structure of the borrowing language (Jacobs and Gussenhoven, 2000, Paradis and Lacharité 1997, Hyman, 1970). The different treatment of French and English words by Japanese speakers is puzzling for such an approach for two reasons. First, French and English words ending in [Vn] represent identical surface forms; consequently, they should yield the same adaptation patterns. Second, given that Japanese words can end in a moraic nasal consonant, the appearance of an epenthetic vowel in loanwords from French seems unmotivated.

One way to resolve these puzzles would be to argue that the difference in adaptations is due to differences between French and English. In particular, French, but not English, has a lexical contrast between [Vn] and [V~]. French words ending in [V~] are adapted as [VN] in Japanese (Shinohara 1997); therefore, it might be the case that the bilingual speakers who provided the on-line adaptations in Shinohara (1997) applied

epenthesis to words ending in [Vn] in order to preserve the original French contrast. However, in our perception experiment, Japanese monolinguals with no knowledge of French show the same patterns of adaptation.

Another possible phonological explanation would be to suppose that loanwords from French are adapted to a default pattern in Japanese. Apart from the fact that it would remain unclear why such a default pattern would not be applied to English words, this hypothesis is not supported by lexical data from Japanese. Indeed, words ending with [n:] are very rare and those ending with [N] are extremely common in Japanese (Kimihiro Nakamura, personal communication). If a default pattern were applied, then it would probably be the ending [N].

The absence of a pertinent phonological analysis suggests that the adaptation patterns do not result from phonological transformations. Rather, following Peperkamp and Dupoux (2003), we argue that they reflect perceptual assimilation, according to which foreign words are assimilated to the phonetically closest legal surface structures of the native language. We have shown that French and English stimuli ending in [n] differ with respect to both the length and intensity of the nasal consonant and its release, and that these differences account for the absence versus presence of an epenthetic vowel in the responses of our Japanese subjects. What remains to be shown is that word-final [n] in English is phonetically closest to the Japanese moraic nasal [N], which has a variety of phonetic realizations word-finally, including [̃], a nasalized copy of the preceding vowel (Shibatani, 1990), or [}~] (Shinohara, 1997), whereas word-final [n] in French is closest to the Japanese sequence [n...].

We conclude that the process of loanword adaptation is guided by perceptual assimilation which exploits the principle of minimal phonetic distance and is sensible to fine phonetic details of foreign speech. Further research is needed to study perceptual assimilation mechanisms and their application to loanword adaptation process. The reported experiment paradigm, based on controlled phonetic material and accompanied by phonetic analysis, offers an excellent framework to carry out such research.

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Sample nr 2

The structure of the paper

Title of the paper

Conversation logic effects in the minimal group paradigm: existent but weak

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ABSTRACT. According to a conversation logic (Grice, 1975) analysis of the minimal group paradigm, participants discriminate along group boundaries because they feel obliged to incorporate the provided group membership information into their resource allocation decisions. Conversely, intergroup bias might disappear if the relevance of this information is explicitly attributed to a different task, as first demonstrated by Blank (1997). Two experiments addressing possible alternative interpretations of my earlier results, however, failed to support this expectation. In retrospect, the manipulation of group membership relevance might have been overridden by a counteracting salience effect. In contrast, a third experiment provided support for the conversation logic-based prediction that under some conditions outgroup bias should occur. Overall, however, conversation logic effects seem to be weak, compared to other influences in the minimal group paradigm. The general discussion focuses on the inherent uncertainty of the experimental setting and the heterogeneity of behavioral strategies it induces.

Internal division into sections

Introduction

Tajfel and associates developed the minimal group paradigm (MGP) to explore the minimal conditions for intergroup discrimination to occur (Tajfel, 1970; Tajfel, Billig, Bundy and Flament, 1971). In essence, the procedure consists of first categorizing participants into two arbitrary groups on the basis of a trivial criterion (thereby creating minimal groups in the sense that all features normally associated with group membership are missing: face-to-face interaction, common history, personal acquaintance, role structure, group norms, group cohesion, etc.) and then requiring individual participants to judge anonymous other

ingroup and outgroup members on evaluative dimensions or to distribute rewards (money or points) between them. Typically, the participants' averaged evaluations or reward allocations exhibit ingroup bias, that is, on average, participants treat their own group more positively than the outgroup (see reviews by Brewer, 1979; Diehl, 1990; Mullen, Brown and Smith, 1992; Turner, 1978).

Tajfel and Turner (1986) have proposed Social Identity Theory (SIT) as an explanation of this phenomenon: People's group memberships contribute in important ways to their identities, and they also seek to derive positive self-esteem from the groups they are associated with. In the MGP, although the group categorization is trivial, its salience might induce participants to at least temporarily identify with it and try to make it as gratifying as possible, namely, by positively differentiating the ingroup from the outgroup. The salience aspect with respect to group identification has been emphasized particularly by self-categorization theory (Turner, 1985; Turner et al., 1987), a further development of SIT. Other developments within this theoretical tradition have highlighted the uncertainty reduction function of group categorization and subsequent ingroup bias (as opposed or in addition to self-enhancement; e.g., Abrams and Hogg, 1988).

However, there have also been critics of this theorizing and the underlying research paradigm (see, e.g., Rabbie, Schot, and Visser, 1989; and Schiffmann and Wicklund, 1992; for general critiques). Particularly important for the present work, some researchers have been concerned about possible demand characteristics of the MGP (Berkowitz, 1994; Gerard and Hoyt, 1974). The demand characteristics argument holds that participants do not show ingroup bias out of a selfenhancement motivation but are seduced to do so by perceived demand characteristics of the experimental situation. This refers primarily to the fact that the group membership of the participants to be rewarded in an allocation task is made exceedingly salient and may therefore lead the participants to think that the experimenter wants them to use this information and discriminate against the outgroup. Although a study by St. Claire and Turner (1982) seemed to have ruled out such an explanation, it has been revived by additional empirical evidence provided by Berkowitz (1994). Berkowitz found that participants clearly perceived demand characteristics towards ingroup bias and acted in accordance with these. Particularly interesting are postexperimental reports on the transmitters of the demand characteristics: Half of the participants indicated that the group membership information provided along with the distribution matrices

had conveyed them the experimenter's likely hypothesis, and a third of the participants mentioned the categorization procedure. Thus it seems that, at present, demand characteristics cannot be excluded in the MGP.

However, some problems remain with the demand characteristics account as well. Firstly, although the salience of the group membership information somehow seems to convey to the participants that the experiment has something to do with intergroup behavior, it is not immediately clear why this would lead them to suspect that ingroup-favoring behavior (and not outgroup-favoring behavior or fairness) is expected of them. To some degree, there is an inherent circularity in the demand characteristics argument, because it presupposes to some degree the phenomenon it tries to explain. That is, the fact that participants seem to perceive directional demands (as in Berkowitz, 1994) may in itself be a consequence of their experiences with intergroup phenomena (e.g., knowledge about social norms or social identity processes). At least, it seems that some additional factor is needed to account for the direction of the expected and displayed discrimination (e.g., social norms, see below).

Secondly, while specific situational cues (the categorization procedure and in particular the group membership information in the distribution matrices; see above, Berkowitz, 1994) seem to be important in shaping participants' expectations about the experiment, the exact mechanism by which this is brought about is not specified. The latter, in turn, would allow critics to even question their causal role within the demand characteristics process. For example, one might argue that not the cues transfer the demand characteristics upon which the participants act in the experiment, but instead the participants, when asked in the post-experimental questionnaire, point to these salient antecedent features as convenient rationalizations of their own behavior.

In a sense, the demand characteristics account is unsatisfactory because it provides only a description of the participants' perceptions in (more precisely, after) the experiment (which are then offered as an explanation of the participants' behavior) and does not explain how these perceptions originate in the experimental situation.

As an approach that might serve to bridge this theoretical gap, I (Blank, 1997) have proposed a partial account of the ingroup bias phenomenon in the MGP based on Grice's (1975) conversation logic. This approach provides a mechanism that would explain why the participants draw on the group membership information in order to guide their behavior in the experiment. However, it makes no predictions regarding the precise manifestation of intergroup behavior (i.e., ingroup or out-

group favoritism). Insofar, it is only a partial account for the usual MGP findings. Nevertheless, it yields predictions that are tested in the three experiments reported below.

The general rationale is that the same pragmatic rules of communication operate in psychological experiments as in everyday conversations and this must be taken into account when interpreting the results of such experiments lest one runs the risk of serious misinterpretations. Particularly, each step in an experimental procedure (e.g., instructions, presentation of information, measurements, repetition of measurement, etc.) constitutes a communicative act which is interpreted by the participant on the basis of certain conversational rules or, in Grice's terminology, maxims. Importantly, when analyzed before the communicative background of the experiment, experimental manipulations may take on different meanings from what was intended by the experimenter, opening the door for alternative interpretations of the investigated phenomena in terms of conversation logic. Such accounts have recently been provided in such different fields as attribution, eyewitness testimony, judgement and decision, and opinion surveys (Blank, 1998; Bless, Strack and Schwarz, 1993; Fiedler, 1988; Hertwig and Gigerenzer, 1999; Hilton, 1995; Schwarz, 1999).

Applied to the MGP, the logic of conversation approach concentrates particularly on the group membership information given in the reward allocation task. However, unlike the demand characteristics account, it provides a mechanism by which the participants come to use this information. According to Grice's maxim of relevance, each contribution to a conversation is perceived to be relevant to the topic of the conversation. Thus, when information about the group membership of two persons to be rewarded is given along with the distribution matrices, participants will assume that this information is relevant for the task at hand (otherwise it would not be presented) and therefore feel that they should somehow take it into account when making their allocation decisions (moreover, it is the only useful information the participants have to guide their allocation decisions, which should enhance reliance upon it). Insofar as this information is one about a difference (in the most interesting case of one ingroup and one outgroup member to be rewarded), the default reaction mode to this information should be to make a difference, namely, in the rewards allocated to the ingroup and outgroup members.

Of course, this is not to say that each and every participant has to and will use the group membership information in this way. Some people may recognize that the group membership information may be relevant

for the task (or, that the experimenter wants them to perceive it as relevant), may also clearly realize the option of making a difference, and may nevertheless decide to ignore this option and allocate the rewards according to other principles (e.g., equality). Indeed, human behavior is expected to display some variability. Still, this does not invalidate the present approach, because firstly there would be observable effects at the group level even if only some participants would “fall prey” to the conversational mechanism advocated here, and secondly people’s behavior in the MGP itself is known to be extremely variable. For example, there is typically a sizeable proportion of participants who distribute fairly (Turner, 1983).

Of more importance is an inherent limitation of the present approach (which, however, allows for additional predictions; see Experiment 3): “Making a difference” does not predict the direction of the difference (i.e., pro ingroup or pro outgroup), and therefore the conversation logic account can only be a partial explanation of ingroup bias. For a complete account of ingroup bias, this explanation must be supplemented by other, ingroup-favoring mechanisms (e.g., selfenhancement via positive distinctiveness as posited by SIT, or a generic norm of loyalty to the ingroup as initially suggested by Tajfel et al., 1971; see also Gaertner and Insko, 2001; Hertel and Kerr, 2001; for the impact of social norms in the MGP). Nevertheless, because it disentangles differentiation and direction, the conversation logic approach suggests a unique experimental approach (beyond the assessment of perceived demand characteristics), as will be detailed below.

To reiterate, the conversation logic approach proposed here holds that the presentation of information about an ingroup-outgroup difference and the perception of this information as relevant for the allocation task are necessary (but not sufficient) conditions for ingroup bias to occur. With an eye towards experimentation, this specification of a relevance perception process as a precondition for ingroup bias allows us to identify conditions under which ingroup bias might disappear. If the group membership information is presented but not perceived as relevant for the task, then the participants will not feel obliged (by virtue of adherence to cooperative communication principles) to use it, and therefore no ingroup bias might result. Such a state of affairs could be achieved if the participants had an alternative possibility to attribute the relevance of the group membership information, for instance, a second task besides the reward allocation task for which this information is explicitly made relevant.

This was the idea I explored in a previous study (Blank, 1997), which otherwise followed the usual MGP. That is, the participants were categorized into two minimal groups and subsequently distributed rewards between ingroup and outgroup members. Half of the participants, however, worked on a second task in combination with the reward allocation task. They were requested to remember, after three matrices each, the points they had given to each member of the ingroup or outgroup, a task for which the group membership information was obviously relevant (however, the relevance of this information to the allocation task was not explicitly denied). In order to prevent easy shortcuts in solving this task, several numerically different versions of the distribution matrices were constructed. The basic result was that ingroup bias was absent in the double-task group, whereas the usual ingroup bias could be replicated in the standard group, which is in accordance with the conversation logic approach.

Yet these results were equivocal because there are at least two alternative interpretations (brought up by a reviewer of the 1997 article): First, the secondary memory task was relatively difficult and demanding, so that the participants might have concentrated on this task at the expense of the allocation task (plainly speaking, they were too busy to discriminate). Second, the memory task had unequivocal and easily checkable solutions and therefore probably induced evaluation apprehension in the participants. Because it was also a difficult task, mastery of it might give them an opportunity to present themselves favorably to the experimenter and thereby enhance self-esteem in way that bypasses possible self-enhancement through ingroup bias (i.e., they might show interpersonal instead of intergroup behaviour; Tajfel and Turner, 1986).

The first two experiments presented here sought to test the same conversation logic prediction as above while systematically exploring the impact of these alternative mechanisms. In Experiment 1, the difficulty of the secondary task as well as the relevance of the group membership information for this task were experimentally manipulated, with the conversation logic expectation that ingroup bias should disappear at either level of task difficulty, provided that the group membership information is relevant for it. Both alternative interpretations would predict that a difficult task suppresses ingroup bias regardless of the perceived relevance of the group membership information for it. In Experiment 2, the relevance issue was investigated even more directly and without a secondary task by plainly telling half of the participants that the group membership information was irrelevant for the reward allocation task

but would be needed in a later task. According to the conversation logic approach, no ingroup bias should result. Finally, Experiment 3 tested a new prediction of the conversation logic approach. As argued above, the perceived relevance of the group membership information only prompts the participants to make a difference but does not per se imply the direction of this difference. Consequently, it should also be possible to systematically induce outgroup favoritism under suitable conditions.

EXPERIMENT 1

Method

Participants

A hundred and forty-two students from various disciplines except psychology took part in the study. They were recruited from diverse classes held at the campus to participate in “three psychological experiments” (see below) in exchange for a remuneration of 5 Euros. The data of 14 participants could not be analyzed because they had misunderstood the instructions or did not complete all matrices, etc. The remaining 128 participants had been randomly assigned to four experimental conditions (see below) with the restriction that (a) 32 of them participated in each condition, (b) counterbalancing was preserved within conditions (see below), and (c) within one experimental session only one condition could be realized. The number of participants within experimental sessions ranged from one to fifteen.

Procedure and design

The first part of the study (designated “Experiment 1”) served to categorize the participants into two minimal groups with the help of an ostensible colour perception test which required them to make five choices, on five-point scales, between pairs of colours placed successively on a sheet of paper, according to their preference for one or the other colour. The experimenter¹ collected the finished “test sheets”, and while the participants worked on a 15-minute filler task (designated “Experi-

¹ In different sessions, Stefan Röttger, Gregor Weißflog and myself served as experimenters.

ment 2"; a study on autobiographical memory), he pretended to calculate each participant's individual colour perception "test result" with the help of a computer notebook. In fact, the experimenter did not calculate individual scores but randomly informed half of the participants that they were of the "colour sensitive type" or the "contrast sensitive type," respectively. This feedback was embedded in the written instructions to the reward distribution task ("Experiment 3"). The instructions announced the reward distribution task as a decision making task that required to have two groups of participants. For convenience, the two types of perceivers as identified in the first "experiment" (which, so the participants learned, were about evenly distributed in the population) would be used for this purpose. Then each participant read that he or she was a member of the "colour sensitive" or "contrast sensitive" group. Their task would be to distribute reward points between two anonymous people identified only by their participation number and group membership. A filled-in example matrix (showing mild ingroup bias) followed. Further, we emphasized that it was not possible to allocate rewards to oneself. However, as an incentive, we announced that the three participants with the highest sum of points awarded by the other participants each would win 10 Euro.

Depending on the experimental condition, additional instructions followed with respect to the secondary task. Specifically, there were four experimental conditions: (1) The standard condition proceeded just as explained above, without a secondary task. (2) In the difficult only condition, the participants had to remember, after three matrices each, the participant numbers² of the persons to be rewarded (these numbers also figured in the matrices) as well as their position in the matrix (top row vs. bottom row; see matrices and dependent measures section). (3) The relevant-difficult condition was identical to the difficult only condition except that the participants had to remember the participant numbers and the group membership of the rewarded persons. (4) In the relevant-easy condition, the participants had a fairly easy secondary task: They were to remember, after each matrix, only the group membership of the persons in the matrix. In conditions 2 to 4, we explained the respective

² Note that this constitutes a difference to the procedure employed in Blank (1997), where the participants were required to remember the points allocated to the persons. This, however, often led the participants to choose numbers in the distribution matrices that were easy to remember, a strategy that obviously interfered with their allocation behaviour. Therefore, I tried to avoid this in the present studies.

secondary tasks using an example, and instructed the participants to devote equal effort to both tasks.

Thereafter, the participants began with the reward allocation (plus secondary) task. When finished, they answered a final post-experimental questionnaire which asked for their distribution strategies, the perceived purpose of the experiment, the impact of the provided group membership of the persons, and reasons for ingroup bias or, alternatively, fairness in the distribution of rewards (I return to some relevant results from this questionnaire in the discussion section). Upon termination of the study, the participants were fully debriefed.

Matrices and dependent measures

Each matrix consisted of two rows. Each row represented possible payoffs for one person and first indicated on the left side the participant number (a one- or two-digit number) and group membership of the person. The possible payoffs for the persons in the two rows depended on the matrix type. I used three types of point distribution matrices to measure the prevalence of various distribution strategies. (1) A simple INFAV matrix (as employed in Tajfel et al., 1971, Exp. 1) assessed the degree to which the participants favored their own group vs. the outgroup in the reward allocations. (2) A MIP and MJP vs. MD matrix (as used by Tajfel et al. in their second experiment) measured the joint impact (or, "pull") of the two distribution strategies maximum ingroup payoff (MIP) and maximum joint payoff (MJP) on another strategy, maximum difference (in favor of the ingroup; MD). (3) The third matrix type was a variation of another commonly used matrix, F (fairness) vs. MIP and MD (e.g., Billig and Tajfel, 1973). This variation consisted of adding MJP to the fairness side of the matrix, thus contrasting the joint impacts of two nondiscriminatory distribution strategies - F and MJP - and two discriminatory strategies - MIP and MD - on each other. For details on various distribution strategies and the logic of their assessment via pull scores, see Tajfel et al. (1971), Blank (1997), Bornstein et al. (1983), or Bourhis, Sachdev and Gagnon (1994).

In agreement with the proceeding in Blank (1997), I used eight versions of each matrix type in the present experiments. Four versions each differed in the numerical values of the rewards to be distributed, although they obeyed the same construction principle. For example, in a standard version of an ingroup favoritism matrix, the values in the top

row (assigned to, say, an ingroup member) run from 1 to 14 whereas the bottom values (assigned to an outgroup member) run from 14 to 1. Then, a numerical variation of this principle would have, for instance, the top row running from 5 to 18 and the bottom row from 18 to 5. Another variation would have values from 2 to 28 in the top row and from 28 to 2 in the bottom row (however, no matrix contained any negative values in the experiments reported here). Also, these matrices differed from those conventionally used in that they consisted of only seven columns instead of thirteen or fourteen (making it easier to construct numerically different versions). Further, the four numerically different matrix versions were used in four different combinations of ingroup and outgroup members in the top and bottom rows of the matrices (i.e., ingroup top/ingroup bottom, ingroup top/outgroup bottom, outgroup top/ingroup bottom, and outgroup top/outgroup bottom). This served to counterbalance the assignment of numerical versions to member combinations across participants. Finally, each of the four versions of each matrix type had an additional mirror version with reversed right-left ordering of the points, yielding eight versions of each matrix type and 24 matrices altogether. Another three matrices placed at the beginning of the matrix booklets served as practice trials and were not analyzed.

Because the specifics of these various matrix types and distribution strategies are not a central focus of this article, I also calculated a more general measure as suggested by Diehl (1990), that is, the difference between the total points assigned to ingroup members and the total points assigned to outgroup members, summed across all 24 analyzed matrices. This measure will serve as the dependent measure throughout this article. The results based on this analysis are entirely consistent with the more specific analyses of the matrices as outlined above (these specific results may be obtained upon request from the author).

Results and discussion

Table 1 gives the essential results of Experiment 1. In the standard condition, the usual ingroup bias effect could be replicated with one-tailed testing, the effect size (Cohen's *d*) being in the small to medium range, corresponding to the usual order of magnitude in minimal group experiments (Mullen et al., 1992). Contrary to my expectations, this ingroup bias effect did not vanish with a secondary task for which the group membership information was explicitly relevant. This held for

both the relevant-difficult and relevant-easy conditions, where significant ingroup bias emerged. Another unexpected result was that ingroup bias was essentially absent in the difficult-only condition where the participants worked on a difficult secondary task for which the group membership information was not relevant.

Table 1. Average ingroup bias in different experimental conditions of Experiment 1 (Difference between total points assigned to the ingroup and outgroup)

Condition	Difference	SD	t(31)	p[a] d
1. Standard	25.4	77.2	1.86	.04 .33
2. Difficult only	7.3	59.0	.70	.24 .12
3. Relevant-difficult	21.8	61.9	1.99	.03 .35
4. Relevant-easy	45.0	77.9	3.27	.001 .58

[a] One-tailed tests against the null hypothesis of no discrimination.

This latter result is perfectly in line, however, with both alternative interpretations of the Blank (1997) results as outlined in the introduction. That is, the difficult secondary task may have absorbed the cognitive resources of the participants, keeping them too busy to discriminate, and/or may have provided them with an opportunity to directly enhance their individual self esteem, thereby obviating the need for indirect self-enhancement via ingroup favoritism.

Yet some aspects of the data cannot be fully explained by these alternative accounts either. Because, according to these accounts, the difficulty of the secondary task is responsible for a suppression of ingroup bias, they cannot explain why there is significant ingroup bias in the relevant-difficult condition. Also, they cannot explain why the amount of ingroup bias is roughly twice as high in the relevant-easy condition, compared to the standard condition, while there should be no difference – from these perspectives – between these conditions. Thus, the pattern of results creates problems for all of the previously discussed explanatory approaches.

A more convincing, post hoc interpretation of the pattern of results in Experiment 1 would result from the supposed operation of two separate principles: First, the difficulty of the secondary task serves to reduce ingroup bias, as expected from the two alternative interpretations of the Blank (1997) results in terms of cognitive load and direct self-enhancement.

cement. Second, the use of the group membership information in the two relevance conditions leads to increased salience of the group categorization, which in turn is known to enhance ingroup bias (e.g., Brewer, 1979). Such increased salience was also reflected in some participants' comments in the post-experimental questionnaire (e.g., "[I] only attended [to the group membership information] because it was later tested (...) If this had not been the case, I probably would have paid no attention to it"; statement by a participant in the relevant-easy condition).

Importantly, this effect of increased category salience would perfectly counteract the effect of the relevance manipulation that followed from my conversation logic analysis. Rather than freeing the participants from the (conversationally implied) demand to use the group membership information for discrimination, its stated relevance for the other task seems to have seduced at least some participants to use it as a guideline for their reward allocation decisions, this latter effect being stronger in hindsight. In retrospect, then, the four conditions realized in Experiment 1 constitute a 2 (secondary task load) * 2 (category salience) between-participants design in which the experimental conditions can be identified as follows: Standard = no load, low salience; difficult only = high load, low salience; relevant-difficult = high load, high salience; relevant-easy = (essentially) no load, high salience.

Having identified this post hoc design, it may be appropriate to conduct a post hoc ANOVA in order to assess the impact of secondary task load and category salience (treated as a random and a fixed factor, respectively) on the amount of ingroup bias. This ANOVA revealed marginally significant impacts of both factors (secondary task load: $F(1,1) = 63.23$, $p = .08$; category salience: $F(1,1) = 43.27$, $p = .10$). There was no significant interaction between these factors ($F < 1$).

Taken together, this analysis lends some support to the above post hoc interpretation of the Experiment 1 results. With respect to the original issue being investigated in this experiment, namely, the possible contribution of conversation logic mechanisms to ingroup bias in the minimal group paradigm, it seems then that the idea of manipulating the perceived relevance of the group membership information for the reward allocation task did not work very well because the participants' reward distributions were more thoroughly affected by two unintended side effects of this manipulation, namely, effects related to task difficulty and category salience. In particular, it seems that the obviously stronger but contrary effect of category salience on ingroup bias made it impossible to detect a relevance effect as expected from the conversation logic analysis.

There is, however, at least a single proof of existence for such a mechanism in Experiment 1, stemming from the postexperimental questionnaire. One participant (in the relevant-easy condition), when asked how the information about the group membership of the to-be-rewarded persons influenced his or her strategy in the distribution task, answered: "Not at all! K and F [the German initials of the categories] had a meaning only for the memory task". While this single statement certainly constitutes no impressive evidence for the conversation logic account, it points to the possibility that one might find more support for it with a different procedure that avoids the problems of the secondary task manipulation in Experiment 1. I tried this in

EXPERIMENT 2

The key idea in Experiment 2 was to manipulate the perceived relevance of the group membership information for the reward allocation task without the help of a secondary task, in order to circumvent the problems associated with such a task, as detailed above. I did this by simply telling the participants in an irrelevance condition that the group membership information was not needed for the present reward allocation task but for another experiment that would be done later with the same materials. A standard condition identical to the one realized in Experiment 1 (except for minor changes due to the computer-controlled administration in Experiment 2) served as a control condition. The expectation from the conversation logic approach was that participants in the irrelevance condition should not feel obliged to use the group membership information to guide their reward allocation decisions, and therefore they should not exhibit ingroup bias in their allocations.

Method

Participants

Fifty-two psychology undergraduates participated in Experiment 2 in exchange for a payment of 5 Euro or 7.5 Euro, depending on whether they also participated in Experiment 3 (see below), or for equivalent course credit. All of them knew at the outset that some of them would be chosen randomly to participate in a second, shorter session (Experiment 3). By random assignment, 24 individuals in Experiment 2 participated in

the standard condition and 28 in the irrelevance condition (with the restriction that counterbalancing was preserved). In order to enhance their motivation to participate, five times 10 Euro were disposed of by lot among the participants in Experiment 2 (irrespective of their additional participation in Experiment 3).

Procedure, design, and dependent measures

In most procedural respects, Experiment 2 was identical to Experiment 1 except that it proceeded as a computer-controlled experiment for practical reasons and there was no filler task. The participants first read instructions equivalent to those in Experiment 1 and started to work on a computerized version of the bogus colour perception task. When finished, the computer program announced that it had calculated their score. To avoid having two versions of the computer program which would have to be counterbalanced across participants (in addition to the counterbalancing of matrix versions, see Experiment 1), however, they merely learned about the existence of two distinct perception categories („colour sensitive” or “contrast sensitive”) but not to which group they themselves belonged. Instead, the program explained that for the decision task to follow it was only necessary for them to know whether the persons to be rewarded belonged to their own group or to the outgroup. (This means at the same time that any possible identification with the ingroup should result from mere belongingness but not from any substantive features of the categories.) An explanation of the reward allocation task followed, using an example, and the participants also had the opportunity to go through the instructions for a second time if they wanted. After having finished the distribution matrices, the program reminded them that some of them would be asked to participate in a second session the next week. I delayed debriefing of all participants until this second session (Experiment 3) had been run. The whole procedure of Experiment 2 lasted about 45 minutes.

The standard condition of Experiment 2 - with the changes described above - was equivalent to the standard condition of Experiment 1. The irrelevance condition differed from the standard condition in only one respect: In the introduction of the reward allocation task, an added sentence stated that the group membership information given in the matrices would not be needed in the present session but only in the second

and was retained here only for practical reasons. I highlighted this sentence in red to ensure that it would be noticed by the participants. All matrices and dependent measures were identical to Experiment 1.

Results and discussion

As Table 2 shows, the amount of ingroup bias in the standard condition was comparable to Experiment 1, even though it reached only marginal significance because of the smaller sample size. Contrary to my expectations, ingroup bias did not vanish in the irrelevance condition but was even larger than in the standard condition. Thus, the results of Experiment 2 also failed to support the conversation logic approach to the minimal group paradigm.

Table 2. Average ingroup bias in Experiments 2 and 3 (Difference between total points assigned to the ingroup and outgroup)

Experiment/Condition	Difference	SD	t	p[a]	d
Exp. 2 irrelevance (N = 28)	38.6	83.4	2.45	.01	.46
Exp. 2 standard (N = 24)	22.4	75.8	1.45	.08	.30
Experiment 3 (N = 24)	21.7	88.6	1.20	.12	.24

[a] One-tailed tests against the null hypothesis of no discrimination.

In retrospect, the most likely explanation for this might be the one also invoked in the discussion of Experiment 1: Although not intended, and indeed hoped to be circumvented by the new manipulation, the irrelevance manipulation in Experiment 2 might again have increased the salience of the group categorization, which in turn resulted in sizeable ingroup bias, over and above any possible reduction of it due to a perceived irrelevance of the group membership information for the allocation task.

Indeed, this suggests a fundamental difficulty in testing predictions of the conversation logic approach in the minimal group paradigm: It might not be possible at all to manipulate the perceived relevance of the group categorization without at the same time increasing its salience, because in order to manipulate the perceived relevance of the only piece of information that seems to be useful for the participants to guide their decisions, one must somehow relate to it, mention it, which might suffice to increase its salience and counteract the intended effect of the manipulation.

EXPERIMENT 3

Experiment 3 tested a unique prediction of the conversation logic approach, and one that should not be plagued with the problems discussed above. As outlined in the introduction, the conversation logic approach holds that the group membership information should induce the participants, by obeying the maxim of relevance, to make a difference in their reward allocations along the group categorization. However, it does not specify the direction of the difference, that is, pro-ingroup or pro-outgroup. Accordingly, it should be possible to systematically induce outgroup bias under suitable circumstances, at least in some participants. In Experiment 3, I tried to achieve this by creating a situation where the outgroup appeared more deserving of rewards than the ingroup, that is, a situation where a fairness or distributive justice norm is compatible with "making a difference". Consequently, participants acting according to such a norm (and typically, there are quite some participants in minimal group experiments found to distribute fairly; cf. e.g. Branthwaite, Doyle and Lightbown, 1979; Turner, 1983) might be expected to exhibit outgroup bias.

Actually, this prediction was tested in the second session announced to the participants in Experiment 2. All participants in the standard condition of Experiment 2 were requested to take part in this second session, at the beginning of which they learned about the ostensible meantime result after the first session. They were told that up to this point the ingroup had been awarded about 25% more points than the outgroup. Because the participants were about to make allocation decisions in another round of distribution matrices, they had the opportunity to correct for this outgroup disadvantage by showing outgroup bias in their decisions if they wanted to. The latter should hold particularly for those participants who had distributed fairly in the first session.

Method

Participants

The 24 psychology undergraduates from the standard condition of Experiment 2 participated in what was for them the second session of their experiment (see method section of Experiment 2 for further details).

Procedure, design, and dependent measures

The computerized instructions at the beginning of the session informed the participants that this second session was necessary because usually their concentration on this type of decision would decrease after about 30 matrices. They further learned that some participants had asked how many points both groups had received so far, and therefore we (the experimenters) had decided to announce the meantime result of both groups. Ostensibly, the ingroup had received 1809 points and the outgroup had received 1423 points. After this information, the experiment immediately proceeded with exactly the same set of matrices as in Experiment 2. Finally, after having finished the matrices, the participants received a post-experimental questionnaire similar to that used in Experiments 1 and 2. Together with the first session from Experiment 2, this additional session constituted a longitudinal design, with a major emphasis on changes in the participants' reward distributions.

Results and discussion

Table 2 shows that the overall level of ingroup bias in Experiment 3 is largely unchanged from the first session (that is, the standard condition of Experiment 2). However, this first impression is not very informative with respect to the theoretical expectation entertained here, that is, that in particular those participants who had distributed fairly in the first session might exhibit outgroup bias in the second session.

More specific evidence relevant to this prediction can be gathered from a more refined analysis in terms of dominant distribution strategies of participants, as suggested in recent work (Blank, 2003; Petersen and Blank, 2001), which makes it possible to subdivide the sample in terms of dominant strategies in both sessions. The essence of this analysis (although the details are beyond the scope of this article) is, first, to identify the strategy with the largest pull score on a given matrix type. This is done on the basis of an expanded pull score analysis that includes a third pull score (in addition to the two conventional pull scores), which reflects the participant's tendency to check columns in the middle of the matrix (conversely, the two conventional pull scores reflect tendencies towards certain columns at the ends of the matrix). For example, the middle of a MIP and MJP vs. MD matrix represents the point of fairness, and a par-

participant checking the middle column would therefore be assigned the maximum pull score for fairness.

The second important step in the analysis is to take the consistency of strategies across different matrix types in an experimental session into account (cf. the description of the matrix types in the method section of Experiment 1). Conceivably, if a strategy is dominant, it should be operating in all of the matrix types (usually, minimal group experiments make use of three different matrix types). Moreover, because each matrix type confounds two or more strategies by design, the cross-matrix type analysis helps to strip a dominant strategy from spurious companions, so to speak. In short, the dominant strategy analysis combines local dominance (i.e., within a given matrix type) and crossmatrix-type consistency to yield dominant distribution strategies of individuals at the level of an experimental session. In a validation study (Blank, 2003), such dominant strategies turned out to correspond quite well with the participants' self-reported strategies. However, it may also be the case that no dominant strategy is identified, as when participants respond randomly (Blank, 2003).

In Experiment 3, the dominant strategy analysis established that six of the 24 participants pursued a fairness strategy in the first session (including one participant who exhibited a mix between two cooperative dominant strategies, fairness and MJP). These participants are of main interest for the present purposes.³ How did they behave in the second session? Two of them stuck to their fairness strategy, while the other four at least partially changed it in the predicted direction. More precisely, one participant completely shifted his or her strategy to a MOP (maximum outgroup payoff) strategy. This change – as identified on the basis of the objective reward allocations – was corroborated by the participant when asked about possible strategy changes in the post-experimental questionnaire: “In the second session, I tried to equalize the point scores of the groups and therefore always gave as much points as possible to the outgroup” [my translation]. The remaining three participants exhibited an inconsistent mixture between fairness and outgroup-favoring strategies (MOP or MDO – maximum differentiation in favor of the outgroup) in the second session. This partial change was also corroborated

³ The other participants largely fell into three categories. Four individuals pursued other meaningful intergroup strategies like MDI, another four followed a consistent response tendency towards the middle of the matrices (which can be meaningfully distinguished from fairness in the dominant strategy analysis; see Blank, 2003), and finally, ten participants did not display any consistent strategy at all.

in the postexperimental questionnaire by one participant: “in the second session occasionally more points to the outgroup, because it was behind in terms of the point score” [my translation]; the other two participants provided no relevant information.

Importantly, an outgroup-favoring strategy in the second session (MDO or MOP) was neither associated with any other consistent dominant session one strategy than fairness nor with any of the inconsistent strategy mixtures in session one. In other words, the changes predicted by the conversation logic account were in fact specific to the fair session one participants. This difference in outgroup favoritism proportions (four of six fair participants compared to none of the remaining 18 participants) is significant by a chi square test (corrected for small samples), $\chi^2(1) = 10.00, p = .002$. Thus, the results of the third experiment are more supportive of the conversation logic account than the results of the preceding two experiments, even though this support is not impressive in numbers and not all of the fair session one participants completely shifted to an outgroup-favoring strategy. However, it might be that some participants’ desire to appear consistent across sessions had worked against the predicted changes and, therefore, the expectation of a complete and radical shift was too optimistic from the start. In sum, it seems fair to say that Experiment 3 yielded the first substantive support for my conversation logic analysis of the minimal group paradigm. Participants in the latter become inclined to differentiate in the first place, and when given a good reason to do so, they also differentiate in favor of the outgroup.

Seen from a slightly different angle: Fair participants discriminate if their underlying fairness motivation is compatible with making a difference. This may at the same time explain why they did not discriminate (in favor or against any of the two groups) in the first session: Their fairness motivation had suppressed any discriminatory demand that might have been conversation-logically conveyed. Once again, however, such a suppression mechanism would illustrate the comparative weakness of conversation logic effects in the MGP. They are easily overridden by the salience of the group membership information, and they seem to be just as easily suppressed by a fairness motivation under the standard MGP conditions.

General discussion

Let me summarize the main findings from the present experiments. Experiment 1 tested the conversation logic-based prediction that ingroup bias would be eliminated if the group categorization was not perceived

as relevant for the reward allocation task. I tried to achieve this by making it explicitly relevant for a secondary task. As it turned out, however, the presence of a categorization-relevant secondary task heightened rather than diminished or eliminated ingroup bias. A second finding from Experiment 1 was that a cognitively demanding secondary task (whether categorization-relevant or not) reduced the amount of ingroup bias. In Experiment 2, the perceived relevance of the group membership information was manipulated without the help of a secondary task, by plainly telling the participants that this information was not relevant for it (but for a later task with the same materials). This new manipulation again led to more rather than less ingroup bias. My post hoc explanation for these unexpected findings was that any potential effect of perceived relevance of the group membership information for the reward allocation task was overridden by the increased salience of the group categorization. In retrospect, this unintended counter-effect seems to be an unavoidable consequence of the relevance manipulation.

However, with this interpretation I do not mean to immunize the conversation logic account against falsification. A counteracting salience effect, although possibly unavoidable in terms of experimental design, does not make it logically impossible for the participants to behave in accordance with the presumed conversation logic mechanisms (and in fact, the quote from one participant in Experiment 1 provided evidence that these mechanisms were possible to operate). Thus, the question is why the participants went on to use the group membership information for discrimination purposes even if they should, according to conversation logic, feel no need to do so. Two possibilities come to mind.

First, not all participants may in fact have perceived this reduced need. This may explain some of the Experiment 1 effects, since the induced relevance attributions to a secondary task did not logically exclude an attribution also to the primary task. Thus, some participants may have perceived the group membership information as relevant for both tasks. However, this explanation is less applicable to Experiment 2 because, in the irrelevance condition of this experiment, it was made quite explicit to the participants that the group membership information would not be needed for the matrix task.

Therefore, a second possibility seems more viable, namely, that at least some participants intentionally decided to use the group membership information in spite of its perceived irrelevance. Whatever the motivation behind such intentional decisions (I return to this issue below), their mere existence clearly indicates that the impact of conversation

logic-based relevance perceptions is relatively weak in the minimal group paradigm, compared to other factors and processes.

On the positive side, Experiment 3 found support for a different prediction of the conversation logic account, namely that, if differentiation takes place, the direction of this differentiation is not restricted to ingroup favoritism but can also take on the form of outgroup favoritism under suitable circumstances. After having learned that the ingroup was "ahead" after the first session, participants who had distributed fairly in a first session shifted to outgroup bias in a second session. However, I should mention in all fairness that the conversation logic account cannot explain the whole pattern of results in Experiments on its own. Ironically, the very precondition for conversation logic-based outgroup favoritism to occur (i.e., fair distribution behavior in the first session, which means not differentiating) is left unexplained by it. That is, conversation logic mechanisms have to interact with other factors (as the impact of social norms like fairness) in order to produce the pattern of results in Experiment 3. While this does not invalidate the conversation logic account, it again testifies to its limited role in the minimal group paradigm.

Given that the conversation logic account can play, as we have seen, but a minor role in explaining the results of the complete set of experiments presented in this article, is there a better explanation? To begin with, social identity theory might well explain the participants' allocation behavior in Experiments 1 and 2, if we assume that the relevance manipulations had inadvertently increased the salience of the group categorization. This, in turn, would have led the participants to see themselves as group members and act accordingly, that is, exhibit intergroup discrimination. The fact that the participants showed less ingroup bias when they had to perform a cognitively demanding secondary task might also be interpreted in line with the social identity approach. It can be argued that this task offered them an opportunity to directly enhance their individual self-esteem by performing well, obviating the need for an indirect enhancement of self-esteem via identification with their minimal group. Consequently, it would be of no wonder that they showed no or less intergroup discrimination.

However, the assumption that a difficult secondary task would induce an individual self-esteem enhancement motivation in the participants is in itself clearly post hoc and cannot be verified by independent data in the present experiments. Moreover, even if this should have been the case, one might ask just why the participants found it more attractive to engage in interpersonal instead of intergroup behaviour. Or, why did

the participants not try to pursue both personal and intergroup goals at the same time? Logically, this would have been entirely possible in this case. Finally, social identity theory cannot straightforwardly explain why some of the fair participants shifted towards outgroup bias in Experiment 3. I admit that this is not a big failure of social identity theory, because it never denied the impact of other than identity-enhancing motivations, like fairness, in the MGP. Then, granted the impact of fairness, the shift towards outgroup favoritism can simply be regarded as a situationally adapted form of fairness.

In general, however, what it is difficult to explain from the perspective of social identity theory is why there are such large differences in strategies between people, that is, why some individuals show ingroup favoritism, others distribute fairly or show outgroup favoritism, and still others pursue no meaningful intergroup strategy at all and allocate points randomly (cf. Blank, 2003). A similar explanatory problem exists if social norms are invoked to account for the participants' allocation behavior. In this case, one would have to explain why some people act according to a loyalty-to-the-ingroup norm, others according to a fairness norm, and so on.

Inherent uncertainty of the experimental setting leads to strategy variability

Perhaps the solution to this heterogeneity of behavior in research done with the MGP and the Tajfel matrices lies not in any "substantive" processes or mechanisms as suggested by social identity theory, social norm adherence, or conversation logic but in the inherent uncertainty of the experimental setting and the reward distribution task. Allocating points to people one does not even know, without any reasonable clue as to how to distribute besides the knowledge about those people's membership in one of two more or less meaningful categories, comes across for many participants as a rather strange and nonsensical task and creates considerable uncertainty as to the proper way to handle it. In fact, in the present studies, the question most often asked of the experimenters during the experimental sessions was "How am I to distribute the points? According to which criterion?". That is, there was clearly no self-evident "task solution" for many of the participants. In the face of such uncertainty, they may have sought to define the experimental situation in ways that (1) maximized sense and (2) minimized uncertainty.

As one way of meeting these criteria, they may have chosen to concentrate on the secondary memory task as an intuitively sensible task with a clear performance criterion („remember as much and as correct as possible“) and to more or less neglect the reward allocation task by responding randomly or according to some arbitrary criterion (e.g., always checking the middle column of the matrix). Alternatively, if concentrating on the reward allocation task, the participants might employ any simple strategy that makes sense within itself, that is, appears consistent and rational in the sense of conforming to some plausible and acceptable standard. Such standards may be social norms that are applicable to intergroup situations, like fairness or loyalty to the ingroup (see, e.g., Gaertner and Insko, 2001; Hertel and Kerr, 2001, on the impact of norms in minimal group situations), but also motivational standards like self-esteem enhancement, as suggested by social identity theory. Moreover, participants might use conversationally implied situational cues or perceived demand characteristics to derive subjectively meaningful allocation strategies. Finally, personality differences may also play a role.

In short, when faced with an inherently uncertain situation, the participants look for and choose from an array of quite different cues and standards to guide their behavior, resulting in a multitude of distribution strategies. Of course, depending on the situation and on experimental manipulations, one or the other cue or standard may become influential, leading to mean shifts in strategies, without however reducing their variability.

Abrams and Hogg (1988) have presented a somewhat similar – at first glance – analysis of the minimal group situation (see also Grieve and Hogg, 1999; Hodson and Sorrentino, 2001; Jetten, Hogg and Mullin, 2000). These authors, too, point to situational uncertainty as a major determinant of the participants' behaviour in the minimal group paradigm and hold that ingroup bias is a means of reducing the uncertainty of the relation between the two minimal groups. I agree with this analysis; however, I would extend it to the experimental situation as a whole, as described above.

That is, the first question is how the participants deal with this situation, how they define it in ways that maximize sense and minimize uncertainty. Such definitions may be in terms of individual, interpersonal or intergroup situations. Only if the participants come to define the situation as an intergroup situation arises the further question how to reduce its uncertainty in terms of intergroup strategies. Ingroup bias is one possibility, as conceived by Abrams and Hogg (1988). But this is not an in-

evitable consequence; fairness is another feasible strategy of dealing with it (and indeed, there were quite a few participants in the present experiments who chose fairness as their rationale for intergroup behavior rather than ingroup favoritism). Which solution the participants will endorse may depend on factors as conceived by social identity theory, for example, the degree of identification with the ingroup, but also on additional influences as self-presentation concerns. A participant may well identify with the ingroup and feel inclined to treat it more favorably but deliberately choose a fairness strategy because he or she assumes that the experiment has to do with ingroup bias and he or she does not want to appear prejudiced to the investigator.

In short, ingroup bias as a reaction to intergroup uncertainty is but one possible process in the minimal group paradigm which should be regarded within the larger context of the experimental situation and the participants' definition of it. A more detailed analysis, based on the post-experimental questionnaires, of these perceptions and the mechanisms that lead to one or another way of dealing with the experimental situation is currently under way. The conversation logic mechanisms featured in the present work are one possible mechanism in this process but, as we have seen, not a particularly powerful one. In any case, what follows from this analysis is that the minimal group paradigm, particularly when combined with the Tajfel matrices, is perhaps not the best way to study intergroup processes, because of its inherent uncertainty and the sometimes erratic behavior it provokes.

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General audience scientific papers

5. The structure of a general audience scientific paper

A general audience theoretical paper may be quite theoretical in scope but has been addressed to an educated general audience. It usually has a rigid structure and contains a number of parts, such as the following:

- title of the paper
- name(s) of the author(s)
- their affiliation (optional)
- their addresses (optional)
- abstract (optional)
- keywords (optional)
- internal division into sections (usually numbered) which include:
 - o introduction
 - o sections
 - o conclusions
 - o paragraphs
 - o diagrams, figures and other graphic means
 - o quotations (optional)
 - o bibliography (or references which may be optionally numbered)
 - o annexes (optional)
 - o acknowledgements (optional).

6. Samples of general audience scientific papers

Sample nr 1

The structure of the paper

Title of the paper

Never cry wolf: science, sentiment, and the literary rehabilitation of Canis Lupus

Karen Jones

INSTEAD OF AN ABSTRACT. A shepherd boy was watching his flock near the village and was bored. He thought it would be great fun to pretend that a Wolf was attacking the sheep, so he cried out Wolf! Wolf! And the villagers came running. He laughed and laughed when they discovered there was no Wolf. He played the trick again. And then again. Each time the villagers came, only to be fooled. Then one day a Wolf did come and the Boy cried out Wolf! Wolf! But no one answered his call. They thought he was playing the same games again.

Internal division into sections:

The boy who cried Wolf

In common with the mischievous shepherd boy of Aesopian fable, humans are profligate storytellers. Individuals recount both monotonous routines and unusual occurrences with narrative verve. The telling of

tales is enshrined as a popular tradition in many cultures. Significantly, human accounts abound with references to other creatures, narrators populating their tales with a cast of beasts designed to provide sylvan sparkle, convey moral messages, or impart keen warnings. The depiction of faunal characters in popular literature also tells us a great deal about environmental attitudes. The roles apportioned to animals – their character, motivations, and qualities – reflect societal views of the natural world, suggesting how humans perceive nature and alluding to our relationships with other species. Behind the caution against habitual equivocation of the Boy Who Cried Wolf lurks an assumption of canine malevolence, the cunning lupine villain pitted against an embattled human community.

From *Black Beauty* (1877) and *Kindred of the Wild* (1902) to *Tarka the Otter* (1927) and *Pilgrims of the Wild* (1935), literary protesters have deployed the written word to lobby on behalf of four-legged forms. Even in the age of mass media, the book remains a key medium of environmental expression offering emotive and cogent alternative narratives on intra-species relations, industrial progress, and human behaviour towards the rest of nature.

It is precisely this relationship between nature writing and environmentalism that I want to explore by looking at the controversy generated by *Never Cry Wolf*, a cardinal text of Canadian wildlife advocacy. Published by distinguished nature writer Farley Mowat in 1963, the book tells the story of a greenhorn biologist and his encounter with a wolf pack in the Canadian tundra. The title earned international renown, sold over a million copies, and made it onto the big screen courtesy of Disney Pictures in 1981.

Part of the allure of *Never Cry Wolf* heralded from its position within an illustrious storytelling tradition. For thousands of years, *Canis lupus*, or the gray wolf, has proved a popular character in folklore. Native American medicine men related how lupine protagonists dispensed hunting lore to listening warriors or guided travellers safely out of danger. Parents in eighteenth-century Europe warned their progeny of lascivious canines that preyed on red-jacketed girls in the gloomy forest. North American pioneers, themselves entranced by wolf howls in the woods, spun yarns of rapacious lupine killers with the capacity to destroy hundreds of cattle.

In the early 1900s a new breed of wolf literature emerged from the likes of Jack London, Ernest Thompson Seton, and Charles G.D. Roberts. These North American authors revered the wolf as an accomplished wil-

derness hunter and independent spirit, hailing the animal as a vibrant and vital symbol of an unspoiled and primitive continent. According to the realistic animal story of the early twentieth century, wolf society was moral, honourable, and benign. Farley Mowat drew heavily on such themes in crafting *Never Cry Wolf*. Yet, in contrast to its widespread appeal as a readable and romantic northern yarn, *Never Cry Wolf* was greeted with skepticism in scientific circles. High-ranking biologists raised solemn objections to the book's idiosyncratic blend of scientific argument and quixotic prose.

This article suggests that *Never Cry Wolf* represents an important chapter in the history of Canadian environmentalism. The deluge of letters received by the Canadian Wildlife Service from concerned citizens opposing the killing of wolves testifies to the growing significance of literature as a protest medium. Modern Canadians roused to defend a species that their predecessors sought to eradicate. By the 1960s the wolf had made the transition from the beast of waste and desolation (in the words of Theodore Roosevelt) to a conservationist *cause celebre*. *Never Cry Wolf* played a key role in fostering that change.

The controversy over *Never Cry Wolf* further encapsulates a crucial divide within modern environmentalism between professional science and amateur naturalism. Opinion on Farley Mowat's tome was divided between those who based their fundamental conservationist visions on rational, scientific research and those who favoured emotional, spiritual, and intuitive engagements with nature. It also raised the problem of competing claims to ecological authority – a theme that resurfaces today in environmental altercations over Atlantic fishing, oil drilling, and global warming.

Writing the wolf

Born in 1921 in Ontario, Farley Mowat nurtured affection for the outdoors at an early age. At the age of fourteen, having moved to Saskatchewan with his parents, the young naturalist issued his first defense of predators in an article for the *Star Phoenix* newspaper protesting the shooting of hawks by local farmers. Such youthful musings situated Mowat in a North American amateur naturalist tradition based on intimate engagement with nature, the collection and classification of species, and moral concern for animal welfare.

Following a tour of duty during the Second World War, Mowat visited the Canadian barren lands, sensing that the remote and pristine wilderness would offer an "escape into the quiet sanctuaries where the echoes of war had never been heard." The North, in Mowat's estimation, served as a refuge from modernity. In March 1947 Mowat signed up for an expedition to Keewatin with an American ornithologist working for the Arctic Institute, and he revisited the area in 1948-9 as a student biologist under contract to study caribou with the newly created Dominion (later Canadian) Wildlife Service. His professional credentials were eclectic, reflecting personal interests in literature, ethnology, biology, and exploration. However, aspirations as a writer, a roving naturalist, and a commentator on northern issues did not marry well with Mowat's biological career, and he was soon dismissed.

When Mowat published *Never Cry Wolf* in 1963, his estrangement from Canada's professional wildlife authorities was obvious. The naturalist had transformed his field observations of a wolf pack at Nueltin Lake in 1948-9 into an imaginative literary plea for canine preservation. Mowat chastized his superiors at the Dominion Wildlife Service (DWS) as doctrinaire officials with military pretensions. In the gloomy and Formalin-smelling dens of the DWS, Mowat portrayed his assignments as nothing more than to discern "legitimate grievances" against wolf outlaws in the Northwest Territories for "killing all the deer."

The wilderness journey of *Never Cry Wolf* represented a route to self-discovery, a conversion project that involved the discarding of hoary preconceptions about bloodthirsty wolves. Captivated by the activities of the pack at "Wolf House Bay," Mowat offered his readers a startling epiphany: "Inescapably, the realization was being borne in upon my preconditioned mind that the centuries-old and universally accepted human concept of wolf characteristics was a palpable lie." This notion of finding truth in the material wilderness related a key trope of North American nature writing. In particular, it recalled naturalist Aldo Leopold's encounter with a vanquished she-wolf in New Mexico in the 1920s. In his famous essay "Thinking Like a Mountain," Leopold recounted how a "fierce green fire" dying in the eyes of his canine prey forced him to reconsider customary assumptions of wolves as worthless vermin. *Never Cry Wolf* discarded rationalist scientific protocols in favour of a more intuitive approach, with personal observation and spirituality replacing scientific dogma as axioms of truth.

Mowat presented his lupine compatriots as a tightly knit, convivial community of mesmerising, albeit anthropomorphic characters. Wolf "George" represented the ideal father, "Angeline" the devoted yet feisty mother, and "Uncle Albert" the dependable pup sitter. Crucially, amid

the jocular anecdotes, Mowat forged a vivid impression of the northern landscape, its wolves and its people, as a vibrant, pristine, and, above all, moral society. Pertinent comparisons can be drawn with works by Canadian precursors -- Grey Owl, Ernest Thompson Seton, and Charles G.D. Roberts. For these writers, the natural world demonstrated a natural civility, harmony, and decorum. Their literary remit involved presenting animals as sensitive, thoughtful individuals whom humans could identify with as "fellow mortals," in Scottish-Californian naturalist John Muir's famous phrase. In contrast to frontier stereotypes offering the wolf as rapacious, Charles Roberts instructed his readers as to the personality, charm, and kinship to be had with furred and feathered friends.

Mowat learned to see wolves as worthy members of the Arctic ecosystem. *Never Cry Wolf* disseminated a powerful, alternative narrative on *Canis lupus*. Mowat presented wolves as ingenious creatures engaged in a naturally beneficial relationship with the caribou. Instead of the ferocious beasts indiscriminately slaying entire herds, the pack favoured sick or weak animals and subsisted on small rodents once the caribou migrated to summer range. This observation was not an original contention -- a handful of North American scientists from Adolph Murie to Aldo Leopold had already articulated powerful pleas for canine preservation on the grounds of ecological health. However, *Never Cry Wolf* played an instrumental role in bringing the rehabilitated wolf, the ecological predator, into the public arena.

Farley Mowat ended his literary foray into the barrenlands with an abrupt change of style. The author adopted sombre language to describe the war waged on northern fauna by Euro-American sports hunters armed with high-powered rifles. The white man embodied a rapacious destroyer driven by a desire to control the environment. The fate of the barren lands poignantly demonstrated the alienation of modern man from nature, the North emblematic of a lost kingdom where people and wolves lived in natural harmony. A brief epilogue provided a climatic end to the declensionist tale. In starkly impersonal fashion, Mowat related how federal predator control agents placed cyanide guns and poison outside the "Wolf House Bay" den during May 1959. The last line of *Never Cry Wolf* read: "It is not known what results were obtained."

The scientific critique

In a 1963 review article for the *Toronto Globe and Mail* entitled "To the Rescue of the Wolf," literary editor William French extolled *Never Cry Wolf* as a "splendid and satisfying book." Wolves, he noted, owed

“Mowat a debt of gratitude for rescuing their reputation. However, officials in the employ of the Canadian Wildlife Service (CWS) articulated a different response to Mowat’s treatise. Biologists were furious at the portrayal of scientific scholarship, lupine characteristics, and governmental bureaucracy in *Never Cry Wolf*.”

The scientific community censured Mowat for presenting his sojourn in the Northwest Territories as authentic. Although an engaging yarn, *Never Cry Wolf* failed to offer a valid biological exposition on wolves. C.H.D. Clarke of the Canadian Wildlife Service labelled Mowat as “a wonderful raconteur posing as a scientist.” Wolf researcher Douglas Pimlott categorized the work as “a satire with a factual background.” The response was unanimous. Mowat represented a pseudo-scientist as well as a pseudo-wolf.

Authorities recognized that Mowat had conducted fieldwork for the Wildlife Service in Keewatin but cited that [he] had observed wolves for a total of just ninety hours -- an indictment on his research credibility and scientific commitment. Staff contended that much of Mowat’s observations regarding wolf relationships and eating habits had been “borrowed” from Adolph Murie’s *The Wolves of Mount McKinley* (1944). A.W.F. Banfield, who oversaw the Keewatin wolf-caribou project in the 1940s, noted that Mowat had been given Murie’s work to peruse as part of his orientation. “Any resemblance between *Never Cry Wolf* and that book is *not* coincidental,” he urged.

Biologists took Mowat to task for his roseate portrayal of wolf society. Exacting commentators exposed the proclaimed July “love affair” between “Uncle Albert” and a female husky as a biological impossibility. Scientists criticized Mowat for forging a menagerie of “most loveable creatures,” contending that wolves often killed healthy as well as weakened caribou.

Scientific unease over Mowat’s depiction of lupine fellowship related a deeper concern regarding appropriate tactics to use to inspire public interest in wildlife. Although *Never Cry Wolf* invariably countered misconceptions about wild predators as “ferocious vermin,” experts feared that Mowat was doing the species a disservice by investing it with angelic traits. The canonized wolf, a saintly figure with exemplary morals, proved as distorted (and anthropomorphic) an image as the demoniac canine of European folklore. In the 1930s and 1940s, when federal policy first moved towards tentative protection of predators in Canadian national parks, wildlife officials faced a rabid band of wolf-haters demanding the extermination of local lupines. Resource managers now feared that Mowat’s treatise might rouse an equally ardent, and misinformed, cadre of wolf lovers. In such a

climate, the CWS could well find its options limited. Douglas Pimlott argued: "I feel very strongly that the case for the wolf should be fought on the basis of facts and on the grounds of his basic right to be here."

Biologists responded angrily to Mowat's allusions of the Canadian Wildlife Service as a reprehensible band of wolf haters. Certainly, government departments had presided over the killing of wolves in Canadian national parks in the early 1900s, but by the 1960s they asserted a broad preservationist mandate based on ecological science, rarity value, and historical presence. Wildlife officials prided themselves on their impartiality and commitment to natural resource management on the basis of sound research.

Seeking to disprove the contentions of *Never Cry Wolf*, a distinguished cadre of CWS officials ruminated over the particularities of wolf-caribou policy. Staff argued that the agency had never demanded the extermination of the wolf and that *Canis lupus* was recognized as a useful and integral part of the northern ecosystem. Mowat's remit had not been to research excuses for the eradication of resident wolves, but to investigate the relationship between local caribou and their lupine neighbours. As Banfield exclaimed, the "suggestion that he [Mowat] was hired to produce incontrovertible proof to damn the wolf is a woolly fabrication."

With caribou populations plummeting from 3 million animals in 1940 to a mere 670,000 in 1948, the Wildlife Service had been forced to act to save the herd. Wolf control had long been viewed as an appropriate tool in wildlife management, and authorities looked to this option as a way of mitigating caribou decline. The prevalent scientific assumption was that wolves, as carnivorous hunters, exerted considerable pressure on ungulate herds. Whenever herbivore populations dipped, Canada's wolves became legitimate targets. In the early 1940s, control activities in Banff and Jasper National Parks continued under the rubric of whitetail deer preservation. In the Northwest Territories, 16,000 tundra wolves succumbed between 1952 and 1962. Yet wildlife managers proved keen to stress that this attack was not a rapid witch-hunt of *Canis lupus*. Control measures tapered off after 1959 - the same year that wolf-killing activities ended permanently in Canada's national parks - when caribou numbers began to recover.

Science versus sentiment

Mowat's irreverent attitude towards established knowledge and authority jeopardized the reputation of the Canadian Wildlife Service as a specialist in lupine matters. In offering their assessments of *Never Cry*

Wolf, staff biologists remonstrated their learned status by categorizing Mowat's fable as fictional. Reviewers fashioned an unbridgeable divide between rational inquiry (embodied by their research) and entertaining fiction (as represented by Mowat's discourse).

The presentation of animals in popular literature had raised hackles in the naturalist community before. In the early 1900s, Seton and Roberts had been castigated by an angry crowd of scientific and sporting luminaries who took issue with their blend of natural history and artistic licence. The furor - which played out in the pages of literary and sporting journals in the eastern United States - involved President Theodore Roosevelt, who famously lambasted Seton and his cohorts as "Nature Fak-ers."

Farley Mowat remained unruffled by the professional backlash against his lupine rffable. Keen to assert the validity of "subjective experience over objective data or statistics," the unrepentent writer issued a fervent battle cry: "Never Let The Facts Interfere with the Truth." "Deliberately unscientific," Mowat freely admitted that he crafted the work to foster a positive impression of *Canis lupus*. He was operating within a different, storytelling, tradition, perceiving imagination and literary verve as key routes to converting his audience to an environmental cause. The emotive epiphany of *Never Cry Wolf* positioned it squarely within a North American amateur naturalist tradition. The book related a spiritual awakening and an intuitive environmental narrative that deplored the decimation of resident fauna at the hands of a bureaucratic elite. It was consciously designed as a piece of propaganda, employing natural history, humour, and tragedy to fashion an affecting tale. Lupine biology proved a malleable tool in the hands of the storyteller, much to the consternation of government biologists, who viewed science as absolute and infallible. The fervent debate over the efficacy of Mowat's modern morality tale illuminated a struggle between two authorities working according to different rubrics of knowledge. Disputed notions of fact and truth reflected a deeper contest over the relative role of science and sentiment in constructing human perceptions of the natural environment.

Inciting public howls

In a review of Mowat's book published during the spring of 1964, A.W.F. Banfield concluded: "It is certain that not since Little Red Riding Hood has a story been written that will influence the attitude of so many

towards these animals. I hope that the readers of *Never Cry Wolf* will realize that both stories have about the same factual content." In comparing Mowat's tale with the famous European story, Banfield adroitly recognized the impact of powerful storytelling on the reputation of *Canis lupus*. His prediction about the popularity of the work also proved highly pertinent. Captivated by the story of George, Angeline, and Uncle Albert, citizens roused to defend the wolves of nonfiction.

Staff at the Canadian Wildlife Service faced a deluge of correspondence from all over the world about *Never Cry Wolf*. Missives typically expressed heartfelt admiration for the book and praised its conservationist tenets. Anxious citizens seemed particularly concerned about the portrayal of Canadian government policy and proved eager to discern whether predator control schemes remained in force.

Never Cry Wolf steadily gained popular currency as a credible source on lupine conservation. Herbert Huwarth from New York described the book as "fabulously well-written, but most important, it is telling the truth." Letter-writers eagerly stressed the accuracy of Mowat's lupine portrayal and admonished the CWS for its irrational stance. Popular critics emphasized the negligence of the Canadian Wildlife Service, reproaching federal authorities for their prejudiced perceptions of wild carnivores and issuing acidic attacks on the department for subscribing to "old wives tales." Government cadres were repeatedly instructed to use *Never Cry Wolf* as an educational tool. Raymond Bock insisted: "I respectfully suggest that you make it required reading for every member of your Service - and for that reason I have sent you a copy!". In an intriguing inversion of the biological debate over *Never Cry Wolf*, citizens cast Mowat as a knowledgeable, reliable authority and the Canadian Wildlife Service as a fallible institution devoid of factual analysis.

Letters to the Wildlife Service applauding the virtues of *Never Cry Wolf* often employed humanitarian motifs. These themes reflected traditional concern for animal welfare, yet also testified to an emerging animal rights discourse exemplified by organizations such as Cleveland Amory's Friends for Animals (1967) and the International Fund for Animal Welfare (1969). Respondents to the CWS perceived predator control as needless, brutalizing, and inhumane. Readers singled out sportsmen as particularly immoral.

By contrast, letter-writers commonly paid homage to the moral society of the wolf. As David Sheppard, a seventh-grader from Edmonton, exclaimed: "The wolf kills only the sick weak animals and even then he takes a chance." [Mary Sue] Haliburton, meanwhile, lauded wild canids as "loyal," "intelligent," "fun-loving," and "good parents."

Significantly, however, respondents couched their newfound appreciation for the wolf by ascribing the species human qualities. Readers followed Mowat's lead in constructing lupine society as an anthropomorphic world of "married" wolves, "old maids," and "bachelors." Nature was understood in terms of human society and its value systems. According to environmental historian Lisa Mighetto, this process suggested an inability to accept the wolf on its own terms. This proclivity for anthropomorphizing animals was not confined to Mowat and his readers. From Aesop to Disney, many commentators cast their animals in sapient garb and judged them according to cultural precepts. A few dissenters - notably Henry David Thoreau, Grey Owl, and John Muir - proclaimed a nascent biocentrism, but it was not until the 1970s, with the rise of deep ecology and Earthfirst!, that the environmental movement received an organizing biocentric rationale.

Readers of *Never Cry Wolf* fostered an abiding anthropomorphic attachment to the virtuous community of appealing, doglike animals. However, that view did not stop them from proclaiming a distinctly misanthropic agenda. Communiques celebrating the "humanity" of the wolf pack regularly displayed unease about the moral fibre of sapient society. Accustomed notions of civilized and uncivilized society were reversed in the environmental vernacular, the wolf's traditional position as most hated predator now assumed by *Homo sapiens*. Raymond Bock stated that "the wolf competed with the worst predator ever to roam this planet, namely man." David Sheppard asserted that "wolves are not the vicious killers that some authors pictured them as. We are! Yes, us. The highly sophisticated and superior race known as Man. Slaughterer of the caribou, mass murderer of the seal, terror of canines. Man. Preacher of peace, user of violence."

Although Mowat's tale might easily be taken as a single-issue campaign for the preservation of the tundra wolf, his readers made connections with other environmental campaigns. The destruction of wolves, the hunting of seals, and the chemical pollution of the planet were read as symptomatic of modern industrial society's relentless pursuit of profit over ecological sustainability. Raymond Bock prefigured his comments with a call for "population control rather than predator control," an allusion to Paul Ehrlich's forecast of overpopulation doomsday in *The Population Bomb*.

Respondents displayed an accomplished awareness of key ecological texts and tenets. Along with a copy of *Never Cry Wolf*, Mrs. F. Vacher of Salinas, California, sent Canadian officials a version of the "Leopold Re-

port" (1964), the famous US government-sponsored study chaired by A. Starker Leopold (Aldo's son) that stressed the importance of large predators in ecological systems and inaugurated a policy of natural regulation in US national parks. Readers characterized *Canis lupus* as a vital ecological agent, playing a necessary and productive role in nature.

Enlivened letter-writers manifested an impassioned distrust of governmental and scientific authority. This estrangement from traditional sources of knowledge and power related a key characteristic of the modern environmental movement. To many activists, bureaucratic and technological expertise bespoke socio-environmental despoliation rather than progress. Institutions were berated for the ineffective environment stewardship, while the sanitized language of science was deconstructed to reflect a more malfeasant agenda. Respondents read wolf control as annihilation.

***Never Cry Wolf* and literary environmentalism in the 1960s**

Never Cry Wolf sits within a North American nature writing tradition that encompasses works by literary greats such as Henry David Thoreau, John Muir and Ernest Thompson Seton. Communion with nature, geographical and personal exploration, and a mystical sense of the environment as a moral and beneficent realm denote elemental themes in this naturalist vernacular.

At the same time, *Never Cry Wolf* participated in the birth of a new environmental revolution. Mowat's text represented part of an emerging discourse on animal rights and human wrongs that characterized the Canadian environmental movement in the 1960s. The storytelling naturalist incorporated his personal foray to the North into a truly modern, activist discourse on human relations with nature. This timely blend of traditional naturalism and modern ecological awareness explains the significance of *Never Cry Wolf* in Canadian environmental history. Mowat drew on traditional animal stories and contemporary fears about human-crafted biocide to fashion an effective protests discourse on wolves. The book is best interpreted as a bridge between two realms -- historic North American nature writing and modern environmental literature.

In terms of its science, *Never Cry Wolf* conveyed traditional naturalist pursuits of describing individual animals and landscapes. Rather than comprehend nature using professional, bureaucratic methods, Mowat adopted an amateur enthusiast approach that embraced sentimentalism

as well as biological process. This refusal to separate biological knowledge from a romantic perception of the natural world recalled the works of Seton and Roberts in the early twentieth century and set *Never Cry Wolf* apart from contemporary environmental treatises stressing the dangers of nuclear power, human overpopulation, or industrial pollution in grave and functional prose.

The story of the greenhorn biologist and the lupine protagonists in *Never Cry Wolf* conveyed a highly personal narrative about a specific place. It operated on a local level. By the end readers knew every character, both human and nonhuman, intimately. This sense of nature as familiar, even familial, harked back to the nature writing traditions of Muir, Grey Owl, and Seton. Seton's personal interaction with a real Mexican wolf formed the basis for his lupine story, "Lobo: The King of Currumpaw." is tale cast the "king wolf" as a unique and rugged character, a noble personality with feelings and goals. Such emphasis on the individual animal, of seeing ecological interactions in microcosm, did not naturally lend itself to the global, all-encompassing doctrines of modern environmentalism, to talk of acid rain and nuclear fallout. And yet, as Mowat's work demonstrates, stories of human-nature interactions in one place could inform a greater ecological cause. Mowat readily linked the fate of the Wolf House Bay pack with wider destructive impulses and events, such as the decimation of Native peoples and the ruination of sensitive ecosystems. Readers analogized the persecution of the wolf with that of the seal and the whale. The fate of an individual animal – the tundra wolf – grew to embody the unequal relationship between humans and other species.

Measuring environmental impact

Mowat's book depicted a program of wolf culling that had all but ended by the time of its publication in 1961. Predator control had wound down after 1959, and its family came to an end in the late 1960s. *Never Cry Wolf* could claim little role in altering CWS policy in the Northwest Territories, with change instead determined by the dissemination of ecological science and the recovery of caribou populations. The book did, however, inaugurate a discourse within the professional wildlife community over how best to present the dynamics of wolf ecology to an interested public.

Issues of predator management clearly moved into the public arena courtesy of *Never Cry Wolf*. Mowat employed his literary skills to synthe-

size natural resource issues that had largely remained the preserve of the scientific community. The tragic fate of the individual animals at Wolf House Bay, coupled with the book's wider critique of industrial scientific modernity resonated among an environmentally motivated Canadian public. It also won many converts to the lupine cause in the United States. The book emerged as a prominent consciousness raiser for canine preservation. *Never Cry Wolf* ensured that predator-killing programs in North America could no longer escape public scrutiny.

Perhaps the greatest testament to the significance of *Never Cry Wolf* lay in its prolonged shelf life. Irate missives to the Wildlife Service through the 1960s and 1970s attested to the book's continuing saliency. In literary and celluloid guise, the lupine tale was employed in campaigns to prevent government wolf control programs in British Columbia in the late 1980s and in the Yukon in the early 1990s. Three decades on, the book retained its power as a tool for rousing sympathy for wild lupines.

Questions remained, nonetheless, over the efficacy of Mowat's portrayal. In the 1980s and 1990s resource managers complained that the complex task of wildlife management had been rendered more difficult because of *Never Cry Wolf*. Biologists today still face a small cadre of advocates who willingly regurgitate that wolves dine exclusively on small rodents.

In the 1990s the "Friends of Farley" roused to defend the "northern national icon" from renewed attack, asserting the importance of sentiment over science as a method of apprehending environmental realities. Portraying Mowat as the common man of Canadian environmentalism, the affable and accessible wildlife guide, one commentator asserted: "There is more truth in one of his outrageous exaggerations than in a shelf-load of pretentious twaddle." A critical article in *International Wolf* in 1996 spurred outrage on the letters page for the "low hit against *Never Cry Wolf* a book that is, after 34 years, still a bestseller and available in more than 20 languages, and that has created sympathy for wolves like nothing else." Akin to the charismatic canines that Mowat idealized, the Canadian writer continued to inspire perversive attacks and equally enlivened defences. The truths of wolf conservation remained contested territory.

The writer as environmental commentator

Ecological science has often been lauded as integral to the rehabilitation of the wolf in post-1945 North America. According to biologist John Theberge: "The rapidly growing concern in defence of the wolf stems to

a large degree from the results of wolf research. Books, articles, radio programs, television documentaries, and commercial recordings have put into public hands many new biological facts." However, the currency of *Never Cry Wolf* as a text of lupine advocacy also suggests a need to consider the role of the storyteller in propagating environmental awareness. Following on from his wolf story, Mowat successfully publicized the fate of marine mammals using a similar blend of biological knowledge, personal storytelling, and anthropo-morphism. *A Whale for the Killing* (1972) recounted the senseless murder of a gin whale by sports hunters, while *Sea of Slaughter* (1984) decried the killing of seals in the Canadian north. These ethically focused, affectionate portrayals of animals fostered empathy between the reader and the faunal subject. The popularity of such narratives in North America was perhaps unsurprising, given the predominance of moralistic and humanistic attitudes towards animals. Citizens responded well to the blending of wilderness and domesticity, rendering the animal at once an independent spirit and an appealing pet. Tales stressing intuition and sentiment over rationality and analysis gained widespread appeal with those disaffected with progress or seeking spiritual reconnection with nature.

The wolf, meanwhile, remained a popular character in North American nature literature. Several titles narrated the return of the wolf to Yellowstone National Park in 1995, while lupine protagonists patrolled works on the modern West by Nicholas Evans and Cormac McCarthy. As a conservationist agenda and as a literary character, the wolf has been transformed from the skulking killer of the *Boy Who Cried Wolf* to an exemplary symbol of wild, ecologically healthy North America. *Never Cry Wolf* played a role in that greater story. At this juncture, however, it appears appropriate to offer a cautionary epilogue. Although the wolf of literature has been redefined, humans, as the crafters of the story, invariably construct their animals. In common with the gloomy fairy tales of medieval Europe, the bright fable of *Never Cry Wolf* conveyed imaginary beasts. A potent dilemma thus remains: If writers create the wolf in order to save it, what happens when the animals roaming the material landscape fail to satisfy human expectations?

A note from the compiler:

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Sample nr 2

The structure of the paper

Title of the paper

UK research on the biology of aging—the next ten years

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Internal division into sections

Introduction

We are, at least in my opinion¹, the leading nation in Europe as regards biogerontology research. Will we remain so? For reasons best known to himself, Richard has asked me to offer my views on how we can best capitalise on our present position in the coming decade. It has been said that my habit of making suggestions to my experimentalist colleagues, when I myself have no clue how to run a gel, amounts to treating the world's PIs as my graduate students; perhaps that is fair. This time, however, at least I have the defence that I am not doing so at my own initiative.

Like it or not, biogerontology is a biomedical field. Whether aging is or is not a disease (a question which is, in my view, purely semantic), it is rather widely perceived as undesirable—and, quite correctly, as potentially combatable by future medical technology. Biogerontologists cannot, therefore, consider themselves as no different than students of areas less directly related to human suffering, such as development. For present purposes, this means that maintaining our pre-eminence entails doing the most useful basic research, applying its findings in the most effective therapeutic ways, and maximising the quantity as well as quality of both these types of output by obtaining as much funding as possible. I will therefore divide my comments into three groups: how to understand aging better, how to expedite the alleviation of suffering associated

¹ See the web site, <<http://www.gen.cam.ac.uk/iabg10/>>, for details.

with aging, and how to convey our knowledge and aspirations to policy-makers and the public so as best to increase financial support for our work.

Understanding aging: exploit failed shortening of lifespan

A core component of aging research is the design of interventions to alter the life expectancy, or sometimes the maximum lifespan, of an experimental population. Interventions designed to extend an organism's lifespan are often claimed to be far more informative than ones designed to shorten it, because shortening lifespan can be done in innumerable ways that do not necessarily have anything to do with what limited the controls' lifespan, whereas to extend lifespan one must modulate *all* the organism's life-limiting processes. I feel that this overlooks a critical point. Our key goal is to test hypotheses concerning which *mechanisms* do and do not greatly influence lifespan. An intervention that extends lifespan does not generally do this, because putative markers of lifespan-limiting processes (PMLPs) that are postponed may be causal in determining lifespan or may be mere bystanders, while ones that are not postponed may be unimportant for lifespan or may be important but better tolerated because of the intervention. Moreover, interventions designed to extend lifespan but which fail to do so also tell us nothing, because PMLPs that they postpone are not shown to be irrelevant (only to be not the only ones that are relevant), while ones that are not postponed are again neither supported nor challenged (they could either matter or not for lifespan). When the intervention is designed to shorten lifespan, on the other hand, information can be gained that truly falsifies hypotheses. True, when lifespan is indeed shortened we learn nothing, since the organism may have been killed by something irrelevant to controls: thus, no PMLP is falsified, whether or not the intervention accelerates it. But if lifespan is *unaffected* by the intervention, the situation is totally different: any PMLP that *is* accelerated is unambiguously eliminated as being relevant to the determination of lifespan in that organism.

This point is of immense relevance to contemporary biogerontology, on account of the many examples of such "failed shortening of lifespan" that are now available, and especially of the mammalian examples. A vast amount of effort worldwide, and a considerable amount in the UK, is going into work on interventions that successfully lengthen lifespan (such as modulation of the insulin/IGF pathway), but our chances

of thereby identifying the downstream means by which these interventions exert their lifespan-modulating effects are quite slim, for the reasons just mentioned. Far less work is being done on animals with genetic defects that they shrug off, such as mice lacking telomerase, lacking cytosolic superoxide dismutase or heterozygous-null for mitochondrial superoxide dismutase. It has in all these cases been several years now since such mice were generated and reported to have undiminished lifespan, but pitifully few reports are yet available of their PMLPs relevant to the various leading candidate mechanisms of aging. It is unknown whether mtDNA deletions accumulate faster in these mice than in controls, whether senescent gene expression is seen in a higher proportion of cells in any tissue, whether nuclear mutations are more abundant (except in the case of cancer, where interpretation is more complex), whether advanced glycation end-products or their precursors are more abundant in extracellular matrix, whether lipofuscin or other intracellular aggregates accumulate faster, or whether there is faster loss of motor neurons, dopaminergic neurons, cardiomyocytes, blood stem cells or other cell types known to fall in number during aging. The suspicion inevitably arises that these experiments are being spurned because those best placed to do each of them tend to be those with careers invested in the truth of a hypothesis that the experiment might falsify; such scurrilous accusations can only be rebutted in one way.

Combating aging: attempt reversal, not retardation

Since being alive in the first place is a process of whose complexity we have, in all honesty, hardly scratched the surface, and since aging is well understood to be a consequence of evolutionary neglect and hence likely to be comparably complex, any attempt to do something about aging must be grounded in principles that apply to the manipulation of systems that are poorly understood. Foremost among those principles is that any intervention is in grave danger of doing more harm (by ill-understood pathways) than good, and that the best way to avoid such side-effects is to perturb the system as little as possible.

“Yes obviously”, you’re all saying. However, a key practical upshot of this principle remains largely ignored by biogerontologists: that the interventions most likely to postpone age-related decline without serious side-effects are *not* ones that attempt to influence normal metabolic processes. The best-studied interventions are ones that do make this attempt:

that try to “clean up” the process of being alive—to slow the rate at which metabolism generates accumulating damage. [Note: I use the term “damage” in a broad sense here, to encompass all the physiological changes that give, say, a 40-year-old a lower remaining life expectancy than a 20-year-old. Whether the process by which such damage arises is better characterised as “wear and tear” or as “programmed” is not relevant here.] But that is too early in the causal chain of events that leads from being alive to being dead, because in attacking the precursors of such damage we are interfering with the concentrations of bioactive molecules with which evolution has lived for a long time, and which life has thus learned not only to tolerate but to exploit. The many signalling roles of reactive oxygen species are just one class of this. The changes that constitute “damage” (as just defined), by contrast, are inert and harmless to tissue function until they reach a threshold abundance. Moreover, there are not very many types of such damage, even if we include ones for which the evidence of their pathogenicity in a normal lifetime is still tenuous:

- Cell loss and atrophy
- Cell senescence
- Lysosomal aggregates
- Extracellular aggregates
- Extracellular cross-links
- Nuclear mutations
- Mitochondrial mutations.

[I omit from this list a clearly important cause of morbidity, the increase of fat mass with age, only because it is so much easier to reverse than the above that it arguably need no longer concern us except socio-logically.] I have discussed in a number of recent publications 2-5 why these categories constitute an exhaustive list of the intermediaries between metabolism and age-related pathology, so I will not repeat myself here. My basis for what many consider absurd optimism concerning timescales for seriously combating mouse aging is simple: all these changes are potentially reversible in mice by techniques whose most challenging aspects have been developed already, but often for purposes other than life extension 2-5. In many discussions of these matters with biogerontologists, it has become abundantly clear to me that the main reason such approaches are not thought more realistic is my colleagues’ ignorance of this non-gerontological literature, which leaves them with nothing to go on but the intuition that reversing aging is “obviously” not worth contemplating because it’s “obviously” far harder than retarding

aging. Readers curious to learn whether I have any right to deliver so confrontational a verdict are urged to attend the 10th Congress of the International Association of Biomedical Gerontology, which I am running in Cambridge on September 19–23 and whose program heavily emphasizes such work.

Attracting funding: tell it like it is

Funding for research into the basic biology of aging has risen only modestly over the past few decades. The fact that it has risen at all is often hailed as a success of our efforts to communicate our field's potential to improve the elderly's quality of life, but it would be a gross exaggeration to suggest that the level of public or private funding of our work is yet remotely appropriate.

I would like to suggest that this is because we are too Machiavellian in our presentation of our case. Specifically, in our desperation to stop policy-makers from focusing on perceived drawbacks of progress in understanding and modulating aging, we have resorted to arguments that are not just weak but downright flawed, and that are very easily seen to be so by those whose support we need to garner. We should instead tackle that potential apprehension head-on, and explain why the perceived drawbacks in question are illusory.

The main "drawback" I'm talking about, of course, is increase of life expectancy. The first thing that comes into most non-gerontologists' heads when they consider living to 150 (say) is that all those extra years will be frail ones. Politicians make this mistake too, and are doubly concerned as a result of their responsibility for distribution of wealth in a society in which (in this scenario) an increasing proportion of the population are not supporting themselves. Rather than rehearsing the simple logic that this is not only not the purpose of biogerontology research but is also virtually impossible (since being frail is very risky), we have hitherto pandered to that fear and so let it become an increasingly accepted "fact".

Worse yet, the argument we have most frequently adopted in order to bolster our requests for funding while ducking the above issue is one so transparently false, whatever its superficial cosiness, that its chance of securing a serious hike in biogerontology funding is surely zero. The idea that "compression of morbidity" or "adding life to years" are realistic medium-term outcomes of progress in modulating aging is so obvi-

ously counter to common (let alone expert) knowledge that its proponents can only be viewed as deluded, duplicitous or both. Let's be clear: appreciable and sustained compression of morbidity is impossible. Compressing morbidity means compressing "frailspan" – reducing the interval between the onset of morbidity and its conclusion (i.e., death). Thus, it can be achieved only by delaying the onset of morbidity *and not* similarly delaying death. The latter criterion is the problem. It is not that any particular technical advance is impossible, but that the requirement is to *avoid* making certain advances despite making other ones. And unfortunately, society has long demonstrated its obstinate determination to extend total lifespan as far as it can, and to put at least as much effort into doing so as into postponing morbidity. Add to this the simple biological truism that being healthy is not risky – i.e., that interventions that truly extend healthspan will generally extend total lifespan by a similar amount even *without* specific efforts to keep frail people alive – and it is inescapable that a preoccupation with compressing morbidity is, and will forever remain, quixotic. Moreover, this is nothing special about biogerontology: postponement of the onset of major age-related diseases is the reason life expectancy is still rising in long-industrialised nations. Stark confirmations of this abound: see, e.g., analysis of statistics of hospitalisation 6 and activities of daily living 7,8 in ref. 3, and also ref. 9.

The problem with a focus on compressing morbidity is not, of course, that there is anything to be said in favour of morbidity. Interventions that increased healthy lifespan without similarly increasing total lifespan would be unconditionally welcome. But the above logic leaves no room for doubt that, with the exception of the modest improvements that might be made by postponing diseases that debilitate long before they kill (Alzheimer disease being the prime example), any hope of compressing morbidity is misplaced. Instead, we should be telling people (including politicians) that:

- Yes, serious progress in modulating aging will, eventually, greatly increase life expectancy;
- No, it will not increase frailspan, it will increase healthspan;
- No, it won't reduce frailspan either, but that's OK, because:
- Yes, it will lower the incidence of age-related frailty, because if successive cohorts are having the onset of frailty postponed to later and later ages a lower proportion of people will be frail;
- Yes, this (greatly increasing life expectancy) is the *only* way greatly to lower the incidence of age-related frailty;

- - Yes, modulating aging is the only feasible way greatly to increase life expectancy. Is that really so hard to communicate that we mustn't try?

Whatever we may sometimes think of the decisions of our elected representatives, I suspect it is unwise to suppose that their non-receptiveness to a view that we find obvious is necessarily due to an inability to grasp simple logic. In common with at least one widely respected colleague¹⁰ (even though his views as to what interventions might work, and how well, are very different from mine), I contend that a policy of appeasement of ill-informed fears has failed for too long, and that the direct approach just outlined is one whose time has come.

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Sample nr 3

The structure of the paper

Title of the paper

Opinions on the social and cultural impact of English as an international language

David McLachlan Jeffrey

1. Introduction

This paper examines a range of opinions within the debate on the social and cultural impact of English as an international language (EIL), including the personal opinions of the writer.

The social and cultural impact of EIL is a wide field encompassing many often-conflicting issues, especially with regard to whether it has been advantageous or disadvantageous to former colonies, and whether this continues to be the case at present with unprecedented globalization.

As it will not be possible to do full justice to the wide scope of this subject in the short space of this paper, the approach will be an attempt to draw from the varied perspectives of an assortment of theorists, and to limit the focus primarily to two formerly non-English speaking countries, Nigeria and the Philippines.

The paper begins by examining the relationships between language, society and culture (in Section 1), which will in turn be used as a backdrop upon which to extend the debate by including the views of other theorists across the ideological divide concerning the social and cultural impact of EIL (in Section 2). Here, various aspects of EIL will be discussed, such as its center-periphery dimensions, its propensity to marginalize other languages and cultures, the impact of globalization (including advances in communications technology) and the ownership of English by non-native speakers. The latter is considered an important turning point in the evolution of EIL, and examples of where this happened in Nigeria and the Philippines are used to illustrate this (in Section 3).

Finally (in Section 4), the main conclusions reached in the paper are drawn together and highlighted, together with their implications for the English language teaching (ELT) profession.

SECTION 1

2. The relationship between language, society and culture

The relationship between language, society and culture is central to the field of sociolinguistics. Holmes (1992, 1) says:

Sociolinguists study the relationship between language and society. They are interested in explaining why we speak differently in different social contexts, and they are concerned with identifying the social functions of language and the ways it is used to convey social meaning.

It is important to note that while sociolinguists pursue the relationship between language, society and culture, they do not always agree on the meanings of these terms. This is because sociolinguistics is a subjective discipline. Despite the desirability to present unbiased views, it is not always possible given that the sociological perspectives of theorists are influenced by their differing social and political opinions pertaining to how they see the roles of language, society and culture, as the quotes by the three prominent theorists Wardaugh (1987), Phillipson (1992) and Crystal (1997) in the set question indicate (please see the appendix).

People live in societies that have a strong influence on their lives, opinions and beliefs. Wardaugh (1998, 1) defines a 'society' as 'any group of people who are drawn together for a certain purpose or purposes'. He stresses that, in this definition, 'society' is necessarily brief in order to be comprehensive, as 'society' is a broad concept, given the many different societies that exist.

Attempting an equally comprehensive definition of 'language', Wardaugh (ibid.) says that it 'is what the members of a particular society speak', but notes that 'speech in almost any society can take many very different forms' and hence '...our definitions of language and society are not independent: the definition of language includes in it a reference to society'.

Culture is also linked to society and language, and can have different meanings depending on how it is viewed, for example, aesthetically, sociologically, semantically, and pragmatically (Adaskou, Britten and Fahsi, 1990, 3). A well-known definition by Goodenough (1957, 167, cited by Wardaugh, 1998, 217) views culture as:

...whatever it is one has to know or believe in order to operate in a manner acceptable to its members, and to do so in any role that they accept for any one of themselves.

Wardaugh stresses the importance of Goodenough's definition in terms of the practical importance of culture (as opposed to music, literature and the arts) as being 'the "know-how" that a person must possess to get through the task of daily living' (p. 217). Another perspective of culture emphasizes its group characteristic that unites itself as a distinct entity against other groups, as Podur (2002, 4) notes:

Culture is those tools, practices, assumptions, and behavioral patterns that members of a group use to communicate with one another and to demarcate themselves from other groups.

Culture is mainly about social identity, and communication, and, as Podur notes, is an important part of that select identity.

However, identity cannot exist in a vacuum, because people identify and communicate with each other for definite purposes, and it would personally seem that the main purpose is for the economic subsistence of the society. This is because, without an economy to sustain it, it would appear that language, society and culture could have no foundation upon which to exist.

2.1 The importance of economic subsistence in language, society and culture

Wardaugh (1987, 15), please see the quote in the appendix, seems to believe it possible for English learning to take place independently from the need to subscribe to external cultural values.

In his view, culture and learning English appear to exist as separate entities. He argues that, because English is spoken by almost everybody in the world to some degree, it has the tendency to transcend cultural aspects such as social, political, economic and religious systems, thus functioning independently from any specific culture, in terms of either race or group, to the extent that it can become a positive feature to all or nobody. This implies that English can be regarded as essentially a value-free means of learning to communicate.

Personally, and despite agreeing with Wardaugh's definitions of society and language above, English does not seem value-free, but instead laden with values, given that the main purpose of communication appears to be economic subsistence. Not only are language, society and culture interdependent, as Wardaugh notes, but they also seem to func-

tion inseparably with the inherent need for economic subsistence (primarily to fulfill the human need for food, clothing and shelter).

This, in turn, suggests that social institutions, such as education, exist as components of society with English teaching extending beyond a means of providing the skills of communication, in serving as a way of reflecting the ideological values of society.

Society and culture shape the roles of people in the economy, which are inherently unequal, separating the interests of the elite with excessive, mainly economic power, from the workers and unemployed, and minority groups, who are with limited power. This does not appear as a situation that comes about by chance, but one that is consciously institutionalized.

In the next section, the analysis of the debate on EIL is widened to include further influential opinions of others, whilst adding my opinions.

SECTION 2

3. The social and cultural impact of EIL

This concept of the inseparable linkages between language, society and culture, which ensure economic subsistence of society, is important in a consideration of the social and cultural impact of EIL, because EIL concerns the relationship between the international spread of English across national boundaries and the many groups of people within their own societies, each with distinct traditional languages and ethnic traditions, since the beginning of colonialism around 500 years ago, to the present age of globalization.

Phillipson (1992, 166) views the spread of EIL as repressive since it not only substitutes and displaces other languages, but also imposes new 'mental structures' on learners (please see the appendix). These 'mental structures' are possibly the ideologies that Westerners use to justify their own culture and impose these ideas on others. He sees English learning and culture as inseparable, given that he sees 'modernization' and 'nation building' as being 'a logical process of ELT'.

Phillipson also considers the implications of this, and criticizes the English language teaching (ELT) profession for not having cross-cultural studies as part of its core, and for not having any principled consideration for the educational consequences that follow from its own awareness

of this situation, thereby implying that ELT is not only ignorant, but also guilty, of the 'linguistic imperialism' it promotes.

The economic objective of colonization subjugated the colonized countries so that they became the suppliers of primary and secondary products (minerals, agriculture and people in the form of slaves) for the economic sustenance of the colonizers, who needed to keep up the economic tempo created by the Industrial Revolution. Phillipson makes sense in terms of the role EIL has played historically, especially during colonization.

Culture would seem to be as important to communication as it is to personal identity, and the two are related to economic subsistence as the prime consideration, thus colonization aimed to destroy the personal identity of the colonized. It had to subdue their resistance by marginalizing, among others, their indigenous channels of communication and forcing them to learn English, the language of the colonizer.

This would seem why, as Phillipson points out, English learning and culture are inseparable, and the imposition of Western ways of thinking ('modernization' and 'nation building') are 'a logical process of ELT', in the same way that economic inequality, sustained by EIL through ELT, was a logical process of colonization, in order to keep the poor nations economically poor, mentally subdued, and hence easily exploitable.

Phillipson's observation of the lack of cross-cultural studies at its core also seems reasonably true, as Abbott (1992, 178) says:

There is, I suggest, a missing link between development studies and sociolinguistic studies, especially that part of sociolinguistics that deals with language planning.

However, the role of ELT and EIL has also changed somewhat since that time. They have become somewhat more sensitive in their interaction with other cultures, while English has become adopted as a part of the culture of many former non-English speaking countries, as will be discussed later.

3.1 The center-periphery debate

EIL theorists that view EIL as mainly oppressive tend to make a core-periphery distinction between native-English speaking and non-native English-speaking countries. Holliday (1994, 4) distinguishes between a dominant 'center' of native-English-speaking countries and a 'periph-

ery' of non-native-English-speaking countries. Kaplan (1987, 139) notes a hegemonic, dominating, EIL influence of the 'center' over the 'periphery'. Phillipson (1992, 166) refers to the EIL relationship as 'linguistic imperialism'. Shaw (1981) sees EIL as a remnant of British colonialism or a current sign of American imperialism.

Kachru (1985, 12-15) conceptualizes three concentric circles of global English use: an inner-circle (the native-English speaking countries), an outer-circle (countries that speak English as an additional language) and an expanding-circle (countries that need English for international communication). He concludes that the relationship reflects and unbalanced and harmful state of power and influence on the societies and cultures to which English spreads.

The center-periphery distinction is a useful tool analyzing the impact of EIL, and the relationship does seem largely unbalanced and harmful as a result of colonization having created a center-periphery global economy with colonized nations in an economically dependent situation upon the colonizers, reinforced institutionally through the spread of English.

Kennedy (2001, 92) notes, however, the beginning of some shared contact between Kachru's outer- and expanding-circle countries such as Turkey (an expanding circle nation) having considered (although not having implanted) hiring English as-a-second-language (ESL) teachers from Denmark (an expanding-circle country). He also notices a similar trend in Malaysia. However, the extent of this shared contact is small, even in Malaysia where, according to Kennedy (2001, 96) there is an 'interesting role for international English in that it provided a way of linking nations not sharing the same first language but sharing common religious beliefs', the fact remains, as Kennedy stresses, that counter-imbalance forces are happening very slowly, and do not affect the overall influence from the center to the periphery in the world today.

Despite the importance of social and cultural considerations, they remain secondary in significance to economic considerations, which divided the world into center and periphery during colonialism, and this inequality remains much the same way under the imperialist economic relations in post-colonialism and present globalization.

The flow of EIL from the center to the periphery thus does seem to have had a harmful and unbalanced influence on the periphery. Perhaps the most noticeable way in which this has happened was, and is, in the destruction of minority languages and cultures.

3.2 The marginalizing social and cultural impact of EIL

Abbott (1992, 174) states that:

The widely perceived need to promote technological development through teaching an international language such as English overshadows an arguably more basic need to transmit indigenous cultures.

Friere (1972, 121) calls this 'cultural invasion', a situation in which:

...the invaders penetrate the control context of another group and, ignoring the potential of the latter, ...impose their own view of the world upon those they invade and inhibit the creativity of the invaded by curbing their expression.

Tully (1997, 157) argues that English in India after colonialism is:

...not just an unhealthy hangover after colonialism, but also a means of continuing the suppression of Indian thought, and of preserving an alien, elite culture.

He summarizes his concern by saying:

Perhaps the most damaging result of all the effects of English is to promote the snobbery of the English-speaking elite. There is no doubt that English as a status symbol means a distinctly inferior status for Indian languages and sadly, for some reason, particularly for Hindi (p. 162)

It also appears to some that it is primarily America who benefits from globalization, and whether globalization should be referred to as 'Americanization'. According to this perspective, globalization is oppressive, resulting in more social and economic divisions and the marginalizing of minority cultures, languages, religions and ethnic groups (Hoogvelt, 1997, and Castells, 1999, in Hadley, 2002, 5).

Skutnabb-Kangas (1999, 2) states that only 10 percent of the approximately 6 800 languages left in the world will exist in 100 years time, and:

...the media and the educational systems are the most important direct agents in language murder today; indirectly the culprits are the global economic and political systems.

However, is English directly the culprit? Abbott (1989) considers EIL as having the potential to be either liberating or oppressive depending on the underlying educational and political issues that extend beyond the linguistic influence of English. For Abbott, English is not necessarily directly accountable, but rather indirectly accountable given the way it is

applied within the institutional setting. In his view, it is not English per se that impoverishes communities and destroys other languages, but rather it is people and their institutions, which use English. He therefore sees English as being unfairly singled out as the sole culprit for repression, when it actually serves as an appendage to the policies of educationalists and politicians. Rather than eclipsing and devaluing indigenous languages, Abbott feels that English can exist alongside indigenous languages, in that mother tongue literacy is important and should be equally encouraged in the same curriculum.

Nevertheless, because EIL has been indivisible as an institutional ramification of society and culture, in playing an essential part of supporting the economy that is intrinsically and deliberately unequal to sustain privileged political and economic power, English would seem to be directly responsible, as its role should not be viewed separately from the institutions that support it. Still, simultaneously, situations are not static, and people are becoming enlightened to some extent nowadays to the liberating potential of EIL and its capacity to exist alongside other languages.

In this respect, Wurm (2001, 1), whilst conceding that many small and minority languages have become endangered, and some extinct, notes an encouraging trend where dominant languages, including English, can co-exist with an indigenous language and points out:

About 1970, a widespread revival of ethnic identity feeling started among speakers of minority languages, and governments often changed their language policies to positive ones. Bi- and multilingualism has advantages over monolingualism in matters of applied intellect, and memory and learning capacities. More languages survive now.

Wurm advises that speakers of threatened languages should be assisted by linguists to distinguish between their use of the dominant language, such as English, for 'making a living in an environment dominated economically by speakers of dominant languages' and their use of their indigenous languages, which he describes as:

...a precious symbol of their ethnic identity and gives them a feeling of belonging to a special community, of which they should be proud, and last but not least, give them the advantages of a secret language not intelligible to speakers of dominant languages whom they may have reason to distrust' (p. 12)

However, it would seem somewhat idealistic to expect the ex-colonized, of which the vast majority remain in abject poverty, to have

the contemplative luxury to consider the value of their ethnic identity and the secret-code value of their indigenous languages while they struggle against all odds to survive economically, and it will take considerable effort and vast resources that are not currently available. These people are in a poverty-trap, whereby it becomes too risky to change course, even linguistically, given that any failure could spell disaster.

There are some, although limited, encouraging indications of awareness of the historical shortcomings of EIL and the need to adapt ELT to play a more progressive role. One example is Sifakis (2001, 5–6) who suggests a conceptual distinction between norm-bias and culture-bias in ELT instruction. Historically, norm-biased instruction was used by drawing on the native English speaker as the standard for language learning, a culture-bias focuses on the non-native speaker's language ego and cultural identity. Norm-biased approaches comprise a top-down approach, with non-native speakers trying to rise to the level of the typical native-English speaker, whereas culture-biased approaches begin from the bottom-up, with non-native speakers establishing a standard of communicative fluency that is suitable for educated non-native speakers of English.

A culture-bias would be the ideal, since it reflects the reality for the majority of students in today's world, and encourages students to adopt English as a second language, through promoting a positive impression of it.

3.3 The impact of globalization and communications technology

Globalization is the interchange of economic integration, personal contact, technology, and political engagement. Held (1999, quoted in Hadley, 2002, 4) defines globalization as:

...the widening, deepening and speeding up of all worldwide interconnectedness in all aspects of social life, from the cultural to the criminal, the financial to the spiritual.

Despite the harmful effects of EIL in post-colonial imperialistic core-periphery relations, globalization is also creating opportunities for some ex-colonies to benefit from their historical experience with EIL, and use it for their own economic development.

Globalization affords certain underdeveloped countries the opportunity to skip certain traditional stages of economic growth, and catch up rapidly with developed countries, especially those underdeveloped countries that now speak English as a second language. For example,

while Mabogunje (1980, 13) found a close relationship between poverty and ex-colonial status, which in turn suggests a relationship between poverty and dependency on non-indigenous languages, Abbott (1992, 176) notes that there are exceptions, such as Singapore. However, for most of the ex-colonies, the unequal economic relationships, and the legacy of English as a language for the elite will almost certainly remain so for the foreseeable future.

There thus exists a potential for EIL, despite its oppressive historical role, to be adapted to play a more constructive role in the future in that it is has become a world language, no longer exclusively imposing a Western mindset, but helpful for human development especially through the advances being made in communications technology, and international communication in general, that have enhanced access to markets, technology and ideas needed to reach higher and equitable patterns of economic growth in the world. As Kaplan (1987, 144) indicates:

...the relative achievement of those [modernization] objectives is significantly tied to the availability of English because, for better or for worse, English is the language of science and technology.

Over a decade later, this trend seems even more evident, as Mayer (2000, 1) points out:

Globalization has drastically improved access of technological latecomers to advanced technologies and, to the extent that technological upgrading is important for development, it provides a unique opportunity for low-income countries to raise per-capita income.

With this in mind we now contemplate the views of theorists who view EIL mainly as liberating, and the phenomenon which seems to hold the key to unlock the potential for EIL to play a more liberating role, which is the issue of the adoption and ownership of English by formally non-English speaking countries.

3.4 The ownership of English by non-native speakers

There is a growing realization that EIL is becoming adopted by people who speak it as a second language, and not as something being imposed from the outside anymore. Crystal (1992) noted that non-native speakers of English represent more than two-thirds of its potential speakers. Swales (1993, 284) emphasized that:

...internationalism favors no nation nor gives any permanent credit for the length of membership in a global association. Therefore we have to concede that it no longer makes any sense to differentiate between the native speaker and the non-native speaker.

Similarly Walker (2001, 1) reports that:

English is currently regarded as the world's principal international language. As a result there are now more exchanges between non-native speakers of English than between non-native speakers and native speakers. In the immediate future at least, this situation is unlikely to change in favor of the minority of native speakers, and so suddenly the hegemony of their particular (and sometimes peculiar) accents is under fire.

Kramersch and Sullivan (1996, 199) note that:

The notion of "authentic" becomes problematic within the framework of English as an international language: whose words and whose culture comprise authentic language?

Thus, it could be fair to say that English no longer belongs to any particular group of people, and that they are no longer mere consumers of the Western-Anglo-Saxon tradition. Kachru (1982, cited by Talebinezhad and Aliakbari, 2001, 1), despite his predominant focus on the unbalanced center-periphery relationship, admitted that 'for the first time a natural language has attained the status of an international (universal) language'. Kachru (1994, 135) also saw English as being very adaptable and thus capable of sustaining a large assortment of functions. It seems that this phenomenon of EIL, the adoption and ownership of English by formally non-English speaking societies, is a major switch in the role of EIL from its former repressive role, to one that offers possibilities for EIL being used in a liberating sense.

The following sections on Nigeria and the Philippines, where this has happened, help to illustrate how this is happening.

SECTION 3

4. The ownership of English in Nigeria and the Philippines

4.1 EIL in Nigeria

Despite the many theorists who view EIL as oppressive and laden with Western values that it inflicts on other cultures, Wardaugh (1987, 15) was not alone in his value-free perspective. Indeed Smith (1983)

noted that English was the language most frequently used in international trade, diplomacy and tourism, and proposed a value free or cosmopolitan English that was quite independent of any cultural background but able to signify, portray and demonstrate all cultures with equal dynamism, according to Talebinezhad and Aliakbari (2001, 3).

Bisong (1995, 122), argues that Phillipson's argument of the centre-periphery dominance of English, and the marginalizing of indigenous cultures, as applied to Nigeria 'have not been properly understood' and that:

Something more needs to be said about why English continues to maintain its pre-eminent position as the official language of countries like Nigeria, what effect this has on the people's culture, and the role of the English language in a multicultural context such as Nigeria.

Bisong (1995, 123) says that the Nigerian experience cannot necessarily be generalized to other former colonial countries, but stresses that EIL is not value-free either, and certainly was not so for Nigeria historically during colonialism. He is Nigerian, and Nigeria has 410 languages according to Skutnabb-Kangas (1999, 1), so his conclusions to his paper are interesting. He said:

English performs a useful function in the multilingual society of Nigeria and has not succeeded in displacing or replacing its indigenous languages;

English has not undervalued or marginalized Nigerian culture; and Prominent Nigerian writers choose to write in English. (p. 131)

Bisong argues that, in Nigeria, English is 'no longer perceived as the Imperial tongue that must be mastered at all costs' in that 'Reasons for learning English now are more pragmatic in nature' and that 'Phillipson's argument shows a failure to appreciate fully the complexities of this situation' (p. 131). Also, with Nigeria being a multicultural society, he says that 'the Euro-Christian culture embodied in the English language is only one of a number of cultures that function to shape the consciousness of Nigerian people' and that 'Part of the problem...is Phillipson's tendency to generalize from a few examples that occur in one part of the periphery' (p. 131). Nigerian writers, he says, write in English not because they were victims of cultural imperialism, but because the writers have chosen to write in English, in that:

English has become one of the languages available for use by the creative writer. This sociolinguistic reality has to be accepted for what it is' (p. 131).

Bisong stresses that Phillipson's argument may be historically valid, but needs to be examined in terms of current attitudes. It seems that the essence of Bisong's argument against Phillipson is that, because colonization, and its use of English in Nigeria, had a detrimental affect in a historical sense, it should not automatically be used to infer that the detrimental effect continues, as this would be an over-generalization. The current situation is more complex, and cannot simply be seen as a direct manifestation of the exploitative past. Bisong's account of Nigeria represents an interesting departure from the more widely held perspective of EIL as a repressive force.

Perhaps Bisong was a little unfair towards Phillipson, whose view of the repressive impact of EIL seems true for most parts of the periphery. It is also difficult to see how EIL had no adverse impact on Nigerian culture and languages, as Bisong asserts, as Nigeria is economically underdeveloped.

Nevertheless, it does seem that Nigeria stands out as an example of a more positive role for EIL. Bisong seems to share some affinity with Omodiaogbe (1992, 26) who writes:

...I believe that English will emerge triumphant after it has made some concessions to the realities of contemporary Nigeria. The language must shed its garb of 'purity' and submit itself to the inevitable buffets and billows in the Nigerian environment... English must learn to live with a peculiarly Nigerian accent.

Perhaps the main reason why EIL is more positively viewed in Nigeria is because it was adopted as one of its own languages, and used as such, sooner than in many other ex-colonies.

4.2 EIL in the Philippines

The culture of the Philippines, a country of very mixed social and economic classes, could be said to have had a unique history, and its Spanish, American, and for a short time, Japanese colonial history is important to understanding the Filipino identity (Gregorio, 2000, 1). As Gochenour (1996, 420) observes:

There is a general sense of being neither this nor that, of sharing something of the Pacific islands, of being heavily influenced by Spanish and American cultures, and of perceiving only a remote historical relationship with the other major civilizations of Asia. If asked what the people of the Philippines are, the Filipino answer may well be "We are ourselves".

Crystal (1997, 49) points out that:

The Philippines became independent in 1946, but the influence of American English remains strong. And as this country has by far the largest population of the English-speaking states in the region (about 70 million in 1996), it makes a significant contribution to world totals.

The use of English in the Philippines has led to a distinct variety of English, also called Philippine English, and is one of the new Englishes in the world brought about the spread of EIL. Before the American occupation, Spanish was the language of those in power (Gregorio, 2000, 2).

The Philippines adopted English, not as the official language, which remains Tagalog, but as the language for both private and public offices, as well as in many other aspects of daily life. Today English is the medium of instruction in all schools and universities. It is used in the government and in private business, and alongside other Philippine dialects in the mass media.

Concerning the role of English education under American colonization Agana (1998, 15), observes that:

English introduced the Filipinos to a strange new world. With American textbooks, Filipinos started learning not only a new language but also a new way of life, alien to their traditions. Furthermore, through the American colonial and educational policies, American institutions and ideas were transplanted to the Philippines.

But, as Agana notes, colonization, despite its use of education in making the Filipinos subservient and having marginalized their ethnic identity, could also be argued to have united Filipinos in two important respects: firstly, the majority of the population is Roman Catholic, and thereby fairly unified in their faith (a product of almost 400 years of Spanish colonization) and, secondly, almost half of the population speaks English (a product of another 40 years of American colonization).

English in the Philippines plays a functional role making it possible for the diverse linguistic groups to communicate with each other, but its main appeal could be in improving the social and economic prospects of Filipinos, and this could be the main reason why a generally positive attitude towards English prevails.

English not only improves employment prospects locally, but also in the Overseas Filipino Worker (OFW) system, whereby many Filipinos have to work abroad, predominantly in Kachru's (1985) inner-circle and expanding-circle countries, and send remittances home upon which

many rely on for their survival. There were about 230 000 OFWs in 1999, during the peak of the Asian crisis (Aldaba, 2000, 13). However, the OFW system is also a disadvantage in terms of perpetuating the economic dependency of the Philippines on the inner- and expanding circle countries.

While English helps somewhat in the attraction of much needed foreign capital and technology for local employment, through foreign investors and their Filipino counterparts being able to communicate in English, Agana (*ibid.*, 12) notes that:

...the learning of English becomes a new form of economic servitude. While during the American colonization Filipinos were employed as cheap labourers in the farmlands producing raw materials for export to America, they are now employed as cheap factory workers in foreign owned-companies producing shoes, micro-chips, and textiles for exports to rich nations.

Agana (1998) observes that perhaps the main disadvantage of English is that it allows for a new type of colonialism to flourish in the Philippines internally, through contributing to the alienation of the poorer Filipinos, who have not had access to channels for learning English. These are mainly the urban poor and farmers in remote rural areas, who are to a fair extent sidelined from contributing in the immediate socio-economic issues affecting their lives, that are mainly undertaken in English, resulting in their continued economic marginalizing and political alienation, and, it would seem to me, an attendant marginalizing of their indigenous languages and ethnic minority cultures.

It seems that EIL in the Philippines relates more to the way Bisong (1995) views EIL in Nigeria (less repressive), than to the way Tully (1997) sees EIL in India (more repressive), but it is worth noting that Filipinos, as a result of colonialism, generally regard American products and values as better-quality and more worthy than Philippine products and values. This is because, as Agana (1998, 12) explains:

Philippine schools are still producing a de-nationalized Philippine citizenry with a strong fondness of American culture and the American way of life. Thus, the Philippines becomes an easy dumping ground for American goods. During the American occupation, Filipinos had learned to love American products because of its "superior" quality. This kind of thinking has been passed on from generation to generation. Because of the use of English in schools and the influx of American movies and television programs in the Philippines, these old colonial thinkings are introduced and are repeatedly being reinforced in the minds of new generations of Filipinos.

This correlates somewhat with the way Tully sees India, where he contends that English is still a means of continuing to suppress Indian

thought. If there exists something of an association, Tully's (1997, 163) observations about India would add some insight to this dilemma of what to do about the repressive side of EIL when he says, in relation to India:

What can be done about this? One apparent answer is simply to encourage the spread of English in India so that it becomes the genuine link language of the country, not just, as it is in present, the link language of the elite...In these days of the global market English is a very valuable asset, and why shouldn't India capitalize on it? And, of course, Indians have established a very high reputation in the software business. And again, obviously, English is a huge advantage to them. All these arguments are, in my view, reasons for maintaining a high standard of English in India, for not throwing the baby out with the bath water.

The Philippines has also established a good reputation in the software business, and is also a part of globalisation which is no longer restricted to tangible goods and natural resources, but also increasingly to human capital, in which EIL plays an important role.

One global area in which the Philippines can benefit its local economy is in the field of communications technology, especially through its expanding call centre business (Henderson, 2001, 5). However, it seems that many of the call centre training courses are designed to create an ability to speak and communicate in "standard" American English, in order to achieve a wide range of acceptability among potential customers who are native speakers of American English. Whilst this is understandable from a business point of view of attracting customers, and protecting against the call centre competition from India, where the American accent is not as easily impersonated, it is regrettable, in that it does not seem to nurture a local acceptance and global respect for Philippine English, which deserves acceptance in its own right internationally.

The success of globalization relies on tolerance and acceptance for diverse cultures, and the acknowledgement that native speakers of English are now in the minority, despite their ongoing global economic hegemony.

SECTION 4

5. Conclusion

It was argued that not only is language, society and culture inseparably linked to each other, but they are also linked institutionally to the most important underlying need for society, which is economic subsistence.

It was against this backdrop that the social and cultural impacts of EIL were viewed, from colonialism to present-day globalization. It appears that EIL played a repressive role historically, in being part of the institutional structure of the colonizer, and as an ideological tool to suppress the colonized, so that their economies could become the suppliers of raw materials for the benefit of colonizers' economies.

Given this view, it also seems that EIL sustained an unbalanced and harmful center-periphery relationship, in favor of the center, and that EIL continued, and still continues, to marginalize minority cultures and destroy their indigenous languages, under the imperialistic relations that are generally perpetuated under post-colonialism and current globalization.

However, there are some positive aspects which have emerged where the historically repressive impact of EIL can be lessened, and could in some cases, like in Nigeria and the Philippines, become an instrument of social, cultural and economic emancipation to some extent.

This is because these countries have come to adopt English, and have taken ownership of it, which is a very important turning point in the evolution of EIL. English in these countries seems to have a tendency to no longer be viewed as something imposed from the outside, but as something belonging to, and becoming an intrinsic part of the national culture.

This allows English to be used as an advantage, particularly if applied to the advances in communication technology that current globalization is making available. It also means that, in certain cases, English can exist alongside minority languages. Nevertheless, this does not imply that EIL will not continue marginalizing minority cultures and languages, which will unfortunately almost certainly continue in most cases.

The attitudes that colonialism planted in peoples' minds that still convince them that their own cultural ways, even their ways of speaking English, are somehow inferior, need to be replaced with ones that nurture positive attitudes, for example, in the Philippine call center business, where Filipinos should feel proud to speak Filipino English, and make business with Americans speaking naturally, who in turn should respect Filipino English.

Positive social and cultural impacts through the spread of EIL still seem to occur to a limited extent, and slowly. Therefore, the repressive legacy of EIL will not easily be reversed, or considerably lessened, in most ex-colonies for the foreseeable future, because most of these countries lack the material resources to do so. Nevertheless, those that adopt

English and use it alongside their own culture, and combine it with, for example communications technology, can possibly escape from the poverty-trap and catch up with developed countries rapidly.

For EIL to play a more positive role in the future, it should become further integrated with other disciplines that promote human development, for example with development studies. Despite the generally positive contribution made by the ELT profession together with its growing awareness of its historical shortcomings, there is the potential for ELT to become more integrated and coordinated with other social and economic development initiatives, especially in ex-colonies, to make it more acceptable and to promote social and cultural development, and appropriate globalization where all societies and cultures benefit.

ELT professionals should also strive to encourage their students to express matters that are important to their lives, and how to confidently and effectively communicate their concerns, cultural viewpoints and personal interests by taking ownership of English and using it as a meaningful interchange with people of other countries, and to relate what it means to be a member of their specific societies and cultures in a positive way to others in the world community.

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A note from the compiler:

This article was accessed from the Internet (www.nuis.ac.jp/~hadley/publication/jeffrey/Jeffrey-EIL.htm).

Reviews and review articles

7. The structure of a review of a scientific publication

In English, a review of a scientific publication (be it a monograph or an edited volume) usually has a rigid structure and contains a number of parts, such as the following:

- title of the review (optional)
- general information about the book under review (book under review; optional)
- author(s) of the review (including the individual author's affiliation)
- abstract (or executive summary; both are optional)
- reproduction of the front page of the publication (optional)
- general introduction
- introduction of the book under review
- the review proper (with an optional inclusion of quotations from the book under review)
- final conclusions
- a synopsis (optional)
- selected bibliography (or references; both are optional).

It may be written in a formal (impersonal) or personal style.

8. Samples of reviews of scientific publications

Sample nr 1: a review

The structure of the review

Book under review

Applied population ecology: principles and computer exercise using RAMAS EcoLab 1.0 by H. Resit Akçakaya, Mark A. Burgman and Lev R. Ginzburg. (Foreword by Mark Shaffer). New York: Setauket. xii + 255 pp; illustrations; index. ISBN: 1-884977-23-5 (book and disk). 1997.

Author of the review

*Reviewed by Don Waller,
University of Wisconsin (Botany), Madison, Wisconsin*

General introduction

To succeed as a professional ecologist or conservation biologist, one needs both a broad conceptual understanding of the field and a set of quantitative tools for analyzing data and predicting outcomes. While most ecologists agree that our subject is intrinsically quantitative, we often shy away from quantitative topics in our courses. This is both because it requires considerable effort and because we realize that “many people drawn to the fascination and beauty of the qualitative aspects of ecology are put off by the quantitative aspects” (M. Shaffer, Foreword). In response to such concerns, some textbooks in ecology and (sadly)

most in conservation biology avoid a rigorous introduction to quantitative population models. While such approaches are certainly justified in many situations, they also handicap students serious about pursuing careers in ecology or conservation biology.

Introduction of the book under review

Fortunately, our field is now blessed with *Applied Population Ecology*, an excellent introduction to population models that facilitates the inclusion of quantitative materials in upper-level undergraduate and beginning graduate courses. Students with even a modest background in mathematics are guided step-by-step through a graduated series of explanations, examples, and exercises designed to give them a firm grounding in how models of population growth and regulation are used in ecology. The well-chosen examples range from Muskox reintroduced to Nunivak Island through population explosions of humans, to the erratic declines of threatened species like the Helmeted Honeyeater and California Spotted Owl. These examples capture the interest of the reader, and allow the book “to introduce mathematical ecology by developing an intuitive understanding of the basic concepts and by motivating the students through examples that put these concepts to practical use” (p. xi).

The review proper

In the first five chapters, the authors concisely lay out the essentials of population growth and its variability, population regulation, and the structure and dynamics of age-structured and stage-structured models. The authors ably introduce key quantitative concepts, emphasizing discrete time models and numerical simulation which, they argue, are “more applicable ... and easier to explain and understand” (p. 26) than continuous time models and analysis. In addition, such models allow them to embrace the stochastic nature of demography at small population sizes and thus emphasize the variability and unpredictability that rarely emerge when we teach by using the usual deterministic models. This newer paradigm is explored via numerical examples in both the text

and the problems that appear at the end of each chapter. Many of these exercises rely on the integrated EcoLab 1.0 software package for simulating population processes that would otherwise require lengthy and tedious calculation. Indeed, simulations provide the only practical way for readers to explore such models, imparting an intuitive feel for modeling, uncertainty, and the impact of chance events. Another compelling aspect of this book is its surprisingly broad coverage of topics in conservation biology. This emphasis accords well with current student interest and reflects the authors' active research interests (but may disappoint those expecting more coverage of fisheries or wildlife management). The authors speak knowingly of current and past problems in applying ecology successfully and refer directly to their own experiences. They also present interesting asides that enliven the text and effectively link concepts to important contemporary issues.

The final three chapters tackle the areas of metapopulations and spatial structure, population viability analysis, and decision-making in natural resources management. While coverage is necessarily less complete in these areas, the book touches on a remarkable diversity of topics, including sensitivity analysis, corridors and reserve design, the precautionary principle, type I and type II errors, and the general problems presented when few data are available to make decisions. There are also selective and informed choices for further reading at the end of each chapter.

Final conclusions

Applied Population Ecology succeeds in teaching quantitative models while explaining the context that makes these models important. Readers will gain quantitative insights and opportunities to exercise their skills in a trim and readable package. Instructors will gain an authoritative and pedagogically effective tool for teaching core concepts thoroughly. If we join in the efforts of this book to raise levels of numeracy in future cohorts of ecologists, our students, the field, and perhaps even natural populations will benefit.

A note from the compiler:

This review was originally published in *The Quarterly Review of Biology* 73.3. 1998. 380-381.

Sample nr 2: a review

The structure of the review

Books under review

(1). *Corpus linguistics* by Tony McEnery and Andrew Wilson (Lancaster University). Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press (Edinburgh Textbooks in Empirical Linguistics, edited by Tony McEnery and Andrew Wilson), 1996, x + 209 pp; distributed in the U.S. by Columbia University Press. Hardbound: ISBN 0-7486-0808-7. Paperbound: ISBN 0-7486-0482-0.

(2). *Language and computers: a practical introduction to the computer analysis of language* by Geoff Barnbrook (University of Birmingham). Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press (Edinburgh Textbooks in Empirical Linguistics, edited by Tony McEnery and Andrew Wilson), 1996, ix + 209 pp; distributed in the U.S. by Columbia University Press. Hardbound: ISBN 0-7486-0848-6. Paperbound: ISBN 0-7486-0785-4.

Author of the review

*Reviewed by John M. Kirk
The Queen's University of Belfast, Northern Ireland*

General introduction

The appearance of not one but two introductions to corpus linguistics within the same series shows the maturation and diversification of this fledgling sub-discipline within linguistics. McEnery and Wilson offer an overview or annotated report on work done within the computer-corpus research paradigm, including computational linguistics, whereas Barnbrook offers a guide or manual on the procedures and methodology of corpus linguistics, particularly with regard to machine-readable texts in English and to the type of results thereby generated.

Whereas McEnery and Wilson recognize that the distinguishing features of corpus linguistics rest with its computer-aided empiricism, they are eager to line it up alongside cognitive rationalism in an effort to show the complementarity and interdependence of the two. As they argue, the advantages of a corpus-linguistics approach are that it is invariably systematic and rigorous, and that linguistics based on a corpus acts as

a yardstick or control to linguistics based on artificial or introspective data. Of these current research paradigms, the authors' discussion offers fair and balanced criticism.

Introduction of the books under review

In the central core of the book, McEnery and Wilson present overviews of the theory and practice of corpus linguistics, the relative merits of qualitative versus quantitative approaches to language study, and a report (within linguistics) on subject-based studies using a corpus linguistics approach of which the authors evidently approve.

The review proper

The three central chapters constitute essential reading for every newcomer to the field. In Chapter 2, the authors emphasize the key factors in a corpus-linguistics approach: sampling, representativeness, size, format (and all their many sets of choices). In Chapter 3, by emphasizing the dilemma of interpretation inherent in any claims about a language as a whole that are based on no more than a sample, they focus on the benefits of quantitative information that is statistically reliable and from which robust generalizations may be made.

As graduates of Lancaster, whose mentors and now collaborators have included Professors Garside and Leech, the authors reflect the preferences of their training: they favor well-controlled (usually smaller) corpora (random *stratified* samples rather than simply random samples) with good extra-textual information stored in headers, which can be reused, with the same data yielding increasingly complementary results, such as the Brown and Lancaster-Oslo/Bergen written corpora, or the Lancaster Spoken English Corpus.

The many criteria expounded in these chapters will almost certainly lead others embarking on the use of corpora to justify their many strategic decisions. Although newer investigations might come to upstage some of the topic-centered studies highlighted here, the general criteria seem sufficiently assured to be of service for some time to come—particularly those of verifiability, total accountability, and strength of argument.

The final two chapters deal quite specifically with computational approaches and numerous accompanying issues, and it is doubtful whether

they will interest many who are not natural language processors--certainly, there is little for the student of English who is primarily interested in the analysis and description of data, for whom these chapters are almost certainly beyond reach without further specialized training.

The chapters understandably reflect the authors' experience as programmers with Lancaster's pioneering projects: the development of automatic techniques for word-class tagging and syntactic parsing (as evidenced by the development of the CLAWS tagger and on the Lancaster Parsed Corpus and the Lancaster-Leeds Treebank), for automatic machine translation (as evidenced by work on the Canadian Hansard Corpus and on the Crater Corpus), and for the automatic identification of sublanguages (as in the IBM manuals study), on all of which they write with conviction and enthusiasm. Whatever the merits of these various approaches, the discussion lacks a demonstration of the results of machine translation in action, so that readers might see how the approach could benefit them. Nor are there any actual samples from the IBM manuals, whose words and sentences and ratios of words to sentences are counted and presented on graphs ad nauseam, nor a passage illustrating the finite subset of the language (referred to as "closure") in action. Indeed, the entire book is short on substantiating examples, so that it rarely emerges what scholar X's work on subject Y contributes to Y, however much favored by the authors.

Whereas McEnery and Wilson attempt the broad sweep across this burgeoning field, Barnbrook attempts a much deeper analysis of the exploitation of corpora (McEnery and Wilson's Chapter 2). There are separate chapters on using a computer in the first place, issues arising from the choice of data and their capture, the use of frequency lists, the generation of concordances, the analysis of collocations, and the question of tagging, parsing, and other kinds of in-text annotation. All of these chapters are very accessible to students of English because they are richly illustrated with examples. This same is true of Barnbrook's next chapter, which provides an overview of uses of corpora and their exploitation within natural language processing: students of English can see instances that relate to their use of computers (as simply in word-processing) or examples of what is automatically analyzed or, in the case of the so-called sublanguage of dictionary definitions, being investigated. Barnbrook's lucidity, his practical guidance in showing the reader what to do and what comes out of doing it, his copious examples and illustrations, all recommend his book highly. Just as McEnery and Wilson reflect their Lancaster training, so Barnbrook's emphasis on linguistic descrip-

tion reflects his association with the COBUILD dictionary and grammar project at Birmingham. My only reservation about Barnbrook is his excessive use of examples of spelling variants from Chaucer; whereas this use is understandable in view of Barnbrook's doctoral research, even many native-speaker students are neither excited nor curious about the language of the past nor about spelling, so that its use undervalues the approach in its perception of relevance, tending, I have unfortunately found, to discourage. Corpus linguistics is so much more than variants within late fourteenth-century spelling! With so much contemporary data running through Birmingham's Bank of English, their use for illustrative or investigative purposes here could only find approval for the book by a much wider and, I'd guess, more widely international audience.

Final conclusions

Although these books are undoubtedly playing to the same tune, with much common ground and overlap, their achievement is to reflect the different traditions emerging in the field by which the authors have become influenced and which ultimately differ between "doing computing" and "doing language." Despite their differences, they each show that corpus linguistics has two central planks: the ways in which the computer is usable for language study and, on this basis, the generation of new descriptions and understanding.

A note from the compiler:

This review was originally published in *Computational Linguistics* 24.2. 333-335.

Sample nr 3: a review

The structure of the review

Book under review

Foundations of statistical natural language processing by Christopher D. Manning and Heinrich Schütze (Stanford University and Xerox PARC). Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 1999. xxxvii + 680 pp. Hardbound, ISBN 0-262-13360-1, \$60.00.

Author of the review

*Reviewed by Lillian Lee,
Cornell University, USA*

General introduction

In 1993, Eugene Charniak published a slim volume entitled *Statistical language learning*. At the time, empirical techniques to natural language processing were on the rise—in that year, *Computational linguistics* published a special issue on such methods — and Charniak’s text was the first to treat the emerging field.

Nowadays, the revolution has become the establishment; for instance, in 1998, nearly half the papers in *Computational linguistics* concerned empirical methods (Hirschberg, 1998). Indeed, Christopher Manning and Hinrich Schütze’s new, by-no-means slim textbook on statistical NLP — strangely, the first since Charniak’s¹ — begins, “The need for a thorough textbook for Statistical Natural Language Processing hardly needs to be argued for”. Indubitably so; the question is, is this it?

Introduction of the book under review

Foundations of statistical natural language processing (henceforth FSNLP) is certainly ambitious in scope. True to its name, it contains a great deal

¹ In the interim, the second edition of Allen’s book (1995) did include some material on probabilistic methods, and much of Jelinek’s *Statistical methods for speech recognition* (1997) concerns language processing. Also, the forthcoming *Speech and Language Processing* (Jurafsky and Martin, in press) promises to cover many empirical methods.

of preparatory material, including: gentle introductions to probability and information theory; a chapter on linguistic concepts; and (a most welcome addition) discussion of the nitty-gritty of doing empirical work, ranging from lists of available corpora to indepth discussion of the critical issue of smoothing. Scattered throughout are also topics fundamental to doing good experimental work in general, such as hypothesis testing, cross-validation, and baselines. Along with these preliminaries, FSNLP covers traditional tools of the trade: Markov models, probabilistic grammars, supervised and unsupervised classification, and the vector-space model. Finally, several chapters are devoted to specific problems, among them lexicon acquisition, word sense disambiguation, parsing, machine translation, and information retrieval.² (The companion website contains further useful material, including links to programs and a list of errata.)

In short, this is a Big Book,³ and this fact alone already confers some benefits. For the researcher, FSNLP offers the convenience of one-stop shopping: at present, there is no other NLP reference in which standard empirical techniques, statistical tables, definitions of linguistics terms, and elements of information retrieval appear together; furthermore, the text also summarizes and critiques many individual research papers. Similarly, someone teaching a course on statistical NLP will appreciate the large number of topics FSNLP covers, allowing the tailoring of a syllabus to individual interests. And for those entering the field, the book records “folklore” knowledge that is typically acquired only by word of mouth or bitter experience, such as techniques for coping with computational underflow. The abundance of numerical examples and pointers to related references will also be of use.

Of course, encyclopedias cover many subjects, too; a good text not only contains information, but arranges it in an edifying way. In organizing the book, the authors have “decided against attempting to present Statistical NLP as homogeneous in terms of mathematical tools and theories” (pg. xxx), asserting that a unified theory, though desirable, does not currently exist. As a result, instead of the ternary structure implied by the third paragraph above—background, theory, applications—fundamentals appear on a need-to-know basis. For example, the key concept of

² The grouping of topics in this paragraph, while convenient, does not correspond to the order of presentation in the book. Indeed, the way in which one thinks about a subject need not be the organization that is best for teaching it, a point to which we will return later.

³ For the record: 3 lb., 10.7 oz.

separating training and test data (failure to do so being regarded in the community as a “cardinal sin” (pg. 206)) appears as a subsection of the chapter on n -gram language modeling. It is therefore imperative that the “Road Map” section (pg. xxxv) be read carefully.

This design decision enables the authors to place attractive yet accessible topics early in the book. For instance, word sense disambiguation, a problem students seem to find quite intuitive, is presented a full two chapters before hidden Markov models, even though HMM’s are considered a basic technology in statistical NLP. Two benefits accrue to those who are developing courses: students not only receive a more gentle (and, arguably, appetizing) introduction to the field, but can start course projects earlier, which instructors will recognize as a nontrivial point.

However, the lack of an underlying set of principles driving the presentation has the unfortunate consequence of obscuring some important connections. For example, classification is not treated in a unified way: Chapter 7 introduces two supervised classification algorithms, but several popular and important techniques, including decision trees and k -nearest-neighbor, are deferred until Chapter 16. Although both chapters include cross-references, the text’s organization blocks detailed analysis of these algorithms as a whole; for instance, the results of Mooney’s (1996) comparison experiments simply cannot be discussed. Clustering (unsupervised classification) undergoes the same disjointed treatment, appearing both in Chapter 7 and 14.

On a related note, the level of mathematical detail fluctuates in certain places. In general, the book tends to present helpful calculations; however, some derivations that would provide crucial motivation and clarification have been omitted. A salient example is (the several versions of) the EM algorithm, a general technique for parameter estimation which manifests itself, in different guises, in many areas of statistical NLP. The book’s suppression of computational steps in its presentations, combined with some unfortunate typographical errors, risks leaving the reader with neither the ability nor the confidence to develop EM formulations in his or her own work.

Finally, if FSNLP had been organized around a set of theories, it could have been more focused. In part, this is because it could have been more selective in its choice of research paper summaries. Of the many recent publications covered, some are surely, sadly, not destined to make a substantive impact on the field. The book also occasionally exhibits excessive reluctance to extract principles. One example of this reticence is its treatment of the work of Chelba and Jelinek (1998); although the text

hails this paper as “the first clear demonstration of a probabilistic parser outperforming a trigram model” (pg. 457), it does not discuss what features of the algorithm lead to its superior results.

Implicit in all these comments is the belief that a mathematical foundation for statistical natural language processing can exist and will eventually develop. The authors, as cited above, maintain that this is not currently the case, and they might well be right. But in considering the contents of FSNLP, one senses that perhaps already there is a thinner book, similar to the current volume but with the background-theory-applications structure mentioned above, struggling to get out.

Final conclusions

I cannot help but remember, in concluding, that I once read a review that said something like the following: “I know you’re going to see this movie. It doesn’t matter what my review says. I could write *my hair is on fire* and you wouldn’t notice because you’re already out buying tickets”. It seems likely that the same situation exists now; there is, currently, no other comprehensive reference for statistical NLP. Luckily, this big book takes its responsibilities seriously, and the authors are to be commended for their efforts.

But it is worthwhile to remember that there are uses for both Big Books and Little Books. One of my colleagues, a computational chemist with a background in statistical physics, recently became interested in applying methods from statistical NLP to protein modeling.⁴ In particular, we briefly discussed the notion of using probabilistic context-free grammars for modeling long-distance dependencies. Intrigued, he asked for a reference; he wanted a source that would compactly introduce fundamental principles that he could adapt to his application. I gave him Charniak (1993).

References

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⁴ Incidentally, FSNLP’s commenting on bioinformatics that “As linguists, we find it a little hard to take seriously problems over an alphabet of four symbols” (pg. 340) is akin to snubbing computer science because it only deals with zeros and ones.

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A note from the compiler:

This review was originally published in *Computational Linguistics* 26.2. 2000.

Sample nr 4: a review

The structure of the review

Book under review

Perspectives on intellectual capital: multidisciplinary insights into management, measurement, and reporting edited by Bernard Marr. Amsterdam: Elsevier, 2005. xviii + 235 pp. Paperback, ISBN 0-7506-7799-6.

Author of the review

*Reviewed by T.D. Wilson,
Editor-in-Chief of Information Research*

General introduction

How refreshing it is to be presented with a collection of papers on intellectual capital that does not have the words 'knowledge management' in either the collection title or in the titles of any of the papers! Perhaps publishers are finally getting the message.

Introduction of the book under review

The idea of knowledge management is discussed, of course, but, in most papers, only in passing. More attention is given by Joe Peppard of Loughborough University in his paper, *An information systems perspective on intellectual capital*. Peppard notes:

If knowledge is personal and embodied in people, it cannot be transferred or imitated by transmitting information – we already argued that knowledge is distinct from information. The technology used by organizations to manage knowledge...therefore contains codified 'knowledge', not knowledge as articulated previously but really information. (p. 111)

I'm not too happy about that notion of knowledge being 'embodied in people', since I regard knowledge not as a *thing* but as a dynamic

process, but the overall idea is very much in accord with my views and the result is that Peppard can discuss the distinction clearly.

However, I am ahead of myself: what is *intellectual capital*? Several authors point to the lack of an agreed definition, noting, for example, that there is a conceptual overlap with *intangible assets*; others present the definition that suits their immediate purpose in presenting their own ideas; for example, Cloutier and Gold (*A legal perspective on intellectual capital*) state:

...we take intellectual capital to mean the sum of all ideas, information and knowledge over which individuals or organizations may wish to exercise some form of control. (p. 125)

while a more economic definition is reported by Sullivan (*An intellectual perspective on intellectual capital*): '**knowledge that can be converted into profits**'.

Perhaps the most specific definition and, consequently the most useful for our purposes is that proposed by Roos (who is credited by other writers in the collection as one of the founding fathers of the idea):

...a consensus seems to have formed on dividing a company's resources into three different groups: human resources, comprising the competence...of the individual employees; relational resources, which represents all the organization's valuable relationships with customers, suppliers, and other relevant stakeholders; and organizational resources, including processes, systems, structures, documented information, patents, brands, other intellectual property, and other intangibles that are owned by the firm but do not appear on its balance sheet. (p. 203)

Some idea of the overall approach of the book is given by the titles I have quoted: there are three parts – Disciplinary views, with ten chapters; Interdisciplinary views, with four chapters; and Discussion and final thoughts, one chapter.

It would be tedious to list all of the approaches and some have been mentioned already (information systems, legal, intellectual property) but, overall, we can say that the multidisciplinary and interdisciplinary approach adds considerably to our understanding of the implications of intellectual capital. Of course, in some of the writers there is an inevitable confusion between 'knowledge' and 'information' (although, as noted

earlier, Peppard avoids this) and that confusion can be very unhelpful since it draws attention away from what organizations can do to ensure that the *articulated* knowledge they control (brands, patents, contracts, etc.) is effectively used and that which they cannot fully control, what *people* know is identified and motivational strategies are put in place to encourage those people to share information *about* what they know.

Of the papers, I particularly enjoyed those by Peppard, Roos, Sullivan and Johanson. The last of these is a very brief analysis of the concept of 'human capital' (which I have always thought to be almost as inhuman a concept as 'human resources') and Johanson (writing of HRCA) or human resource costing and accounting) raises the ethical issues:

*Is there any future for a concept aspiring to reveal
the importance of humans for the firm's value creation
if humans are looked upon as just another form of capital,
interchangeable with other forms of capital? (p. 100)*

Final conclusions

With 'human capital' recognized as such an important element of intellectual capital perhaps we need to be reminded of these ethical issues more often.

A note from the compiler:

This review was originally published in *Information Research* 11.1. 2005. Review no. R195.

Sample nr 5: a review article

The structure of the review article

Title of the review

Origins – investigations into biological human musical nature

Book under review

Wallin, Nils L., Björn Merker and Steven Brown. (Eds.). 2000. *The origins of music*. Cambridge, Mass.: A Bradford Book/The MIT Press.

Author of the review

Reviewed by Leif Edward Ottesen Kennair

ABSTRACT. Lately NJMT has seen a surge of biological approaches to music, music therapy and related topics. Last year also brought the publication of a major collection of multidisciplinary essays collected under the umbrella called “biomusicology”. This text attempts to review the book, tie it to the NJMT articles, and comment on the recent biologising of musicology. This is seen as a part of a movement within many formerly exclusively social “sciences” or humanities, in which both evolutionary psychology and behavioural genetics fit. Many feelings of incompatibility and natural science imperialism may be evoked, though the message would seem to be that there is a greater return if one manages to combine the methods of investigation and experience from different approaches to our universe.

Internal division into sections

Prelude

This is a review of “Origins of Music”, a collection of 27 essays, articles and sketches edited by Nils L. Wallin, Björn Merker and Steven Brown (2000, MIT Press) – in the remainder referred to as “Origins”. Just as Darwin’s (1859) “Origin”, which this volume certainly pays homage to, did not answer the question of the “origin” of life, “Origins” does not

answer the question of the “Origins” of music. Obviously it is a tall measure for the founding text of any discipline to provide conclusive answers. Surely the aim for any such text is to synthesise a foundation and point in the most likely fruitful direction a new study might seek to find the answers. As “Origin” did, this is what “Origins” does.


This is also a consideration of some of the texts presented within last year’s volume of NJMT which focused on biological and evolutionary approaches to music and music therapy. In the end this is a comment on the biologising of music, and psychology in general, and the possibilities to be found in the synergy of combining the approaches of natural science and the humanities.

This is finally a view from what is called Evolutionary Psychology – which in this specific case means that the behaviour generating mind is viewed as the result of an evolved, functional, computational, modular organ. It also means that this is a disclosure – as the discourse at times may be more or less partisan. From this point of view some analyses will be more valid than others... even when one does not agree with the conclusions, the ground rules will be acceptable.

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And now, introducing biomusicology...

Let me state the following, straight off: The opening chapter of “Origins” ought to be included in the general curriculum of any music study. No less. The only reason not to do so would have to be prejudice and fear of anything that smacks of biology. One may only hope that this prejudice may be alleviated in time. Another way to honour the opening chapter may be to claim the following: If you do not read the entirety of this tome, at least read the first chapter!



The book that follows is a mosaic of different theoretical positions, different academic disciplines, different research methods, and several different species are studied. And yet the opening chapter manages to distil some general themes. It would of course be quite a surprise, if biomusicology, at such an early date, was able to present a theoretically united research programme. This makes this guide of an introduction all the more important, as it clarifies the problems and suggests what general themes or discussions one may perceive at this early stage. Every good collection attempts this, not every collection succeeds. I believe I would have been more confused by the variation that met me in the following chapters without the light shed by the editors.

The book continues to present different perspectives to the question of music and biology – and if one has not got multiple degrees in neurology, zoology, evolutionary biology, psychology, musicology, archaeology, palaeontology, ethnomusicology, anthropology, computer simulations, acoustic analysis, music therapy etc. one is going to be challenged more than a few times to be able to follow all the arguments of all chapters. I have to admit to being quite befuddled at several occasions. Miller (chapter 19) was the most familiar chapter for an evolutionary psychologist, Dissanayake (chapter 21) is probably the most readily available text for music therapists, and comparative biologists/psychologists will find a lot of familiar ground – although this might not be home turf for most music therapists.

The quality and style of the chapters seems to be variable, and most attempts at even getting close to answering the question of music's origins ends in speculation. The field is wrought with most of the problems that psychology and anthropology struggle with when attempting to argue for evolutionary perspectives (such as unease in accepting mainstream biology as science, rather than value-laden metaphor that may be played around with at the fancy of the self-ordained virtuoso). I am somewhat surprised that MIT Press has decided to jumpstart this new and disorderly discipline – although this is the most natural science approach to music I have ever come across. I found a few typographical mistakes in most chapters, and of course since publication the human genome has been counted – and the number is closer to 30,000 not 100,000. But when these small and maybe unavoidable faults have been noted – the book is a triumph of interdisciplinary and convergent academia, although, and alas, the only real attempt at synthesis is the opening chapter.

“Origins” is divided into 6 parts. Part I is the “Introduction to Evolutionary Musicology” – do not miss it, or you will get lost. Part II focuses on comparative studies of acoustic signalling in other species – what I would call a comparative psychology of music. Part III takes the step toward human evolution and human music, via language. Language is a specific human capacity, and the evolutionary study of language might inform other studies of specific human capacities. I am less convinced that tying language structurally to everything specifically human, like “music” is meaningful. Part IV is where one is promised insights into the origins, at best one gets speculations. My personal opinion is that the most important essay in this part (and apart from the introduction, the most important essay of the book), is the chapter by Miller on sexual selection. I make this claim although I disagree with the conclusion and found the lack of rigour in definitions and too large emphasis on argumentation rather than evidence annoying. What makes this important is that it advocates an approach founded on mainstream evolutionary theory and empirical studies of human musical ability. Part V focuses on universals in music – and this is an important step on the way to a rigorous research programme. One needs to define what phenomenon one is studying. As the origins of music will be found in the origins of the universal human mental adaptations, exaptations and spandrels¹ that allow us to perform the whole array of musical behaviour. Defining the different phenomena of interest as universals is where one needs to start. The last part, Part VI, is a small but feisty dinner speech – meant to build down barriers between natural science and art, and inspire much needed research within a most exciting field. This essay cannot possibly achieve to pay proper attention to every theory, field, position, tradition and innovation held within the pages of “Origins”, it will therefore attempt to address the major topics of the different parts from this specific author’s restricted perspective. Keep in mind, though, that this is not a book of restricted perspectives, quite the contrary.

For those who do not read more than the first pages, my conclusion is: If you wonder why and how we are able to perform music behaviour, buy the book. But beware: It does not answer the question, and the attempts at providing preliminary speculations are rather complex – but also very intriguing. Remember, Darwin’s “Origin” did not explain how life arose, only how it diversified – though it did spark a revolution in biology, of which the last milestone is the mapping of the human genome... “Origins” is the first step into an evolutionary or biological musicology, and is just as much a call for further research as it is the founding text of a new exciting discipline.

Humans and all of the other animals

In any comparative study, that is: any study that attempts to discover something about one species by studying an other, one runs into certain problems. I have partaken in comparative studies, and in general I would claim that comparative studies have been of utmost importance within psychology. I am therefore not adverse to the study of other animals in order to shed light on humans. The following is a more specific critique of the approach of Part II of "Origins". It consists of ca. 125 pages (almost exactly a quarter of the book) on the sounds, signals, meanings, learning and variations of different birds and mammals. What it has to do with music might not be as obvious.

Simon Baron-Cohen (1997) pointed out that the main point of comparative studies of other animals is not to get to know these animals, but to discover the secrets of humans – and this is worth noting. Psychology has a very good idea about rats – just as Marler (chapter 3) and his colleagues know very, very much about birds. And there is probably good reason to believe that some of this knowledge may inform investigators of humans – but if anthropocentrism might mean just what it states, studies of the specifically human must be performed eventually.

Two very important concepts in evolutionary informed comparative studies are those of "homology" and "analogy". A "homology" is a biological trait that performs similar biological function, and shares the same genetic heritage; my legs and the hind legs of a dog, my hand and the hand of an ape, my eyes and the eyes of all mammals – but not of all animals. "Eyes" have arisen several times in evolution, in different animals. Thus my eyes and the eyes of an octopus are analogous, not homologous. They perform relatively similar functions for me and the octopus, but they do not share genetic heritage. Another example is the shape of dolphins (mammals), fish and *Ophthalmosaurus* (a fish-shaped ocean dwelling dinosaur). The shape is an excellent one for aquatic movement, but has arisen independently in these different species.

Singing in birds is most likely not a homology to human song. The chirping of baby birds probably has nothing genetically in common with mother-infant protolanguage. In this one may agree with Jerison (chapter 12). Also – to be an analogy chirping needs to have the same function as protolanguage. Yet again this is probably not likely. That would mean that both were adaptations solving the same ultimate purpose (that is: increase reproductive likelihood in similar ways). Rather animal "singing" may be more a metaphor of human song: it is like human song in

some ways (and these will inform us of human song, too) but is not really human song (which is why I utter these words of caution).

Why the book ends up being dominated by comparative studies is therefore somewhat puzzling. I end up believing that the reason is this: These researchers have actually gone to work and mapped the behaviour of these animals in a quantitative, behavioural and orderly fashion – the result being that we have more data of this kind on birds than we have on humans. As Miller (chapter 19) points out:

In terms of quantitative data relevant to sexual selection hypotheses, we know more about the calls of the small, drab, neotropical Tungara frog [...] than we do about human music.

Obviously the research ought to be done on the human animal too. And as such Part II ought to inspire musicologists to go to work.

Lingocentrism

When moving from what we share with the animals to the uniquely human, one has to pass through language.

Now, music and language, in my view, probably share mental modules. They are both probably originally voice signal systems, that later also evolved communication qualities. Although we might know what language is, music is not defined. Therefore I could define music as pure semantic communication or signalling, or as totally void of semantic signalling what so ever. And this is the greatest problem of “Origins” – the lack of agreement of what one is searching the “origins” of. (Still today “species” is not an obvious concept, for all purposes, and in all biological camps, so Darwin had such trouble with “Origin”, too).

Even if there should be a link between music and language there is reason to suggest that the selection pressures behind language evolution have much in common with music evolution. Are “music” and “language” homologies – or are some language modules a part of the array of modules that make up the “musical” mind?

The major reward of considering language and evolution – and here inviting MIT linguist Steven Pinker (see Pinker, 1994) would have been expected – is to learn how a specific and unique human capacity may have evolved, and how such a capacity may be studied (Bickerton, Chapter 10). This is at least as important as the comparative study.

I still follow Pinker's (1997) conclusion: Language is probably an adaptation, music is probably not. Music as it remains undefined in "Origins" would at least have to be several phenomena, I would expect to find that in most cases "music" is the result of interactions between other adaptations.

Part III is a very interesting, but jumbled collection of essays. It tells us something about music and language, something about neural evolution, and a beautiful tale of how the thighbone of a young cave bear may be connected to our musical heritage. These are the essays that did not find a home in Part IV, but they might as well have - the reason for making the division is not clear.

Part IV is the chapter that supposedly attempts to answer the questions. At best we get speculations. But of course all science starts with mere speculations - and then progresses through an interaction of definitions, empirical data and theory building, or at least that would be the ideal. The message is clear: There is a lot of work to be done!

Origins of music

How has music come to be? This is a very complex question. It is so complex that one would rather not approach it, or that seems to be the claim in "Origins" - for the last half of last century this question was not considered. Recently it seems to be a favourite topic - and obviously musicologists ought to contribute to this research. By not considering the evolutionary or biological aspects of human nature, including musicality, one will probably not be able to answer such a question.

Music did not pop up due to large brains becoming larger, as paleontologist and essayist Stephen Jay Gould (1991) claims - the brains becoming larger to better cool the hot blood of savannah dwelling folks. And if it did, what luck! Maybe that is all that some dualistic theoreticians would want humanity to be - luck. Of course that would go for all structural evolution, too - fish would be lucky to have gills, hens lucky to lay eggs, and "Darwinism" would be a waste of academic time. In that case the "origins" of music would be impossible to discover, and would not have present day importance what so ever.

If "music" in any way had an effect on the lives of humans, in such a way as to increase the likelihood of reproduction (even if this was via increased survival) then humans would have been "bred for" "music". And that is when evolutionary theory becomes interesting. In order to

avoid becoming a naive “pan-adaptationist” though, one has to consider the following: The mental mechanisms that evolved to increase reproductive success in our ancestors also made “music” possible. In this scenario “music” is not an adaptation, only a spandrel – a side-effect of adaptations. Still evolutionary theory is interesting, and this actually does not belittle music – the phenomenon exists today as it does no matter how it arose, just as we are human even if our genome contains genes from bacteria and monkeys! In this case it is the evolution of these other structures we need to track.

“Origins” has to be a book of evolution and music. That is the only way one may investigate “origins” – at least after the lucky event (no matter if this is the chance designing of a “music” module or a “language” module or an “acoustic ecology scanner” module) became a significant feedback process. The reason is, like it or not, that the ability to perform music behaviour has to be based upon a biological human nature that allows music behaviour to be performed. If one does not like this I suggest that one attempts to discover why one harbours such a dislike – and attempts to change this prejudice. The “origins” of music must be sought in the biological human musical nature. And this human nature is only properly investigated through the convergence of the biology of music and the art itself.

Universal human nature

Evolutionary psychology has made a point of studying universal human nature. As such there is a difference between certain forms of sociobiology and evolutionary psychology, as the former had a more individual rather than species focus. The universal species-typical level of analysis is also the correct level of analysis for the study of species-typical adaptations. And it is an analysis of whether musicality is a human adaptation or not that is the correct place to start. Note: also in the case where one might hypothesise that music is not an adaptation, one has to begin by focusing on whether it actually is – there is no other testable hypothesis.

This is, to add a politically correct point, also the reason why race is not considered interesting within evolutionary psychology. And this is also one conclusion of the human genome project; as Darwin predicted in “Origin” we all share the same origin and humans share the same genes to such a degree that major differences are found between two

specific individuals not groups. There seems to be a universal human set of adaptations.

“Origins” uses a non-absolute criterion for universal, and that seems correct. One would not expect that all human potentials would be put to use in every possible culture, as humans survive on tropical islands, in the arctic, in deserts, and in jungles. Some dive, some never dive; some hunt, some never hunt; some are polygamous, others celibate. The important issue is that “music” through such an analysis becomes a phenomenon probably guided by several adaptations. This probably is true of many complex behaviours that have a high level of interaction with culture in their expression.

It also allows for a modular mind, a corner stone of evolutionary psychology, and a modular definition of “music” behaviour.

The future of biomusicology

“Origins” is a multidisciplinary, panscientific project. The different texts are mostly clearly written, but the spread of theory and science and method ends up leaving me quite bedazzled, rather confused, and at the same time inspired. Consider the style of writing and level of detail in the archeological piece by Kunej and Turk (chapter 15) on what may (or may not – though the wonder of the thing hardly allows for such considerations!) be a flute produced from the femur of a young cave bear. Consider the neurological data, the sound frequency data, the different species of animals considered, the different theoretical positions. The bear is extinct, and yet there it is – a part of music as we know it – as is every detail of the book. There is more of this all through the pages of “Origins”. And there probably is more – out there.

The future of “biomusicology” is therefore interesting. It is the first major start at a historical investigation of music, after the search for “origins” within humanities was called off at the start of the century. It is a start at looking back. At the same time there are some “here and now” problems that need to be addressed:

What is “music”?

Some claim one cannot answer this question, some claim we do not need to, some include any behaviour connected to music as we know it (sex, drugs, rock and roll, dance, song, and rhythm), yet others attempt at providing a partial answer – in some cases based upon “universals”.

I would suggest taking the latter perspective, and then reducing some. One needs to view music in parts to get anywhere. One part might be early mother(parent?)-infant communication. One part might be song, another dance etc. Also, I would suggest adding context, age, gender, etc. to the matrix. There is all reason to believe that the human universals involved in the greater phenomenon "music" are modular. That is why adding a certain number of universals from definition to definition might work. Believing that every activity associated with "music" is music is probably impossible to operationalise and will probably present too complex an analysis, as information processing in several modules will be involved. Also, the inflation of possible arguments will be near infinite without the quality of the science improving even closely. (If I should find that attracting females is "adaptive" for young male jazz-musicians, can I conclude that jazz is an adaptation – or that music is an adaptation? No, I cannot. There is much work left to be done.).

Is music an adaptation or not?

To provide an answer one will need to answer the questions of what are the functions or effects of different operationalised definitions of music, for what ages, for what social contexts, and for what genders. By definition function means that it enhances reproduction in some way – as does survival (Williams, 1966). The only reason survival is interesting, is if it increases the chance of reproduction of ones genes in as many generations as are mathematically relevant (due to sexual reproduction, great-great-great-grandchildren are not very similar to oneself). Thus survival success is pointless without reproductive success, so old animals eventually die. To answer the function-question will be to point out how the trait in question increased reproductive success (in our evolutionary past!). Also it answers what proximate problems (here and now, in the individuals development) the adaptation solved.

If music is not an adaptation we have several possibilities: it may be a chance result of several adaptations; it may be an effect of an adaptation, that the adaptation was not designed for (an exaptation); it may be a result of pure chance with no evolutionary history. The latter is probably the least likely, as music is pretty co-ordinated, systematic behaviour.

If music is not an adaptation one might find that developmental patterns are difficult to discern, that important maturing stimuli seems arbitrary from a musical perspective, and that the systematic appearance of music in all of its forms is a result of information processing in several

other adaptations (and possible exaptations or even spandrels). And in the this case, these need to be described and understood.

The editors of "Origins" make several statements about music being a better area of evolutionary study than language. The important thing to note there is the following: this is probably only true if "music" is an adaptation, and this we do not know. There has been more work on language as adaptation (Pinker, 1994), and depression as adaptation (Nesse, 2000) – but still we do not know if e.g. depression is an adaptation (Nesse, personal communication, March 2001), and the same holds for "music".

To conclude: Considering music an adaptation is no more a reduction or debasement of music than to consider music a part of universal human nature. Also, even though I do not believe music is an adaptation, that would have to be the hypothesis I would have to test were I to investigate biological human musical nature. All human nature is biological – without existence there is no essence; without biology there is no existence.

Where will this end?

The closing chapter of "Origins" is a cheerleader's chant: "Go Biomusicians! Go!" It is a playful, inspirational incitement to take biomusicology serious. As such it shows that this book is just as much an attempt at getting discussion and research started, as it is an attempt at providing scientific answers to the major questions of "the origins of music".

And by the look of things, at least within the pages of this journal, there is great interest in evolutionary and biological approaches to musicology and music therapy. Last year saw a surge of independent articles, which might have come as somewhat of a surprise to its readers. My impression of these articles is that they share many features of the chapters of "Origins" – including the almost total lack of overlapping approach. I would like to tie the following five articles from last years volume of NJMT to the hopes of the last chapter of "Origins":

Kennair (2000) attempted to illustrate how applying an evolutionary approach to music might clarify certain topics within both music development and clinical psychology, more specifically psychodynamic therapy. This text shares a lot of references and perspectives with Miller (chapter 19) – but while Miller claims that music is an adaptation, Kennair's claim is that *instrumental music* is best viewed as an exaptation or even spandrel, and also as a result of several other

adaptations interacting. Kennair's view of *song* is inspired by thinking comparable to Dissanayake (chapter 19) and the work of Trevarthen, among others. But song is not seen as the same phenomenon as instrumental music.

Grinde (2000) makes a similar claim: "music" consists of several different innate abilities, and he agrees with Miller that sexual selection may have had an influence. The main point still seems to be that music was adaptive. Also music ability in itself is not what is adaptive, but the link to language - making language learning possible. This is achieved by eliciting pleasurable states in our brain. This makes a rather complicated argument, where music is linked to both curiosity, language and special hedonistic brainstates. The most interesting point is that language gets centre stage, which is not the case in "Origins", and that the concept of "brain rewards" is used to explain why humans do not as a species engage in maladaptive behaviour, despite our free will... This seems to be sort of circular.

Merker (2000) comments on Grinde (2000). Merker is one of the editors of "Origins". He is also a contributor. The editors of "Origins" make several claims that music is a better phenomenon to study than language in order to understand human evolution, thus it is not surprising that Merker finds Grinde's focus on language problematic. Most of Merker's criticism seems fair, I too find Grinde's theory confusing. Most noteworthy is Merker's pleasure that evolutionary accounts of music, even when he does not agree with the theory, are being put forward: The work heralded by "Origins" is being done.

Christensen (2000) also comments on Grinde (2000). In a short piece he presents his own theory of listening, and ties this to the work of Daniel Stern (see Kennair, 2000, for comments on this approach). His main point is that music precedes language. Yet again, what "music" is is not clear - and though Christensen notes this problem in Grinde's article he does not seem to note it in his own. Christensen accepts the evolutionary perspective, but a major problem is that he seems to confuse ontogenetic development ("music" precedes "language" in the infant) with phylogenetic development.

Trevarthen and Malloch (2000) suggest the most controversial solution - there are supposedly other ways music may have evolved - as they brush off mainstream evolutionary biology as relevant to understanding the origins of music. This is also mirrored within many contributions of "Origins". Miller (chapter 19, p. 334) puts it this way:

[C]omplex adaptations can evolve only through natural selection or sexual selection [...] That's it. There are no other options, and any musicologist who is lucky enough to discover some other way of explaining adaptive complexity in nature can look forward to a Nobel prize in biology.

It could have been said differently, it could hardly be said clearer. And if this is a challenge, then the prize is greater than Nobel's. The closest contribution in "Origins" to Trevarthen and Malloch is probably Disanayake (chapter 21). What these authors have to explain, though, is how they hold the secrets to how biological phenomena (which they concede that they are discussing) develop, apart from those of biology proper.

All in all the conclusion is that human universals are involved. Universal human development and music are connected in some way. Music perception is connected to universals of human cognition and emotion. And evolutionary theory is somehow relevant for further investigation into music behaviours. These NJMT articles could thus easily have become a part of "Origins" – and may be viewed as biomusicological texts. In the articles – just as within the pages of "Origins" – there is no obvious common denominator apart from the fact that one seems to advocate a biological and even evolutionary approach to music. This is all very Kuhnian, and thus might be expected by Kuhnians.

I would like to think that this promising beginning will bring us new knowledge in years to come. I am pretty sure that a more positive attitude toward mainstream evolutionary theory will help, although I am familiar with the resistance toward such. The many utterances within the pages of "Origins" that the author is better able to understand the processes involved in evolution than the *bona fide* specialists within the field ought to worry any unbiased reader. Note Miller's comment above! My claim is that biomusicology could do a lot worse than adopting the rigorous research programme of Leda Cosmides and John Tooby's evolutionary psychology (Cosmides and Tooby, 1997, in press; Tooby and Cosmides, 1992, 1995; Kennair, 1998, 2001).

With a more daring, decisive and operationalised definition of the concepts of music, a clearer understanding of evolutionary theory and more quantitative data on universals of music, biomusicology will become a very interesting mapping of the evolution of the human mind. Thus biomusicology may inform and inspire other areas of investigation into the human psychology – human nature. In that case this conglomerate of various disciplines and cacophony of theoretical perspectives may indeed become a classic. Not only within (bio)musicology.

Postlude

Parallel to writing this text, I have been preparing a presentation for the Norwegian Psychiatric Association on the evolution of depression. This has provided me with the possibility to experience an interesting view of two very different fields being subject to the same theory in an attempt to improve each field's understanding: modern, mainly biologically oriented, psychiatry, in the throes of losing its religion or theoretical foundation (psychoanalysis), and musicology and music therapy, being led into the realm of natural science and evolutionary theory.

What happens in these two different cases? In both cases I would advise that one included both theoretical as well as empirical perspectives, and the choice of theory when one is investigating human nature from different positions is pretty obvious: the only theory that actually may predict anything about human nature is evolutionary theory. All other sub-theories would have to refer to and be disciplined by evolutionary theory.

In the case of psychiatry there seems to have developed a need to distance the field from theory, and approach a somewhat dustbowl empiricist position. Psychiatric science may therefore end up a mere descriptive "sub-science", unable to assist practitioners with knowledge to base generalisations and improvisations upon.

Musicologists, and many investigators within social "sciences" and the humanities, on the other hand are not in general comfortable with evolutionary perspectives or natural science in general. The anxiety of reductionism and genetic determinism is broadly evident. Case studies and limited empirical testing end up crippling the potential validity of theoretical generalisations.

Obviously, my position is that both fields will have more to gain from approaching the world simultaneously with theory and empirical investigation. The ideal is a situation where data disciplines theory, and theory generates data. This is in many ways a naïve understanding of philosophy of science - but that is beside the point. When one approach to the world discards theory, and the other discards the empirical methods of investigation, such simplistic theory of science is more than valid. With dustbowl empiricism all one may achieve is a statistical chance of predicting specific cases, and there is no way to perform improvised implementations based on general principles in non-studied cases (which individuals are, if one strips them of all general features - but such features are Theory!). On the other hand, the method of describing the ex-

perience of the universe of one individual or the specific details of the single case is a highly complex empirical study, but with an N (number of subjects) = 1, thus few valid generalisations about all other cases can be made (and such a valid generalisation would be the basic structure of Theory).

Science would not have got anywhere without reductionism (Tiger, 1999), and I agree – legal reductionism is necessary. Grappling with holism is a sure way not to understand the pieces of the puzzle – the “holistier than thou” (Dawkins, 1982, p. 113) attitude being politically correct, while blindfolding every attempt at seeing solutions. On the other hand, dustbowl empiricism is a dead end, so all legal reductionism must be coupled to valid theory building. I believe the area of biomusicology is an interesting epistemological experiment – that might build down the unease in both (wrongfully perceived?) opposing “cultures”.

Let this end with the words of Brown, Merker and Wallin (Chapter 1, p. 21):

It is our hope that this situation will change in coming years, and that the next generation of students will realize the great awards that await them in making the extra effort to develop training in both the arts and the experimental sciences such as biology.

Amen? I surely do hope so.

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A note from the compiler:

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Sample nr 6: a review article

The structure of the review article

Title of the review

Review of literature on gender in the family

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY. Much family research in Consumer Behavior has implicitly assumed that gender roles are shifting within the household, yet there is a dearth of direct investigation of that assumption. However, to understand the dynamic nature of households, we need to understand the manner in which spouses do gender. An examination of gender in the household is also important because many differences observed in household research do not appear to be biologically inevitable, but socially enforced.

We use the three theoretical gender traditions noted by Risman (1998) to evaluate gender research in sociology in general and consumer behavior in particular as it pertains to the roles that husbands and wives play in household consumption. Specifically, we review research on decision-making, leisure, sharing of labor, and conflict resolution. We suggest that most research has fallen within the gendered-self tradition (whether the sex differences noted are due to biology or socialization) and agree with Risman and Connell's (1987) recommendation that gender needs to be investigated at the axis of the individual, the interaction among individuals, and the oversight of social institutions.

In terms of research on decision-making, we concur with Bristor and Fischer (1993) that not using a gendered-lens is preventing us from organizing our inconclusive findings to date. Given that such findings have been derived from a male-equals-masculine and female-equals-feminine perspective, they lack an acknowledgement of how gender roles are changing.

In terms of research on leisure and household labor, while the vast majority of studies reviewed has consistently found that men are not doing more in terms of domestic labor (despite the entry of large numbers of middle class women into the workplace), there is little support for the intuitively expected premise that this inequality in household responsibilities would result in overt conflict.

Subsequently, in our review of research on household conflict we find much evidence of conflict suppression processes. Such processes include subtle actions taken to maintain harmony within the household by constructing a form of "fairness" that may

not be observable to a neutral third party. What is seen as an equitable distribution of household duties may well vary from an objective evaluation of the number of hours contributed by each spouse. Gendered interpretations are most salient in research on management of household labor and conflict where it is often reported that potential conflict is reduced by the fact that spouses do not see the same outcome as having the same meaning.

The paper ends with a call for research in household consumption and production to incorporate a gendered lens in planning studies and interpreting findings. Specific areas needing such research are the gender socialization processes occurring in the modern household, the investigation of a gender switch phenomenon noted in the current cohort of elderly, more focus on family processes than outcomes, and greater representation of the husband's voice in gender research on households.

KEYWORDS. Gender, family communication processes, family decision making, family harmony, conflict suppression processes, sex roles

Internal division into sections

Introduction

Sex is differentiated from gender in terms of its biological determinism. In other words, while some (sexual) differences between men and women appear to be biologically inevitable, others (gendered) are clearly social constructions that have been knit together to serve various purposes at various periods in time. However, in commentaries on how men and women differ, there is frequently a lack of attention to distinguishing differences that are biologically inevitable from those that do not bear any such biological determinism. The purpose of this paper is to document extant research to date on differences between men and women in the context of household. In documenting the extant research, it is hoped that the reader's attention may be drawn to the fact that many differences observed in such research do not appear to be biologically inevitable and therefore must be qualified in terms of the gendered lens that has been used to both document and interpret such differences.

What is gender?

Gender is the symbolic role definition attributed to members of a sex on the basis of historically constructed interpretations of the nature, disposition, and role of members of that sex. It differs from a classification

based on sex in that there is little evidence to suggest that gendered differences are biologically inevitable (while sexual differences are largely biologically determined); gendered differences are only sociologically inevitable, and that "inevitability" may diminish with time.

An interest in gender has been persistent and gender issues have been investigated in many domains, including workplace, marketplace, and leisure activities. Support for the socially constructed nature of gender lies in the evidence that gender is a malleable concept. For example, an assertive woman executive may enact her gender quite differently in the workplace than at home, or as Risman (1998, p. 2) writes, "the same person may display passive and subordinate 'femininity' in a love affair yet be a tyrant at the office." At other times, for marital harmony to exist, partners must please each other by behaving in ways that are at odds with their gender socialization and which they would not find pleasing themselves (Thompson and Walker 1989). Traditionally, the most basic form of gender was observed within a household, where the expectations for the fulfillment of various specialized household obligations were prominent. Yet, more recently, with the changing compositions of households and many emergent household structures, gender has evolved into a dynamic construct (Firat 1994) even within the household and a marketer must understand the changing nature of how gender is played by spouses in order to understand fully the rapidly changing nature of the household itself.

Perspectives on gender

Risman (1998) identified three distinct theoretical traditions that help understand sex and gender. A first tradition focuses on gendered-selves - whether the sex differences are due to biology or socialization. This focus is on the individual level of analysis, and encompasses social identities. Risman (1998, p. 16) noted that all theories of the gendered-self posit that by adulthood, most men and women have developed very different personalities: women have become nurturant, person oriented, and child-centered while men have become competitive and work-oriented. This perspective has been widely embraced in consumer behavior and marketing; for example, consistent with the gendered-self tradition, Meyers-Levy's (1988) selectivity hypothesis (which has been questioned by both Hupfer (2002) and Putrevu (2001) in this special issue) asserts that the male agentic role is characterized by concern for self, while the female communal role typically embraces concern for both self

and others. Such coupling of male and “masculine” and female and “feminine” has been criticized by many researchers, largely because “gender” is seen to be dynamic in nature (Allen and Walker 2000; Risman 1998), changing for the individual on an almost continuous basis.

A second tradition focuses on how social structure creates gendered behavior. This approach argues that men and women behave differently because they fill different positions in institutional settings, work organizations, and families; in other words, they take on different gendered roles and, consistent with the role requirements, men and women in the same structural roles would be expected to behave identically. For example, Epstein (1988) found no documented differences that can be traced to the predispositions of men and women, concluding that differences between men and women are largely due to gendered roles.

Risman (1998, p. 21) argues that there is a fundamental flaw in the logic supporting the gender role structure tradition: if women and men were to experience identical structural conditions and role expectations, then empirical gender differences should disappear. However, as Risman (1998, p. 52) asserts, no society without a gender structure has ever existed; researchers have investigated role structures as close to gender neutral as possible (Coltrane 1989; Risman 1986), and still have found gendered differences.

A third tradition is the interactional perspective, which emphasizes contextual issues such as cultural expectations and taken-for-granted situational meanings. This approach was best articulated by West and Zimmerman (1987); once a person is labeled a member of a sex category, s/he is morally accountable for behavior as ones in that category do. That is, the individual is expected to “do gender;” gender is not something we are but something we do, or, in other words, “doing gender” means creating differences that are not inevitable nor essential (Risman 1998). Therefore, doing gender implies legitimatising inequality, as what is female in a patriarchal society is devalued (Daniels 1987; Kynaston 1996). Scanzoni (1979) argued for this view of gender in family contexts, expressing the need to deal unambiguously with issues of reciprocity within a couple.

Risman (1998) argues that this tradition is also incomplete as it slights the institutional level of analysis, which includes issues such as distribution of material advantages between the sexes, formal organizational schemas, and ideological discourses. In other words, the links among gendered selves, situational expectations, and institutional gender stratifications need investigation (Connell 1987; Risman 1998). For example, women do gender in ways that support male privilege in family even

when those women have overcome oppression and institutional barriers in other domains (Commuri 2000; Risman 1998). Such complex interplay of traditional and neo-traditional gendered selves cannot be understood unless the analysis is situated at the axis of the individual, the interactions among individuals, and the oversight of institutions.

The domain of the review

The focus in this review is on behaviors of men (husbands) and women (wives) in consumption and production roles within a household. Becker (1965) labeled family a “small factory” that produces commodities (children, health, leisure, etc.) of value to the family. As mentioned earlier, not only are the most basic forms of gender enacted in a household but also, as Risman (1998) suggested, a household is a *gender factory*. Therefore, understanding gendered differences in production and consumption rituals within the household is important. This need is further accentuated by the fact that, as stated earlier, our discipline has embraced a gendered-self perspective coupling man with masculine and woman with feminine. Such a categorical dichotomization across biological and social differences has not only led to an overall lack of acknowledgement of the lenses necessary in interpreting the findings of our research but also a corresponding under-interpretation of the findings. As Bristor and Fischer (1993) noted, it is one thing to observe a pattern of behavior in the household, and another to be able to interpret it fully upon acknowledging the gendered nature of the behaviors observed. The latter results in contextualizing the findings and prevents any researcher-imposed artificial labeling of the observed patterns of behavior. Despite the centrality of the gendered (and not biological) differences observed between men and women in households, there is no comprehensive review of the enactment of gender in the household. It is the purpose of this paper to fill that gap by providing a review of research that has observed differences between men and women in production and consumption rituals in households.

Historical perspective

We will discuss “traditional gender roles” in the sense that they represent family hierarchies as first studied by consumer researchers in the 1950s. This “traditional” positioning is similar to what Parsons (1949,

1964) labeled “instrumental and expressive functions,” in which husbands embrace the responsibility for providing for the family and wives embrace the legacy of meeting the everyday needs of the family members. This “functional” perspective (or consumer research’s notion of “traditional”) may be quite limited in scope historically. Janeway (1971) noted that the notion of “the home” as a distinct sphere of life, as a stronghold of family and leisure, did not exist before the eighteenth century in Europe. Connell (1987) noted that the notion that women ought to be dependent on men would have seemed absurd in the context of the reciprocities of village agriculture and commercial towns, and that the gender-division construction of “breadwinner” and “housewife” has never been a reality for much of the working class.

Allen and Walker (2000) noted that the functionalist perspective is based on a narrow slice of history in the United States, peaking in popularity in the 1890s, at the height of the industrial era. “Prior to the 1940s, wage work for women was invisible; the labor participation of working-class and minority women was ignored, while middle-class women earned money in ways that were concealed from the economy, such as taking in boarders” (Bose 1987, p. 270). The post WWII era brought a resurgence of the functionalist view of gendered-segregated roles in the family. The 1950s were a strange decade in U.S. history, as there was a backlash to the temporary empowerment of women when they entered the workforce in large numbers during WWII. The gender conflict faced after the war resulted in the return of most middle class women to their “place” in the home. These traditional “inside/outside” roles are still prevalent in parts of the U.S. as well as across the world.

Firat’s (1994) perspective of the separation of the home(stead) and the workplace in post-agrarian United States includes the notion that production was delegated to the public domain and was attributed positive values such as useful and creative. The home was for recreation, leisure, and consumption, and those in the private domain did not work. Though we now use the term “non-paid work” in discussing domestic labor, these domestic activities have been devalued because of their association with women and of the greater “usefulness” associated with work in the public domain. Daniels (1987) described “family work” as unseen and unacknowledged because it is private, unpaid, commonplace, done by women, and mingled with love and leisure.

The functionalist perspective of inside/outside roles has been questioned due to the dynamic nature of “gender.” Risman (1998, p. 157) noted that gender is a “human invention and is subject to re-invention

and re-creation." Similarly, Allen and Walker (2000, p. 4) noted that "although gender is a dominant structural force in families, it is constructed and reconstructed on a daily basis in private relationships." In Marketing, Ferber and Birnbaum (1980, p. 269) suggested that since "there is a diminishing utility for professional and house work, spouses are likely to find a more balanced sharing of housework beneficial, and the husband may enjoy getting to know the children better." Sussman (1993, p. 312) predicted that changes within the family will not revert to the old superordinate/subordinate pattern, but rather that equity and sharing will grow in both prevalence and incidence in the coming years. As we will see in the next section, the sharing of housework prediction appears to have little support, but fathers in the 1990s did spend significantly more time with their children than their fathers did with them (Gardyn 2000).

Firat (1994) predicted that post-modernity would be associated with the break between gender and sex categories, arguing that feminine and woman and masculine and man are no longer seen as exclusive representations [what Risman (1998) also referred to as *gender vertigo*]. Part of what is causing this change is the empowerment of the consumer (traditionally the woman) as consumption is becoming "the production and signification of one's self-image" (Firat 1994, p. 217).

While the research cited above would suggest that there is a blurring of gender, whether that is observable in household interactions with the marketplace remains to be established. We will review the family literature in Consumer Research to see how gender differences have been observed (measured) in terms of household production and consumption behaviors. Then we will make the case that the behaviors reported in such research may not be indicative of the underlying gendered differences; for example, though the husband may do much of the cooking or dress a child in the morning, the wife may still be responsible for menu planning or purchasing the child's clothes. Next we will look at the gendered nature of family conflict. Much of this literature comes from sociology, and will deal far more with household production issues than consumption issues. We conclude with a discussion of avenues for future research aimed at understanding how doing gender in the household is undergoing change.

Gender in household decision-making

As noted earlier, in nearly all societies, there has been an inside/outside dichotomy. Women, due to the stronger link to young children because of the birth process and to their generally smaller physiques, have been as-

signed roles inside the home, while men have been responsible for the outside roles, whether it was the provision of fresh meat, financial dealings with others, or, more recently, yard work. Thus, men have fulfilled the more instrumental family roles while women have traditionally fulfilled the more nurturing, supportive roles. To a great extent, these sex-differentiated roles have become perpetuated without being questioned sufficiently as to their appropriateness to modern (or post-modern) society.

Gender as noted in outcome research

The stream of research investigating family consumer decisions offers insight into changing family dynamics. Much of the early work focused on decision roles and provided results consistent with the provider/instrumental/financial officer role for men and the nurturing/supportive/home role for women. As will be discussed below, patterns changed for some households with the entry of women into the work force, but less so for more traditional sub-cultures. For example, Webster's (1994) study of Hispanic-Americans found the relatively simple inside/outside dichotomies that had been found among Anglo-Americans thirty years earlier. The gender perspective that seemed to underlie this stream of research is that of the gendered-self, and the implicit assumption was that men and women embrace household responsibilities consistent with respective biologically-based capabilities.

The changing work status of women in the 1970s and 1980s stimulated a great deal of research concerning decision roles and shifts in role responsibilities. In part, this research may reflect the assumption that roles within the family were expected to change as the wife entered the outside domain. Cunningham and Green (1974) found that decision roles had shifted, with there being more shared decision making for cars, vacations, and housing, but with the wife having more decision-making role in terms of food and groceries while the husband's influence had increased in the case of insurance. Belch, Belch, and Ceresino (1985), however, found rather "traditional" roles with men making the decisions for automobiles and televisions, and women dominating the purchase of appliances, furniture, and cereal. In other words, such investigations indicated that while men and women may take on new structural roles, their allegiance to masculinity and femininity respectively remains undeterred. Such assertions can be challenged (as will be discussed in detail toward the end of the paper) as they are steeped in an assumption that

social actions result in the same outcomes for men and women and all that is of interest is who is performing those actions, not whether the actions mean different things for men and for women given how the meanings are uniquely socially constructed.

Much of the research dealing with the impact of the wife's changing work status on family decision-making was based on the fairly simple premise that working wives would be more time crunched, and would seek "time-saving" products and services in order to fulfill traditional gender roles. The assumption implicit here was that women would be compelled to continue to enact their feminine household roles and, therefore, time saving durables will allow them to take on new roles without relinquishing old ones. Such investigations did not reveal any conclusive evidence (see Comhuri and Gentry 2000 for a recent review of findings in this stream of research). It is possible that we have not been able to find any conclusive evidence of, say, how households manage time (and which time-managing and timesaving strategies work and which do not) because we have adopted a gender-free lens to investigate that problem. Given that gender is a social construction, it is possible that when a woman spends time outside the home, neither she nor the rest of her family feel a need for a prorated compensation via freeing-up time at home. In other words, when a woman spends time away from housework, is that in addition to the time she spends at home or is that at the cost of the time she should have spent at home? When we assume that human actors are free from gendered skins, there is no need to ask that question. However, given that genders have been assigned primary responsibilities for various roles in a household (as discussed earlier), it is imperative that we use a gendered lens when we investigate behaviors that may carry gender overtones (please see Bristor and Fischer 1993 for an elaborate discussion of this argument).

From a gendered perspective, it can be proposed that when a wife spends time outside the home, she (and possibly others around her) may perceive such an activity to be at the cost of the time she should have spent at home. Under such circumstances, we can see why there has been little evidence that husbands take over traditionally "female" household roles. Berk and Berk (1979), Meissner et al. (1975), Pleck and Rustad (1980), Robinson (1977), and Walker and Woods (1976) found husbands' behavior regarding household production to be the same regardless of the wife's working status. For example, DeVault (1997) found that working wives reported doing more housework than did single mothers. Such findings only make sense when inspected through a gendered lens; without such a lens, "all the talk about egalitarian ideology, abstract beliefs about what

women and men 'ought to do' are not connected with the division of family work" (Thompson and Walker 1989, p. 857). Using a gendered lens, Allen and Walker (2000, p. 7) concluded "there is no better predictor of the division of household labor than gender. Regardless of one's attitude about 'gender' roles, the resources one brings to the relationship, and the time one has available, there is nothing that predicts who does what and how much one does in families than whether one is a woman or a man."

In marketing and consumer behavior, even when efforts were made to understand the roles of femininity and masculinity, the constructs were often reduced to a single measure of sex-role orientation. Green and Cunningham (1970) were the first to examine this variable in the context of consumer behavior while Scanzoni (1977) made the strongest effort to outline the relevance of shifts in gender roles for consumer behavior. Scanzoni identified two key demographic and social changes that bear relevance to gender roles: (1) women defining their paid employment in the same terms as men and (thus) (2) a change in relationships between men and women. Subsequently, Qualls (1982) found that not only did sex roles affect the distribution of influence and the extent of interaction within the family, but that they also accounted for differences in the reports of relative influence. Similarly, Rosen and Granbois (1983) found that sex-role attitudes and education were the most relevant determinants of how finances were handled within the household.

One significant departure from this general conclusion regarding "traditional" divisions of domestic labor is the phenomenon of a "gender switch" occurring in later life or as Gottman (1979) concluded, a decline in gender differences in later life. Within consumer research, Webster and Rice (1996) found that, upon retirement, a shift in power favoring women occurs, but only in cases where the incomes of the couples were significantly unequal before retirement. In other words, while men and money have been associated closely in our research (given the underlying gendered-self perspective), one can call for a decoupling of those two and suggest that household research should include independent variables that are not coupled with sex.

Gender as noted in process research

As mentioned earlier, the emphasis on household behaviors may not represent a true picture of gender in household responsibilities. Komter (1989) argued that the focus on observable outcomes diverted attention from the underlying processes. Even if women receive help in domestic

chores from family members, many women report that they need to supervise such help (Berheide 1984). Similarly, DeVault (1997) noted that even in households in which husbands did most of the cooking, the wife was still the household manager and controlled most planning functions related to cooking.

Some women found it easier to do the housework themselves than to get other family members to do it to their standards. In a study of fairly "egalitarian" dual-career couples, Coltrane (1989, p. 480) found there were at least six frequently performed household chores over which the mother retained almost exclusive managerial control and made sure they were performed adequately. In general, mothers were more likely than fathers to act as managers for cooking, cleaning, and child care, even though half of the couples said that they "shared" responsibility in these areas. Helper-husbands often waited to be told what to do, when to do it, and how it should be done. Schwartz (1998) found that, among couples with high-earning career wives, men felt their partners were entitled to do less housework, but did little to integrate an egalitarian process. Ehrensaft (1987) found that women usually bought children's clothes and made sure they looked presentable, even when the father actually dressed the child. Hertz (1986) found that, even in high earning couples that hired housework done by others, the ultimate responsibility for household management still fell to the wives.

Without a gendered perspective, it is easy to propose attributions of expertise as bases for such divisions of labor. However, as Twigg, McQuillan, and Ferree (1999) found, where men participate substantially in household chores, they must cross a series of hierarchical gendered thresholds in order to become high participators. It was not merely an issue of who was good at what but an issue of who is supposed to be doing what. For example, the lowest level tasks, or those that appear to be more gender neutral, include doing dishes and going grocery shopping, while at the high end is cooking meals. Therefore, husbands and wives do not easily take on a task if it calls for crossing a gender boundary. Even when they suggest that they are involved in a task, it may be important to look beyond and verify that involvement includes an actual responsibility for the tasks.

Gender, leisure, and domestic labor

Work in sociology has moved beyond the "who does what" question to investigate why the male/female divisions of domestic labor have changed so little, despite the prominent change in the gendered role of

paid work. Given that neither men nor women perceive household tasks as constituting leisure (and in fact, women are far less likely to view them as such (Shaw 1988)), the fact that women are making strides in paid work outside the home yet hold primary accountability for household tasks could be a reflection of a masculine hegemony.

Though it was initially perceived "that leisure was leisure and what applied to males also applied to females" (Henderson 1990, p. 230), recent work has begun to acknowledge the variance between men and women in emic perspectives on leisure. Men see leisure being constrained by the level of paid work whereas women, even those in the work force, see leisure constrained by domestic labor responsibilities (Firestone and Shelton 1994). Thus, women are less likely to see a work/leisure dichotomy, and are likely to combine "leisure" with family activities (Henderson 1990). Women's traditional leisure activities (such as crafts, sewing, knitting, gardening, reading, cooking, and crocheting) are often associated with short time blocks that fit with domestic labor, whereas men's leisure is usually associated with much longer time blocks (including activities such as golf, hunting, fishing, and attending sports events). Women's leisure may be found in the community or time spent with family, and is perceived to be less free from constraints, while men's leisure is more self-involving and free of constraints. Because of the overlays of women's leisure with their domestic work, it was found that though it may appear that domestic work is typically free from supervision and criticism (Allen and Walker 2000), women's leisure is closely monitored (Henderson 1990). Thus, while domestic labor is not "leisure," it can be integrated with activities that are more enjoyable.

Since neither men nor women actually perceive household work as leisure, it is typically regarded as worrisome, tiresome, menial, repetitive, isolating, unfinished, inescapable, and often unappreciated (Allen and Walker 2000; Berheide 1984; DeVault 1987; Ferree 1984). It has been observed that when men "help" out, they usually do so by selecting some of the nicer household tasks such as playing with children while wives prepare meals or clean up. One of the reasons why men do not actively engage in domestic work has been found to be a matter of standards. Since women hold primary accountability for household tasks, there is a certain eagerness on women's part to have such tasks accomplished to their standards. Wives often complain about the quality of husband's housework and childcare (Lamb, Pleck, and Levine 1986). Further, given that femininity is often intimately tied with being a woman, Coltrane (1989) observed that some mothers found that relinquishing control over the management of home and children made them uncomfortable.

Thompson and Walker (1989, p. 859) explain that, when women criticize their husbands' work in the household, they are protecting threatened territory. The home is the woman's dominion, and many women are reluctant to share control over the one domain in which they have power. In other words, some women do not wish to *not* do their gender.

A second reason why men do so little housework, even when they support the idea attitudinally, is that such men do not wish to do a gender that *they* are not. In other words, they do not want to do gender inappropriately. Coltrane (1989) reported that dual-career fathers' talk of spending time with their children was perceived by co-workers as indicating they were not serious about their work. These fathers reported receiving indirect messages that, for a man, providing for the family was primary and being with family was secondary. Further, over half of the dual-career couples reported receiving negative feedback from their own parents regarding their division of domestic labor when the man was actively involved in it, with most feedback indicating that the wife should quit work and stay home with the kids. Men and women who do gender *inappropriately* are thus prone to societal sanctions. Coltrane (1989, p. 473) concluded that while fathers typically derive a gendered sense of self from begetting, protecting, and providing for children, "their masculinity is even more dependent *on not* doing the things that mothers do." Kynaston (1996, p. 227) noted that "women may be called upon to do 'men's' work when necessary, but only women will ever do 'women's' work."

A more important perspective in understanding the meaning of domestic labor has been proposed by Ferree (1990). While resource models tend to see housework as an unmitigated "bad" that anyone with power would avoid doing, from a gender perspective, doing housework is understood as an expression of love and care. Ferree (1990, 1991) suggested that the creation of gender can be thought of as the creation of a division of labor between the sexes and that it shows that a wife's level of psychic identification with housework as well as her husband's expectations relate to important differences in practical equality. Thus, more important than actual spousal time discrepancies are differences among women in their feelings about housework and their perceptions of the division of labor (Blaire 1993).

Gender and consumption-related conflicts

The topic of "family" has long been associated with "conflict;" Scanlon (1979) noted that the greater the relationship is, the greater is the inevitability of conflict. From a research perspective, this association of

“family” and “conflict” has no doubt been exacerbated by what Hirschman (1993) referred to as the prevailing masculine research paradigm in consumer research, one which focuses on competition as opposed to cooperation. Commuri and Gentry (2000) argued that most family research has been undertaken from a fairly sterile, competitive perspective, implying an “either/or” mentality on the part of the spouses. For example, Qualls (1988, p. 443) stated, “Influence is defined in the present study as the perception of the action taken by one spouse to obtain his or her most preferred decision outcome while simultaneously stopping the attainment of their spouses’ most preferred outcomes.” While which gender wins a decision task or conflict has captured our research interest, the gendered interactions during the process, on the other hand, have been ignored. The consumer literature on household conflict in purchase contexts is somewhat limited, and the incorporation of gender perspectives within it is even more limited. There were strong early efforts (Granbois 1963; Pollay 1968) to develop frameworks for studying conflict resolution in families, but little subsequent work was undertaken. Further, the models discussed several strategies with little coverage of how they varied by gender. However, some strategies such as Pollay’s (1968) discussion of the use of sex as a bargaining tool did carry gender implications.

A bigger focus of family conflict research in general has been the allocation of household production responsibilities, a very relevant topic for marketers given the concern about who uses household products and who makes the purchase decisions for them. DeVault (1997, p. 190) asserted that “overt conflict over who will do housework is surprisingly rare.” Yet, when researchers place couples in tasks dealing with the allocation of domestic labor, conflict is very evident. For example, Pleck (1985) found that, when asked about it, one-third of the wives in his sample expressed the desire that husbands do more housework, and over one-half of the husbands sensed that wives expected more of them. Kluwer, Heesink, and Van de Vliert (1996) concluded that marital conflict comes from such discrepancies between actual and preferred labor division and that such discrepancies lead to dissatisfaction.

The inequity in the distribution of domestic labor results in men striving to maintain the status quo and in women striving for change. Several observational studies of marital conflict show that under such conditions, women exhibit greater emotional expressiveness whereas men rely on factual explanations or excuses (Margolin and Wampold 1981); women generate more negative affect and behavior than do men (Notarius and Johnson 1982; Raush et al. 1974); women are confronting and demanding

whereas men are avoiding and withdrawing (Black 2000; Christensen and Heavey 1990; Heavey, Layne, and Christensen 1993); and women are more negative-active in their conflict management strategies than men who are more positive-passive (Hojjat 2000). Thus, we would expect that men would attempt to avoid change to protect their positions, or will withdraw from any attempts to get them to change (Jacobson 1983, 1989).

In Marketing, Spiro (1983) studied the influence strategies used by husbands and wives in resolving disagreements concerning purchase decisions and found that women were more likely to be "non-influencers" or especially "emotional influencers," while men were slightly more likely to be "light" or "subtle influencers." Thompson and Walker (1989) summarize the conflict process somewhat similarly, with wives often using more emotional appeals and coercion, while husbands tend to remain reasonable and calm, problem-oriented, and conciliatory, but largely trying to postpone or end the dispute. Similarly it was found that, while a wife begins a conversation by stating the issues (Ball, Cowan, and Cowan 1995), when husbands begin a conversation, they leave the elaboration and the guidance of the disagreement to the wife (Gottman and Krokoff 1989).

Gender differences were also noted in the "control" of the dispute and in how one communicates. Wives usually build a climate of agreement, and they also escalate or de-escalate the conflict with their verbal and non-verbal negativity (Thompson and Walker 1989). In "distressed" families, no one seems to temper the negative opinions expressed. Vuchinich (1987) found that daughters and especially mothers were the most active family members in closing off conflicts. Mothers made two-thirds of the compromises while daughters made about one-half of the submissions.

Tracing how such terminal stances are arrived at, Ball et al. (1995) found that both spouses agreed that wives were more active during the initial mobilization phase and that the husband had the "final say" over whether a decision was reached. However, in the middle phase, each spouse singled himself/herself as having the most influence in the way his or her interaction was structured. In particular, it was found that men and women differed with respect to the meaning of keeping their problem-solving discussions "focused." Most men defined "focus" as the ability to stay on the topic *originally raised*, whereas most women described "focusing in" on the real issues and getting to the bottom of things.

Viewing this through a gendered lens, it can be seen that the structure of the task explains the nature of the results quite well. The wife is

more enthusiastic initially, as she has something to gain, but the husband has veto power as it is his behavior that would need to change. In other words, husbands seek to maintain the status quo (which favors them) rather than to make changes; Rausch et al. (1974) found that men attempt to keep a discussion on a track when it does not upset their feelings or disturb the status quo. Even in the mobilization stage in which wives were seen as dominating, wives noted that husbands were able to exert their control largely through a lack of active engagement. Based on Gramsci's (1971) concept of Ideological Hegemony, Komter (1989) theorized that prevailing everyday thought promotes social cohesion by masking contradictions and allows no real choice. Husbands enjoy the "benefits of marriage" (Allen and Walker 2000, p 16) which provide latent power and which induce no desire to change. Husbands' latent power can be used to prevent issues from being raised, which no doubt explains in part the lack of evidence of overt conflict. As Whisman and Jacobson (1990) noted, power or influence comes not only from talk and persuasion but also from not listening or not responding to what one's partner is saying. In a Marketing context, Lee and Beatty (2002) found somewhat similar results in that for fathers and older children, the use of "gaze" was highly related to their level of relative influence, whereas for mothers and younger children, having their suggestions accepted was more directly linked to their levels of relative influence.

Suppression of conflict

Conflict is not a highly sought goal for most people, especially those in a relationship based on love. We argue that there is much need for work investigating conflict suppression processes in households. One stream of research that has investigated suppression of conflict has dealt with issues of equity or fairness. Although it seems reasonable that satisfaction with the division of labor would be determined by the actual division within the family, research indicates that this expectation is wrong: wives are not necessarily concerned with the total number of hours they spend on household labor, but are dissatisfied with inequality or inequity (Benin and Agostinelli 1988; Mederer 1993; Stohs 1995). Distributive justice theory provides a theoretical basis and empirical evidence for the use of equity, equality, or need as principles of justice in the family (Adams 1965; Deutsch 1975; Greenberg 1983; Peterson 1987; Sampson 1975).

What is equitable might be seen quite differently by family members. For example, in the Ball et al. (1995) study discussed earlier, both husbands and wives may be content with the second phase of the negotiation process because they saw themselves as being more influential. The different emics (of problem focusing in this case) allowed both spouses to be satisfied. Further, what is fair is different for husbands and wives, and the gendered meanings attached to domestic and paid work are important in understanding these differences (Wilkie, Ferree, and Ratcliff 1998). Studies conducted from the perspective of gender ideology indicate that the wife's gender ideology functions as lens through which inequalities in the division of household labor are viewed, and provide evidence that inequalities in the division of household labor are more strongly related to perceptions of unfairness for wives subscribing to an egalitarian sex-role ideology than for traditional wives (DeMaris and Longmore 1996; Greenstein 1996).

Thompson (1991) suggested that, to understand women's sense of fairness, researchers need to consider (a) valued outcomes other than time and tasks, (b) between- and within-gender comparison referents, and (c) gender-specific justifications for men's small contribution to family work. First, Thompson included interpersonal outcomes of family work rather than labor time and tasks as valued outcomes, suggesting that relationship outcomes such as care are more important than task outcomes. This line of reasoning is supported by empirical studies showing that husbands' contributions to "female" tasks and appreciation of women's household labor are very important determinants of wives' perceptions of fairness (Blair and Johnson 1992; Hawkins, Marshall, and Meiners 1995). Hochschild (1989), Kessler and McCrae (1982), Pina and Bengtson (1993), and Ross, Mirowsky, and Huber (1983) suggested that it is the "symbolic meaning" of husbands' willingness to share family work that is important to wives' assessment of fairness, rather than the actual amount of work done. Backett (1987), LaRossa and LaRossa (1981), and Wilkie, Ferree, and Ratcliff (1998) noted that the empathy needed to acknowledge the "pressures" in each others' lives (i.e., not thinking that the other has an easier time) can make the division of domestic labor appear fair to partners, even if they are not sharing work equally.

Second, concerning comparison referents, Thompson (1991) suggested that women make within-gender comparisons when they judge the fairness of family work and also make within-gender comparisons of their husbands' contributions. Van Yperen and Buunk (1991) show that the correlation between referential equity comparisons, which involve the comparison of marital inputs and outcomes mainly with same-sex

others in some reference group, and relationship satisfaction is significantly higher than the correlation between relational equity comparison, which involves the comparison within the relationship, and satisfaction. This indicates that satisfaction with the relationship is influenced to a greater extent by the perception of being better off than same-sex others than by the perception of being equally well off with the partner.

Finally, Thompson (1991) suggests that women experience a strong sense of injustice when they find justifications unacceptable for the reasons and circumstances underlying their husbands' failures to contribute more to family work. Hawkins et al. (1995) found that deciding together how things would be divided is an indicator of wives' perceptions of fairness: when wives reported that the division of family work was something that was worked out together with their husbands, wives also reported the division of labor to be more fair. "Deciding together" was correlated both with more equitable arrangements of family work and with feelings of appreciation, both of which, in turn, were associated with perceptions of fairness.

Other evidence of conflict suppression is apparent in studies of atypical (but functional) families. Commuri (2000) reported evidence of efforts to "normalize" a marriage in the case of couples where the wives earn more than their husbands. Steil and Weltman (1991) found that, even when wives earn more, there is pervasive evidence that both spouses define the man as the primary provider. Rosen (1987) noted that many working class wives realize that their husbands' prides, authority, and manhoods are founded upon being the provider and thus willingly do whatever they can to preserve the image of the husbands as the breadwinners, even though the wives may be earning more than their husbands. One way that couples try to maintain the image of wives as secondary providers is to use husbands' salaries for the essentials and wives' salaries for extras (Commuri 2001). Thus, the managing of financial resources in the households studied by Commuri reveals how some households preserve traditional roles of masculinity and femininity in the household even when the *masculine* role of good provision is played by women.

Future research needs

Households today are in the midst of a myriad of changes in their composition, functions, and form. We argue that issues of gender are central to understanding the changes taking place in households, be it

from a marketing perspective or a broader sociological perspective. Given that our review has dealt with a process that is yet changing, we may be witnessing a transitional period leading to very different gender processes in the households of future generations. At the same time, there are several other issues even of the present that have not received adequate research attention and this section of the paper will discuss a number of gender issues in need of such attention. While we do not claim that they are comprehensive, we do see large gaps between what we now know and what we should know.

The use of a broadened gender perspective

As advocated by Connell (1987) and subsequently by Risman (1998), gender is both constructed and perpetuated at individual, interactional, and institutional planes. Correspondingly, the enactment and enforcement of gender can only be grasped if our research is directed at all three planes. Unfortunately, our discipline is yet in a stage of denial as far as gender is concerned. But for the noteworthy examples such as Hirschman (1993) and Bristor and Fischer (1993), our attention to differences between men and women continue to rest at just that – differences between men and women. We have neither questioned the bases of such differences nor have sought to use a gendered lens to interpret the mostly inconclusive and disparate findings of our investigations among men and women within a household. As Bristor and Fischer (1993) demonstrated, using a gendered lens may help us place our extant findings that have hitherto appeared inconclusive into perspective.

Therefore, a first future research need is to begin acknowledging that many of the differences between men and women that we are picking up in our investigations of consumption and production rituals within a household are neither biologically determined nor inevitable. In fact, it may be no exaggeration to propose that the incidence of sociological differences rather than biological differences is so rampant in our extant findings that it may even be safer to assume that the differences we are capturing are gendered until proven otherwise. Such an acknowledgment should then be followed by efforts to seek an explanation of such observed differences between men and women at the individual (biography, fears, and hopes), interactional (relationship and decision histories, social constructions of norms), and institutional (rewards and sanctions) levels.

Today, we are at a stage where it is acceptable for a researcher not to explain his/her findings about the differences between men and women, however inconclusive they may appear. Therefore, the first research need is not so much of what we should study but how we ought to study what we claim to be studying. The form of the household reviewed here is an experimentalist's dream come true - a unified setting with only one layer of contrasting variable - one man and one woman and everything else constant. Isn't it surprising that under such seemingly clean conditions we discover findings that are anything but conclusive? Not only have man-and-masculine and woman-and-feminine been intermingled as if they are one and the same, but they have also been completely stripped of their history and context. How can we ever aim to understand gendered interactions if we do not study and situate our findings within historical and social contexts within which the behavior of interest is situated? For example, it is one thing to declare that our investigations have revealed what happens when women make substantial financial contributions to their households and another to explain such findings in the context of how women's contributions have been regarded historically, how men with successful wives have felt historically, and how society has rewarded or punished men who are not the primary providers of their families. In other words, differences between men and women that are not biologically inevitable are quite meaningless unless they are explained in the context of a gender complex. Our first research need is to move toward a richer understanding of what we observe rather than merely reporting what an informant indicates in a paper-and-pencil task.

Reaching such an understanding is not impossible. For example, Manchanda and Moore-Shay (1996), using a combination of methods, investigated the types of power strategies used by boys and girls. Boys generally used high power strategies (asking, bargaining) while girls reported more switching from high power to low power strategies (persistence, begging and pleading, anger, etc.). Parents, on the other hand, rated girls as being more likely to use high power strategies than boys. Manchanda and Moore-Shay (1996) acknowledge that parents may be unwilling to admit that their children resort to less desirable strategies such as begging and pleading. At the same time, they also suggest that there may be an institutional explanation (p. 89), "perhaps the messages filtered down through other socialization agents such as the mass media and peers alter the more egalitarian messages parents wish to convey." It is a commentary on and an understanding of such multi-tiered (individual, interactional, and institutional) levels of analysis that will enrich our understanding of the differences we observe between men and women.

Gender socialization

It is also important that we consider gender issues beyond the level of spousal interaction. The dynamic shifts in family and the fuzzy nature of gender in post-modern (Firat 1994) society offer a multitude of interesting research questions that have not been investigated. Risman (1998, p. 133) noted that boys are routinely socialized to learn to work in teams and compete, and that girls are routinely socialized to value nurturing. Crouter, McHale, and Bartko (1993, p. 169) noted that "housework is perhaps the domain of family functions in which ideas about gender roles are played out, debated, or suppressed the most clearly." They found that fathers interacted with sons more than with daughters, especially in single-income households.

At the same time, what is masculine in the household may be changing due to the modified roles faced by boys growing up in single-parent households (and possibly in latchkey dual-income households). Bates and Gentry (1994) found that adolescent children were treated more as equals in single-parent households, and given more household responsibility. Twiggs et al. (1999) hypothesized that men coming from single-parent households are more likely to progress through gendered hierarchies. On the other hand, South and Spitze (1994) found that girls do much more housework than boys, especially in single-parent households. These are interesting changes in and of themselves but what makes them even more interesting is how they will affect the socialization of future generations into one gender or another. This is an area that is emergent and open to investigation.

Study of the "Gender Switch" phenomenon

While more investigation of gender issues concerning the young is needed, so should the gender switch phenomenon observed among the elderly (Dickson 2002; Gottman 1979; Webster and Rice 1996) be studied. The shift in power favoring women among the elderly would seem to be predicted by Resource Theory when only the consequences of the husband's loss of resources is considered. However, as Commuri (2001), Rosen (1987), and Steil and Weltman (1991) offer evidence of "normalization" processes occurring in households where the wife earns more, the failure to find a gender switch phenomenon may be better predicted by ideology. Thus, there appears to have been asymmetry in gendered role

changes in the past as resource generation processes changed: wives have not seen major empowerment in family roles as they have generated greater financial resources, but men apparently see reason to empower their wives as they cease generating tangible resources upon retirement.

More research is needed concerning the playing of gender by elderly couples. If health concerns are major explanators, we would expect the phenomenon to be relatively stable in the future (unless we begin to see men living as long as women). On the other hand, if gender roles become more egalitarian in the post-modern world as predicted by Firat (1994), maybe the phenomenon will cease to be observed in future years. In any case, it has strong implications for decision-making in elderly households.

More focus on process rather than outcome

Much study of gender roles in the family has relied on large-scale secondary data bases involving thousands of households, investigating the division of labor for preparing meals, washing dishes and cleanup, cleaning the house, child care, and shopping. Twiggs et al. (1999) note that most quantitative studies in this area focus on the amount of domestic work done by men and women rather than the kinds of work they do. Focusing on the latter will tell a more complete story of what is considered gender appropriate tasks, whether barriers are being crossed and, perhaps, what trends to expect in the future. Twiggs et al.'s (1999) concept of hierarchical gendered thresholds provides a base for investigating the gendered nature of various tasks. This approach can be augmented by Bearden and Etzel's (1982) notion of public versus private consumption; they found that reference groups (in our context, we would substitute social norms) have far greater influence on public rather than private consumption. This would suggest that a highly visible task such as shopping might involve more difficult transitions for men than a more private task such as doing laundry. There is need for research on the allocations of individual tasks using a gendered lens to interpret the results.

Further, as noted earlier, there is need to look beyond reported behaviors to see who has the planning responsibilities, as that individual may be more likely to be the actual decider and/or purchaser. In addition, the issue of "standards" for domestic tasks needs much more inves-

tigation. Research is needed on how standards get set in the socialization process, how they are negotiated, and the extent to which they are a basis for family conflict versus only a concrete manifestation of a more underlying latent family dynamic.

More emphasis on the husband's perspective

As noted earlier, "egalitarian" couples still have unequal distributions of household responsibilities, but there is evidence that husbands are increasing their parental efforts (Gardyn 2000). More investigation of "peer marriages" (those where partners are social equals, both have careers and share equal responsibility for finances and other decision making, and fathers play greater parenting roles; Schwartz 1998) is needed. Is the "peer" positioning primarily attitudinal, or are we going to see behavioral changes in terms of household roles? We would expect husbands in these arrangements to be pre-disposed to being open-minded and thus more susceptible to egalitarianism. More study is needed to determine which partner has more influence in sustaining traditional gendered relations. The gender perspective (Risman 1998) might predict that the one in power, which in patriarchal societies is the man, would have more interest in sustaining hegemony. The literature dealing with wives earning more than their husbands (Commuri 2001; Rosen 1987; Steil and Weltman 1991) provides evidence that these wives desire "normalcy" and are concerned about maintaining their husbands' "masculinities." Is it possible that the wife believes she is doing a favor for her husband by protecting his manhood when in actuality the man is far removed from such feelings? For example, Fischer (2000, p. 186) noted the deeply embedded feminine role: "The care-giving role in general, and the mothering role in particular, are among the most sanctified across a broad range of collectivities, even those where the notion of the patriarchal nuclear family is not resonant." These issues are not independent of marketing concerns, as household maintenance and production behaviors are so very central to how one plays gender in the family.

Much of the research to date has focused on the wife's attitudes and behaviors, and has implicitly assumed that husbands are content with the status quo. Safilios-Rothschild (1969) criticized the study of family life based primarily on information provided by wives, and labeled the phenomenon "wives' family sociology." This limited perspective of family has also been common in consumer research. More investigation of

male behaviors, attitudes, and roles in the household is needed. Do they actively avoid responsibility (or shared responsibility) for household production? What institutional sanctions do they face if they do gender in non-traditional ways? Is the nature of those sanctions changing? Does the portrayal of men in commercials for household products reflect the current state of the American household (for instance, try to recall a commercial showing a husband cooking a meal in a competent manner)? The husband's household role is changing, but it has received less attention than the wife's role.

Conclusion

This paper has focused on gender issues in consumer family research, with much emphasis being placed on household production concerns. At this point in history, family is a very dynamic construct, due in part to the almost continuous redefinition of gender in society. We conclude that traditional functional gender roles are still observable in non-traditional couples, but question whether this is an equilibrium state.

Clearly, increased levels of research are needed to monitor family decision making and particularly issues of gender that may lead to changes in traditional functional roles. We argue that there is a large gap between what is currently known and what needs to be known in order to market effectively to the dynamic American household.

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A note from the compiler:

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Academic miscellanea: book notices and editorials

9. The structure of an academic book notice

An academic book notice is a description of a book (e.g. monograph or handbook) which has already been published or is going to be published soon. It usually contains a very general description of the content of the book under consideration and may be organized into one or more paragraphs.

Detailed information about the book may contain information on:

- the publisher of the book under scrutiny
- name(s) of the author(s) of the book
- the number of chapters (if the book is a monograph)
- the number of contributions (if the book is a collection of papers)
- the number of pages
- the ISBN number
- the price of the volume (or set of volumes)
- the content of the book notice
- the content of the book under scrutiny (optional)
- name of the author of the book notice (optional).

10. Samples of academic book notices

Sample nr 1

The structure of an academic book notice

RORTY, Richard. (ed.). 1967 *The linguistic turn: recent essays in philosophical method*. With an Introduction by R. Rorty. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. 1967. 24 cm, 393 p., \$ 10.00.

Description of the book:

This book contains 37 selections by 29 persons and 2 discussion groups, arranged under 4 topics; a preface and Introduction by the editor; and a bibliography of 985 entries of writings (mostly) in English on linguistic method in philosophy and related issues, which have appeared (roughly) in the period 1930–1965. (The valuable *Bibliography* by Jerome Neu and R. Rorty includes discussions comparing linguistic and other philosophical methods, and references to other extensive bibliographies; it excludes case studies of the application of linguistic methods. Extensive cross references among bibliographic entries and among selections are provided.) – All selections have appeared in print elsewhere (some translated into English for the first time here; some contain minor revisions), all between 1932 and 1965. Topics and contributors include: « Classic Statements of the Thesis that Philosophical Questions are Questions of Language », Moritz Schlick, Rudolf Carnap (2 selections), Gustav Bergmann, Gilbert Ryle, John Wisdom, Norman Malcolm; « Metaphilosophical Problems of Ideal-Language Philosophy », Irving Copi (2), Bergmann, Max Black, Alice Ambrose Lazerowitx, Roderick Chisholm,

James W. Cornman, Willard v. O. Quine; « Metaphilosophical Problems of Ordinary-Language Philosophy », Chisholm, John Passmore, Grover Maxwell and Herbert Feigl, Manley Thompson, Richard Hare, Paul Henle, Peter Geach, Cornman, J.O. Urmson, Stuart Hampshire, Urmson and G. Warnock, Stanley Cavell, Stuart Hampshire; « Recapitulations, Reconsiderations, and Future Prospects », Dudley Shapere, Hampshire, Urmson, the Royaumont Colloquium (2), P.F. Strawson, Black, Jerrold J. Katz, Yehoshua Bar-Hillel. The introductory essay (the longest selection in the book) starts with an insightful comparison of various other revolutions in philosophy with that of « linguistic philosophy » – the view that philosophical problems may be (dis)solved either by reforming present language, or by understanding it better. He then discusses some of the attempts to justify this view, examines the claimed presuppositionless character of linguistic philosophy, mediates the internecine battles of the ordinary and ideal language camps, and prognosticates the future of philosophy subsequent to its present linguistic turnings. – This collection and bibliography should prove useful not only for the sophisticated follower of linguistic philosophy but especially for those whose acquaintance with the discipline is solely through the tawdry jokes and shallow asides of its more contemptuous critics.

A note from the compiler:

This book notice was originally published by Richard Thompson Hull in *Bibliography of Philosophy* 17.28. 18. 1970.

Sample nr 2

The structure of an academic book notice

Loritz, Donald. *How the brain evolved language*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 019511874X, hardback, 240 pages. 91 figures. Price: \$ 50,00.

Description of the book

How can an infinite number of sentences be generated from one human mind? How did language evolve in apes? In this book Donald Loritz addresses these and other fundamental and vexing questions about language, cognition, and the human brain. He starts by tracing how evolution and natural adaptation selected certain features of the brain to perform communication functions, then shows how those features developed into designs for human language. The result -- what Loritz calls an *adaptive grammar* -- gives a unified explanation of language in the brain and contradicts directly (and controversially) the theory of innateness proposed by, among others, Chomsky and Pinker.

„This volume convinces me that its subject matter is an important area for cooperative interdisciplinary research efforts, which have enormous possibilities for future breakthroughs in fields such as speech and language pathology and communicative disorders.” --*Notes on Linguistics*

„*How the brain evolved language* is written in an engagingly chatty style that aids comprehension of the highly technical matter that it covers. Anyone interested in how connectionism might be applied to diverse aspects of language, ranging from phonemic distinctiveness to the particle movement construction, will find the book very useful.” --*Book Notices*

A note from the compiler:

Donald Loritz is an *Associate Professor of Computational Linguistics, Georgetown University, Washington, D.C.*

Sample nr 3

The structure of an academic book notice

Calbris, Geneviève. 2003. *L'expression gestuelle de la pensée d'un home politique*. (The gestural expression of the thought of a political figure). Paris: CNRS Éditions.

Description of the book

The purpose of this book is to analyze the role of gestures in the conceptualization and in the expression of abstract notions in discourse, using the empirical studying of six TV talks with Lionel Jospin. From this particular case, the author makes general theoretical assumptions on the essential role of the body in thought and speech in the direct line of work of Lakoff and Johnson's works. She also proposes methodological principles in order to describe gestures (in particular hand gestures) and their effects in combination with the verbal component of discourse. Finally, she portrays this politician, as he appears through the prism of his own gestural features.

A note from the compiler:

This book notice was retrieved from the Internet.

Sample nr 4

The structure of an academic book notice

ROTH, Eric Abella. (ed.). 2005. *Culture, biology, and anthropological demography*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Series: *New perspectives on anthropological and social demography*. ISBN-10: 0521809053. 232 pages. £ 40.00

Description of the book

Two distinctive approaches to the study of human demography exist within anthropology today: anthropological demography and human evolutionary ecology. The first stresses the role of culture in determining population parameters, while the second posits that demographic rates reflect adaptive behaviours that are the products of natural selection. Both sub-disciplines have achieved notable successes, but each has ignored and been actively disdainful of the other. This text attempts a rapprochement of anthropological demography and human evolutionary ecology through recognition of common research topics and the construction of a broad theoretical framework incorporating both cultural and biological motivation. Both these approaches are utilized to search for demographic strategies in varied cultural and temporal contexts ranging from African pastoralists through North American post-industrial societies. As such, this book is relevant to cultural and biological anthropologists, demographers, sociologists, and historians.

A note from the compiler:

This book was retrieved from the Internet.

Sample nr 5

The structure of an academic book notice

Volkan, Vamik D., Norman Itzkowitz and Andrew W. Dod. 1999. *Richard Nixon: a psycho-biography*. New York: Columbia University Press. 208 pages. £ 14.00

Description of the book

Despite an abundance of literature on Richard Nixon, the man behind one of the most spectacular crash-and-burn careers in modern political history has remained an enigma. Twenty-five years after Watergate, America still does not understand what motivated this ambitious, yet ultimately self-destructive man. "In trying to be greater than everyone else, Nixon stomped where he should have stepped. In aspiring to be the Lincolnesque 'healer' of this century, he became its greater divider. In seeking to do right, he did wrong. Only with psychoanalytic insight can we grasp why a powerful president can destroy himself when there is no need to do so". So write the authors of this book, the first detailed psychoanalytic portrait of the 37th President of the United States of America.

A note from the compiler:

This book notice was retrieved from the Internet.

Sample nr 6

The structure of an academic book notice

Zalidis, Sotiris. 2001. *A general practitioner, his patients and their feelings: exploring the emotions behind physical symptoms*. London: Free Association Books. 245 pages.

Description of the book

The recent explosion of knowledge in the fields of neurobiology, psychology and genetics has made it no longer helpful to discuss whether or not a particular illness is psychosomatic. It is much more helpful to use the term psychosomatic attitude to refer to an approach that pays attention to possible interactions of psychological, social and biological factors in all patients whatever symptom or disorder they may be suffering from. Recent research has demonstrated that contrasting the irrationality of emotions to the rationality of reasoning and decision making is no longer tenable. Emotions are seen as an integral part of the reasoning machinery of the brain. Damage to parts of the brain that process emotion leads to flawed reasoning. Emotions are a striking and omnipresent feature of human experience. Although they are rooted in biology and clearly discernible in the behaviour of many other animals, we humans know our emotions best through our subjective feelings. Emotions are simultaneously somatic and psychological and therefore bridge the psyche-soma divide and are a valuable information system necessary for survival. The author, an experienced general practitioner, presents case histories to show how his psychosomatic attitude has helped to improve these patients' illnesses. His approach has been influenced by the work of Balint, Winnicott and emotion theorists such as Henry Krystal and Graeme Taylor.

A note from the compiler:

This book notice was retrieved from the Internet.

Sample nr 7

The structure of an academic book notice

Rose, Jim. 2002. *Working with young people in secure accommodation: from chaos to culture*. Hove: Brunner-Routledge. 204 pages.

Description of the book

Locking up young people in secure units is a contentious issue which attracts a great deal of public attention and interest, and a broad range of views. This book examines the function of these units and offers a balanced insight into the challenges presented to society by young offenders. The book explores the work of staff in all types of secure unit with young people. The relationships formed in this setting are key for determining to what extent staff achieve their objective of reducing offending by young people. Using extensive case studies, the book covers the underlying problems of each offender; how staff can identify and deal with potential problems as early as possible; professional issues for management and staff; practical suggestions for simple reforms which could dramatically reduce the rate of re-offending.

A note from the compiler:

This book notice was retrieved from the Internet.

Sample nr 8

The structure of an academic book notice

Niedecken, Dietmut. 2003. *Nameless: understanding learning disability*. Hove: Brunner-Routledge. 250 pages.

Description of the book

Psychoanalysis has always striven to reconstruct damaged human subjectivity. However, with a few exceptions, people with learning disabilities have long been excluded from this enterprise as a matter of course. It has been taken for granted that learning disability is a deficient state in which psychodynamics play but a minor role and where development is irrevocably determined by organic conditions. First published in Germany in the 1980s, this book was one of the first to attempt to understand learning disabilities in terms of psychoanalysis and sociopsychology. Rather than distinguishing between a primary organic handicap and a secondary psychological one, the author argues that it is developed from the very outset of socialization during the interaction of caregiver and infant, and therefore gives the analyst room to work on this maladapted socialization.

A note from the compiler:

This book notice was retrieved from the Internet.

Sample nr 9

The structure of an academic book notice

Heinemann, Evelyn. 1998. *Hexen und Hexenangst. Eine psychoanalytische Studie des Hexenwahns der frühen Neuzeit*. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht. Also published in English. 2000. *Witches: a psychoanalytical exploration of the killing of women*. London: Free Association Books. 163 pages.

Description of the book

In this disturbing study the author argues that the naming and persecution of women as witches in the 16th and 17th centuries resulted from the powerful unresolved unconscious psychic conflicts of their persecutors. The accusation of witchcraft and the merciless and sadistic killing of innocent women which ensued emanated from an attempt to resolve this conflict through splitting and projective identification. The historical and social contexts in which trials took place are examined for evidence of how attitudes and beliefs of the time came to play their part in the extraordinary development of this persecutory phenomenon. Arguing that Freud and others were seriously mistaken in their understanding of these events, Evelyn Heinemann asserts that the witch phenomenon is an example of the potential for destructiveness by the human imagination and shows the necessity of understanding unconscious processes in social phenomena today. It becomes clear that the dark forces and processes identifiable in the past continue to find expression in the demonization and persecution of men and women today.

A note from the compiler:

This book notice was retrieved from the Internet.

Sample nr 10

The structure of an academic book notice

Kohon, Gregorio. (ed.). 1999. *The dead mother: work of André Green*. London: Routledge. 229 pages. £ 18.99

Description of the book

This book brings together original essays in honour of André Green. Written by distinguished psychoanalysts, the collection develops the theme of his most famous paper of the same title, and describes the value of relating the concept of the dead mother to other areas of clinical interest: psychic reality, borderline phenomena, passions, and identifications.

The concept of the 'dead mother' describes a clinical phenomenon, sometimes difficult to identify, but always present in a substantial number of patients. It describes a process by which the image of a living and loving mother is transformed into a distant figure: a toneless, practically inanimate, dead parent. In reality, the mother remains alive, but she has psychically 'died' for the child. This produces a depression in the child, who carries these feelings within him or her into adult life, as the experience of the loss of the mother's love is followed by the loss of meaning in life. Nothing makes sense any more for the child, but life seems to continue under the appearance of normality.

The dead mother provides a valuable contribution to literature on psychoanalysis and psychotherapeutic approaches to grief, loss and depression.

A note from the compiler:

This book notice was retrieved from the Internet.

11. The structure of an editorial

An editorial in English is a brief introduction to a scholarly journal which is aimed at expressing the opinion, policy and preferences of the journal's editor(s). It usually has a rigid structure and contains a number of parts, such as the following:

- title of the editorial (optional)
- a motto (optional)
- a brief general introduction
- the editorial proper (organized into paragraphs)
- quotations (optional)
- final conclusions
- name(s) of the author(s) of the editorial
- their academic affiliations
- selected bibliography (or references; both are optional).

12. Samples of editorials

Sample nr 1

The structure of an editorial

Title of the editorial

“People on the move: global contexts for language awareness”

A brief general introduction

Contemporary discussions of many of the issues raised around ‘globalisation’ often lead us to ask ourselves what exactly is new about it. Aren’t many of the things that get talked about under this rubric things that have, in essence at least, been around for centuries? And, if so, what is so different about globalization itself?

The editorial proper

The papers in this issue, for example, are on the topics of tourism and diasporic communities. (‘People on the Move’ is a phrase borrowed from Held *et al.* (1999), and is one which can incorporate both these topics.) Can we seriously claim that tourism and diasporas are entirely new phenomena that have suddenly surfaced in our contemporary ‘globalised world’? There are accounts of Romans travelling to visit historical sites in Greece and to gaze at re-enactments of Spartan rituals, for example. And there is a long historical list of significant population movements even going back to migrations out of Africa some 80,000 years ago (according

to the 'Real Eve Theory') and to the Mongol waves of conquest and migration in the 12th to 14th centuries, for instance.

So one can argue that globalization at least includes a number of processes that are not themselves new at all, and which, at different times historically, have taken on different forms and have occurred to varying degrees. Held, McGrew, Goldblatt and Perraton (1999) have usefully identified a number of dimensions that help us to make comparisons and distinctions between different historical periods. These cannot all be considered in depth here. But if we take tourism, for example, it can be said that modern tourism has comparatively high *extensivity* in the sense that it has a relatively broad reach. International tourists themselves are more numerous and from a range of social strata. Increasing ease of international travel, along with diminishing costs, has also facilitated tourist destinations stretching into more parts of the globe. (This extensivity is uneven, nevertheless, with the major share of international tourism since the 1960s being between and within Europe and North America.) Contemporary tourism is also high in *intensivity* in that there is a greater magnitude of interconnectedness and flows of people. For the time around 1950, the approximate number of international tourists has been estimated at just over 25million, with tourist expenditure at around \$2 billion (Held *et al.*, 1999: 361). By 1995, these figures had increased to around 560 million tourists, spending over \$380 billion a year. There is also greater *velocity* than before. Amongst other things, the development of passenger air travel in the second half of the last century has made it possible for people to arrive at a destination thousands of miles away in a matter of hours. One can also point to a considerably developed organisation, in terms of *infrastructure* and *institutions*, around tourism, mediating, influencing, regulating and even promoting the flows and connectivity and capacity. Again, technology is crucial in this and inevitably stamps tourism with a contemporary character. In the last half-century, the development and rapid spread of television, the internet, mobile telephone technology etc. has created a powerful electronic infrastructure. Flights and hotel accommodation, for example, can be booked and paid for over the web. And in terms of organizational development, even those of us who prefer relatively independent travel cannot realistically do so without at least some involvement with the many business organisations that arrange travel and tourism.

From the deepening enmeshment arising from growing extensivity, intensivity and velocity, *impacts* also need to be considered. In the case of contemporary tourism, for example, we are only too aware of a variety of

impacts. Not least, we are mindful of the potential and real consequences of the economic and cultural effects that tourism can have. Within the infrastructure around contemporary tourism can be included television programmes about holidays and destinations. On the one hand, these doubtless have some effect on people's choices of destinations, and this is undoubtedly how they would perceive one of their primary functions. In addition, though, they are arguably impacting on people's wider impressions of places, people and cultures.

Jaworski, Thurlow, Lawson and Ylännö-McEwen, exploring this tourism side of globalisation, examine how one aspect of destination culture – local languages – are represented in holiday programmes made for television viewers in Britain. The use of local languages, they find, is mainly divisible into the categories of expert talk, phatic communion, service encounter talk and naming. Rather than serving any crucial communicative need in the programmes, their use is seen as adding to the entertainment value. The authors see the use of local languages in these programmes as elements of a somewhat reduced landscape presented for tourists, and referred to here as components of 'linguascaping'. A relational function is also proposed, through the application of Rampton's (1995) notion of 'crossing'. The presenters' use of local languages is seen as constituting a playful (but only playful) embrace of local identity, or 'as if' moments, never truly claiming a new identity. (Compare with the identity issues considered in the paper by Wray *et al.* in this issue.) The authors claim that the inclusion of such languages as part of the backdrop, along with their ludic use, constitutes a devaluing, and also something of an appropriation as they are shown to be utilisable in the pursuit of cosmopolitan and international British tourist identities. On the basis of this British media data, one is tempted to speculate on the most likely effects (if any) of such media portrayal. Many readers of this journal will be familiar with the disappointing record of achievement in foreign language learning in Britain. Social identity issues aside, one can wonder whether such programmes, through their emphasis on the ludic and enjoyment side of foreign language use, might encourage people to feel that committing time and effort to learning foreign languages brings satisfying rewards. Or are such programmes more likely to reinforce the view that one can generally manage perfectly well with English, and that learning foreign languages should take low priority?

The transformation in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union (FSU), and its subsequent interconnection with the economic system generally associated with modern globalisation, was one of the most sig-

nificant events of the late 20th century. As Giddens (1999) notes, it meant that no significant group of countries any longer stood outside globalisation. Within Europe, the collapse of Soviet communism has been felt in many ways, not only in the expansion of origins, destinations and numbers of people on the move, but also concerning the size, composition and direction of the European Union. Most significantly for this special issue, though, it precipitated a large-scale migration of people from the FSU to Israel. In terms of the time taken for this mass migration, it can reasonably be assessed in terms of high velocity.

In their paper, Yelenevskaya and Fialkova put this migration at over 835,000 people over the ten years from 1989. Given that Israel's population in 1988 was below 4.5 million, one soon grasps the magnitude of such a sudden arrival, and the potential for cultural and linguistic impact. The viability of a national language policy may come into question when confronted with the presence of another language group with such high ethnolinguistic vitality both within and outside Israel. The infrastructures of international transport and telecommunications can offer more possibilities for social networking bridging the community within Israel with the FSU community outside, with concomitant further potential for maintaining ethnolinguistic vitality. The authors report on a sample of interviews with recent migrants from the FSU and look for ways in which they reveal instrumental and symbolic orientations to language and languages, how pre-migration experiences can affect linguistic choices in the new country, and what values they attribute to the languages in their new environment. Attitudes and choices are made more complex by a strong (and by no means uncontroversial) feature of the linguistic infrastructure of contemporary globalisation – the position of English. It is interesting that some new migrants find themselves in an environment where they do not feel limited to selecting Hebrew or Yiddish to add to their mother tongue, but feel they have more to gain from adding English instead.

Much 20th and 21st century discussion of diasporas, in the West at least, has tended to give most attention to those of the 18th, 19th and early 20th centuries, and in particular the slave trade from Africa to the Americas and Caribbean, and also the large-scale migrations from Europe to North and South America, Australia and New Zealand. Wray, Evans, Coupland and Bishop focus on one such community – the Welsh in North America. The authors take their data from students at a Welsh college in the USA – students who are singers in the college's Welsh choir, and who were indeed visiting and performing in Wales on the

occasion of some of the data collection. Here, then, some of the cultural inheritors of 'people on the move' in an earlier diasporic migration become 'people on the move' benefiting from the velocity, extensivity and infrastructure of contemporary tourism and travel, as well as from the increased and faster flow of information and knowledge that global technology makes available.

In his writings on globalisation, Giddens (e.g. 1991) emphasizes how, in this period of late modernity, people are increasingly likely to create their own self-identity. The 'self' becomes a reflexive project, as people are less likely to be making predetermined transitions from one life-stage to another, passed down from one generation to the next. Because social change in late modernity is continual and rapid, identity takes on a more mobile nature that we ourselves consciously work on, as we make and remake ourselves. Wray *et al.* set out their own tri-partite model of social identification, comprising knowledge, practice and subjectivity. It is through these aspects – the building of knowledge about social groups, the engagement in identity in practical ways, and the growth of affiliative feelings for an identity – that we are able to develop our personal profiles of social identity. From their data, the authors set out a theory of 'turfin'g'. The metaphor relates to the technique of establishing new lawns by laying thin strips of turf with pre-sown grass, and then waiting for the grass to grow deeper roots into the soil. Globalisation, by opening us to a wider range of potential social identities, by making the development of self-identity a project, facilitates, as the authors say, more complex and multi-layered social identification. Although it is usually wise not to try to extend metaphors too far as we pursue better understanding, 'turfin'g' would appear at this moment to be a useful metaphor as we pursue theories of social identification in this epoch of globalisation. 'Turfin'g' and the authors' model of social identification may be of considerable value to those engaged in the study of the motivational aspects of second (and additional) language acquisition.

Final conclusions

There is a growing literature on how late modern globalisation is affecting our cultural and linguistic lives. In this journal, for example, Kristiansen's (2001) special issue considered representations of standard language varieties in late modernity, and Fairclough (1999) has argued for educational programmes in critical discourse awareness to give better

preparation for life in knowledge based economies, for pursuing new social identities, and for resisting organizational incursions into our everyday lives.. The three papers in this issue draw our attention to some further important issues and contexts arising from the added interconnectivity, velocity of flows, and the social and organisational changes that we see around us. Amongst these issues, and in different ways, each of these papers involves some consideration of language, attitudes and social identification. And in each paper, and again in different ways, we see how language can play an important role in social identity. Late modernity continues to present us with, and demand from us, new questions and perspectives, often requiring us to revisit our existing assumptions and theories. Language awareness has a critical role to play in this project.

The author of the editorial and his academic affiliation

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A note from the compiler:

This editorial was originally published in *Language Awareness* 12.1. 2003. 1–4.

Sample nr 2

The structure of an editorial

A motto

There is no single moment within the social process devoid of the capacity for transformative activity – a new imaginary; a new discourse arising out of some peculiar hybrid of others; new rituals or institutional configurations; new modes of social relating; new material practices and bodily experiences; new political power relations arising out of their internalized contradictions. Each and every one of these moments is full to the brim with transformative potentialities.

(HARVEY, 1997: 105)

A brief general introduction

Harvey's concept of 'transformative potentialities' resonates well with the aspirations of our journal. Several scholars in the field of language and intercultural communication have invoked the term 'transformation' to describe the shift in perceptions and behaviour that can occur as a result of meeting new experiences. Under favourable conditions, transformation is a productive and life-enhancing process. Kafka's *Metamorphosis*, Ovid's *Metamorphoses* and even the Harry Potter novels offer reminders that in different circumstances, transformation can also produce monsters. Even in the best of cases, the subtle dialectic of sameness and otherness lends an undertone of risk to any transformative enterprise. But then, it is also an illusion to believe that there is any safe haven entirely sheltered from change.

Favourable conditions for beneficial transformation may be spontaneous and unplanned, for example, springing from extended exposure to a different culture or a chance encounter with a particular individual or text. The business of this journal is to consider how the conditions for beneficial transformation might be actively fostered, for example by planned integration into teaching strategies or training programmes, carefully constructed and closely monitored. Already, more than one contribution to the journal has described strategies which include ongoing reflection, critical ethnographic practices, and the development of new ways of looking at one's own cultural assumptions and of exploring

difference. Key to these explorations is the commitment of empathy: the willingness to engage with the language and cultural knowledge of one's interlocutors from other cultural backgrounds. We recognise that complexity, ambiguities and inherent contradictions are likely to emerge in such studies.

In encouraging the developing discourse of transformation, we recognise the risks. In particular, it is important to avoid romanticising academic work in simplistic political and ethical terms. We hope that critical stringency will help to avoid this pitfall. For example, scholars in language and intercultural communication have reminded us of the disequilibrium, what Robert Young (1996) has called 'ideological distortions', which can be created when the power relationship between the interlocutors is not one of 'equals'. This journal, in hoping to address a wide international readership, acknowledges this imbalance. In responding to it, we hope to avoid both naive unworldliness and political manipulation.

Initial reactions to the first issue of *Language and Intercultural Communication* have been welcoming, and we are grateful for the constructive comments that some readers have already offered. Several have commended the range of authorship represented in the first issue and we very much intend this to continue. We have set high standards in our reviewing processes, which we believe are reflected in the quality of the articles published. At the same time, we are firmly resistant to the dangers of homogenising thought or imposing an orthodox discourse. Our desire is that the journal should contribute different points of views, rather than merely endorsing the mainstream thought on any subject. To take any other stance would in any case be counter-productive in the evolution of a new disciplinary area, which must be open to ideas from many quarters and strive to create new ways of looking at things and new forms of expression.

Issues of language and terminology will certainly be a major preoccupation. We look forward to more contributions examining the implications for our disciplinary area of problematic concepts such as 'power', 'ethics', 'competence' and 'transformation'. One reviewer, for example, has suggested that the journal needs to develop 'critical, hermeneutic work ... on the terminology of "third space" and "between", tracing the uses of the different terms in various intercultural print languages and drawing on the scholarship that has been done in a variety of languages so that the concepts can be put through their paces'. This is an invigorating challenge, and we anticipate considerable focus in our pages on the evolution of appropriate concepts and forms of discourse. At the same

time, these theoretical questions must also stand the test of practice, and we therefore look forward to more contributions showing how particular concepts succeed in enabling us to reach a greater understanding of real world processes. In particular, addressing our role as educators as well as scholars, we shall welcome reflections on how new ideas, or new combinations or new applications of ideas, can be productively incorporated into effective teaching strategies.

Though our work has a clear academic focus, we are also conscious of political realities, which often give a particularly sharp focus to the importance of intercultural communication. Robert Young has made the point forcefully:

While people from more cultures are communicating and cooperating across differences, as many, it seems, are killing and maiming each other in the name of cultural and religious identity. At the same time, still virulent remnants of the forces of 19th and 20th century imperialism are at work among nations. The dilemma of the global age is that, while we have finally discovered that we are one people who must share one precarious world, we are profoundly divided by race, culture and belief and we have yet to find a tongue in which we can speak our humanity to each other. (Young, 1996: 2)

This comment resonates with any number of recent and current international issues, including the recent Genoa summit, the Palestinian/Israeli conflict, or the worldwide crisis of refugees and asylum seekers. Referring to the mutual recognition of problems and the differences underlying them as the 'intercultural communication context', Young connects the 'real world' with the study of intercultural communications. And while we need to draw a clear line between the focus of academic study and those political issues which surround us, we need also to maintain a balance in recognising the intimate links between the two domains.

In seeking to refine and develop forms of discourse and specific concepts, we have again been reminded that the words we use offer both potentiality and constraints. Our publishers have recently announced that they are giving dramatically reduced subscriptions for print versions of their journals, and free electronic access, to countries defined as 'low' or 'medium development countries' by the Human Development Index. Their aim in doing this is to enable academics in all parts of the world to realise their full potential as equal members of the international academic community, a goal with which we wish to associate ourselves. However, some of us may bridle at the terms 'low' and 'medium development', as

suggesting an objective hierarchy of countries, based primarily on economic indicators, with little regard for ancient civilisations and historic achievement, let alone linguistic and cultural specificity. Recent decades have seen a succession of different terms used to describe the industrially developed countries in comparison with the rest of the world. Each term has, in turn, been abandoned and replaced, as the implications of its discursive context have been identified and challenged. For the most part, these terms are invented by those with the superior economic power, and their sociopolitical connotations creep just as much into the world of academic scholarship as anywhere else. Such considerations provide an even greater imperative for the thrust of our research and teaching strategies, create an undeniable ethical backdrop to our explorations, and point to the greater need for 'transformative potentialities'.

The first article in this issue provides just such an opportunity. Crawshaw's contribution provides insights into the development in one individual of an intercultural self. It provides a valuable contribution to our discourse by exploring the articulatory processes and discursive positioning that takes place when a young man moves from his home environment to live in two different locations overseas and then returns home. The authenticity of this account draws its strength from the detail of the young man's use of reading, writing and translation as a form of rehearsal for the 'intercultural stage'. The issue of translation, in particular, will certainly be an ongoing focus of this journal. Sharifian's paper in this issue explores the complexity of intercultural communication between Australian aborigines and the dominant class of white Australians. It is a rich case study which describes how linguistic difference can mask a range of narrative forms as well as cultural assumptions. Li Wei, Zhu Hua and Li Yue write about conversational management and 'involvement' in Chinese-British business talk; their work draws useful connections between academic study and the pragmatic world of commerce.

The final section of this issue comprises a significant collection of reviews of recent books and other publications. The reviews included come from an international body of reviewers and draw attention to the growing number of texts coming out of a range of academic disciplines with relevance to our own evolving discourse. We encourage readers to propose reviews of recently published texts that they come across which they think will be of interest to others and we hope that this will encourage a dialogue with and between readers. We also invite readers to comment to the Editors on the journal overall and to make suggestions

about the paths open to us. In these ways we hope to offer opportunities through the pages of this journal for our own richly diverse 'transformational potentialities'.

Final conclusions

We have recently been reminded of a striking example of one person's transformative experience, that of Donald Woods, the South African anti-apartheid activist and journalist, whose death in August 2001 stirred memories of his key role in alerting the Western world to the horrors of apartheid. He exposed the murder of Steve Biko in police custody, as a result of which he was kept under house arrest, and eventually forced to flee with his family from his home country. When asked to explain his shift from the traditional viewpoint of white South Africans of the time to the politically active stance he later adopted, he described the experience of meeting Steve Biko as the turning point in his life, and spoke of how he felt he had never known his own country before that moment. Building on this experience, Woods became a tireless campaigner for understanding between different peoples. He was involved with a school of journalism for black journalists to give them a voice in the South African press, and in recent years worked as a human rights consultant among the people of Northern Ireland, the Aborigines of Australia, and the people of the Basque region. A lifelong speaker of Xhosa, the language of the Eastern Cape, he knew instinctively how important it was to learn the language of those people with whom he was working towards reconciliation, in order to have insight into their motives and aspirations. In concluding this editorial to the second issue of our journal, we pay tribute to his example as an intercultural self.

Alice Tomic and Michael Kelly

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A note from the compiler:

This editorial was originally published in *Language and Intercultural Communication* Vol. 1.2. 2001. 97-100.

13. Some useful tips on formal academic (M.A.) writing

„Short words are the best, and short words when old are best of all“

(WINSTON CHURCHILL)

General:

1. Keep track of your academic progress while working on your thesis.
2. Always ask the tutor (supervisor) for help as needed.
3. Take full responsibility for your thesis.
4. Enjoy the subject matter.

Specific:

I. A major warning concerning plagiarism:

Plagiarism is considered to be an act of theft (!) and as such it is condemned in the academic community as a form of crime committed against professional honesty. Plagiarism includes:

- *direct copying another author's sentences word for word, also tables and diagrams, without acknowledging the source of information,*
- *borrowing another author's ideas without giving proper credit to the original author,*
- *paraphrasing another author's text without giving proper credit to the original author.*

Students should be aware of the sanctions which may be imposed on any person found guilty of plagiarizing the work of others. The penalties include:

- *rejecting a piece of a student's written work by the tutor (the supervisor),*

- *failure to receive credit for the semester or the entire academic year,*
- *forwarding the case of attested plagiarism to the University student disciplinary committee in order for an interrogation to be started and, in the case the student is found guilty of the act of plagiarism, a penalty to be imposed on the student by the Rector of the University or Dean of the Faculty (upon the committee's recommendation),*
- *denial of the professional title (e.g. Licencjat or Magister) that has already been earned by a graduate as the most severe penalty.*

II. Some principles of composition in academic writing:

1. Subject matter:

- a. carefully choose the subject matter of your thesis,*
- b. discuss it with your tutor,*
- c. obtain the tutor's acceptance of the subject of your thesis (note: it is obligatory).*

2. Structure:

- a. organize the thesis into chapters and subchapters,*
- b. make the paragraph the unit of text composition,*
- c. briefly conclude each chapter,*
- d. make a necessary liaison to the next chapter,*
- e. conclude the thesis with 'final conclusions' as a separate chapter,*
- f. include the bibliography immediately after the bulk of the text of the thesis,*
- g. include the appendix at the end of the thesis,*
- h. if necessary, include an English or Polish summary of the thesis.*

3. Language:

- a. Be precise:*
 - *choose the right words,*
 - *choose the right terms.*
- b. Be clear and concise:*
 - *avoid unnecessary complexity of your sentences,*
 - *avoid ambiguity,*
 - *eliminate redundancies.*
- c. Be forthright:*
 - *sound sure of your findings and of your stance,*
 - *choose strong nouns and verbs.*

d. Be familiar:

- *avoid unfamiliar terms,*
- *define unfamiliar terms,*
- *use examples illustrating your point.*

e. Be fluid:

- *vary sentence structure to avoid tame and colourless language,*
- *eliminate logical and stylistic discontinuities.*

4. Materials:

- *carefully prepare an extensive bibliography relating to the subject matter of the thesis which comprises the most significant materials (such as monographs, articles, reviews, etc.),*
- *carefully choose quotations,*
- *choose tables,*
- *choose figures.*

5. Technicalities:

a. select quotations which can provide the following:

- *they develop a clear step in your argumentation,*
- *they present a memorable phrasing,*
- *they provide a strong illustrative example,*
- *they summarize an author's main points most lucidly.*

b. paraphrase rather than quote:

definition: paraphrasing is the rewriting of an author's original text in your own words and is a good exercise in text rendition.

Remember: when paraphrasing:

- *you must rewrite the original language,*
- *you must change the original sentence structure.*

c. organize additional materials (questionnaires, protocols, etc.) into a separate section entitled 'Appendices' and include it at the end of the thesis.

d. write the first draft of the thesis,

e. before finishing off the text, revise it carefully a number of times,

f. finish off the text and present it to the supervisor for additional comments,

g. once the text has been edited and finally accepted, make a copy of it on an electronic means (hard drive, CD, DVD, pendrive, etc.).

14. A list of useful sentence connectives

A connective is a word or phrase which is used to connect words, phrases, clauses, and sentences to increase and secure the overall cohesion of a text. The following connectives are distinguished:

1. Connectives which are used in order to indicate **order** (they are followed by a comma. Example: *Finally, it should be stated that...*):
 - above all,
 - finally,
 - first,
 - in conclusion,
 - in spite of all,
 - next,
 - on second thoughts,
 - secondly,
 - to begin with.
2. Connectives which are used in order to **add** some information:
 - again,
 - also,
 - and,
 - besides,
 - equally,
 - further,
 - furthermore,
 - in addition,
 - in the same manner,
 - in the same way,
 - likewise,
 - little by little,
 - moreover,
 - similarly.

3. Connectives which are used in order to **reformulate** a previous statement:
a better way of putting it is
in other words,
it would be (perhaps) better to say (that)
that is to say
that means.
4. Connectives which are used in order to express **inference** (from something):
as to, as for
in other words,
in that case
otherwise
referring to
the former
the latter
with regard to.
5. Connectives which are used in order to make **comparisons**:
as...as
as well
both
but while the first (the second, etc.)
equally
likewise
similarly
whereas the former (the latter).
6. Connectives which are used in order to express **reason and purpose**:
as
because
because of
consequently,
for this (that) reason
hence
on account of
since
so
so that
that is why
therefore.

7. Connectives which are used in order to express a **consequence** or **a conclusion**:
accordingly,
as a result,
at any rate
consequently,
hence
in any case
it follows (from) that
thus.
8. Connectives which are used in order to express **concession**:
even if
even though
though, although.
9. Connectives which are used in order to express **condition**:
if
in case that
on the condition that
provided that
suppose that
unless.
10. Connectives which are used in order to express **time**:
after
afterwards
as long as
as soon as
as time goes on
at length
at the same time
before
eventually
for the first time
from now on
initially
in the end
lately
many a time
meanwhile
momentarily
more than once

no sooner than
now
often
previously
recently
since
subsequently
time and again
when
while.

11. Connectives which are used in order to express an **opposing** or **limiting** statement:

apart from
but
except for
however
in spite of all, despite
inspite of the fact
instead
maybe
nevertheless
nonetheless
on the contrary
on the one hand
on the other hand
otherwise
still
yet.

A note from the compiler:

This information is based on the material published in the Internet at: www.english-on-the-web.de/vconnect.htm

15. Some useful sources on formal academic writing

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